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An Invincible Fleet and a Flawed Plan: The Japanese at Midway

Note: This is the first of a series of articles coming over the next few days about the Battle of Midway, a major turning point of the Second World War.

The Battleship Yamato, Flagship of the Combined Fleet and symbol of Japanese Naval Power

The Imperial Japanese Navy under the command of Admiral Isoruku Yamamoto had been humiliated. On April 18th 1942 16 B-25 bombers under the command of Colonel Jimmy Doolittle were launched from the deck of the USS Hornet and bombed Tokyo.  Though the physical damage was insignificant the psychological impact was massive on the Japanese military establishment. Yamamoto and his deputy Rear Admiral Matome Ugaki had explored the possibility of attacking Midway in the early months of 1942 as the Japanese armed forces competed with each other to determine an overall strategy for the war effort. The Army was insistent on a China strategy while the Navy preferred expansion in the Western, South and Central Pacific.  Yamamoto’s idea envisioned seizing Midway and using it as a forward base from which an invasion of Hawaii could be mounted as well as the bait to draw the carrier task forces of the U.S. Navy into battle and destroy them.

Admiral Isoruku Yamamoto, CinC Combined Fleet

The Japanese certainly had the forces to accomplish the mission outnumbering the U.S. Navy which had taken heavy losses at Pearl Harbor and in the Far East.  Following the Doolittle raid Yamamoto went ahead with the plan to invade Midway. The operation, named MI was coupled with an invasion of the islands of Attu and Kiska in the Aleutians which would form a picket line to prevent future attacks on the Japanese mainland. Fuchida

Yamamoto’s plan was not without its critics, the majority of the Staf of the First Air Fleet embarked on the First Carrier Striking Force was not in favor including the leader of the Pearl Harbor attack Commander Mitsuo Fuchida who considered it “grammar school strategy.”   Despite objections from them as well as his Fleet Operations Officer Yamamoto directed that the plan be implemented.  The plan was to have the First Carrier Striking Force attack Midway and reduce its defenses so that the Invasion Force could undertake the task of invading and occupying Midway.  Supporting these forces was the Main Body built around Battleship Division One included Yamamoto’s flagship the 72,000 ton behemoth Yamato.  Another strong force was assigned to the Aleutian operation. The task forces were spread out across the North Pacific and would not able to provide mutual support to each other in a timely manner.

Japanese Forces were organized in the following manner.

Main Body, Admiral Yamamoto

BatDiv 1, Admiral Yamamoto

BB Yamato (flagship, Yamato), Captain

BB Nagato (Nagato), Captain Hideo Yano

BB Mutsu (Nagato), Captain Teijiro Yamazumi

Carrier Group, Captain Kaoru Umetani

CVL Hosho (Hosho), Captain Umetani

Air Unit (8 bombers), Lieutenant Yoshiaki Irikiin

DD Yukaze (Minekaze), Lieutenant Commander Shizuka Kajimoto

Special Force, Captain Kaku Harada

Chiyoda (seaplane carrier, Chitose), Captain Harada

Nisshin (seaplane carrier, Nisshin), Captain Katsumi Komazawa

Screen (DesRon 3), RADM Shintaro Hashimoto

CL Sendai (flagship, Jintsu), Captain Nobue Morishita

DesDiv 11, Captain Kiichiro Shoji

DD Fubuki (Fubuki), Captain Shizuo Yamashita

DD Shirayuki (Fubuki), Captain Taro Sugahara

DD Hatsuyuki (Fubuki), Captain Lieutenant Commander Junnari Kamiura

DD Murakumo (Fubuki), Captain Commander Hideo Higashi

DesDiv 19, Captain Ranji Oe

DD Isonami (Fubuki), Commander Ryokichi Sugama

DD Uranami (Fubuki), Commander Tsutomu Hagio

DD Shikinami (Fubuki), Commander Akifumi Kawahashi

DD Ayanami (Fubuki), Commander Eiji Sakuma

1st Supply Unit, Captain Shigeyasu Nishioka

Naruto (Oiler), Captain Nishioka

Toei Maru (Oiler)

It was Yamamoto’s plan to use this force to polish off U.S. Forces that would only enter the fight after he had taken Midway. Despite the success of his carrier task forces at his heart Yamamoto was still a Battleship Sailor and believed that his battleships would be the deciding factor in the final destruction of the U.S. Navy forces in the Pacific.  This force could be augmented by the Aleutian Guard Force, detached from the Main Body under the command of Vice Admiral Shiru Takasu and was composed of the following fleet units:

GUARD (Aleutians Screening) FORCE, VADM Shiro Takasu in Hyuga

Chief of Staff, Rear Admiral Kengo Kobayashi

BatDiv 2

BB Hyuga (flagship, Hyuga), Captain Chiaki Matsuda

BB Ise (Hyuga), Captain Isamu Takeda

BB Fuso (Fuso), Captain Mitsuo Kinoshita

BB Yamashiro (Fuso), Captain Gunji Kogure

Screen, RADM Fukuji Kishi

CruDiv 9, Rear Admiral Kishi

CL Kitakami ( flagship, Kuma), Captain Saiji Norimitsu

CL Oi (Kuma), Captain Shigeru Narita

DesDiv 20, Captain Yuji Yamada

DD Asagiri (Fubuki), Commander Nisaburo Maekawa

DD Yugiri (Fubuki), Captain Masayoshi Motokura

DD Shirakumo (Fubuki), Commander Toyoji Hitomi

DD Amagiri (Fubuki), Captain Buichi Ashida

DesDiv 24, Captain Yasuji Hirai

DD Umikaze (Shiratsuyu), Commander Nagahide Sugitani

DD Yamakaze (Shiratsuyu), Commander Shuichi Hamanaka

DD Kawakaze (Shiratsuyu), Commander Kazuo Wakabayashi

DD Suzukaze (Shiratsuyu), Commander Kazuo Shibayama

DesDiv 27, Captain Matake Yoshimura

DD Ariake (Hatsuharu), Commander Shoichi Yoshida

DD Yugure (Hatsuharu), Commander Kiyoshi Kamo

DD Shigure (Shiratsuyu), Commander Noboru Seo

DD Shiratsuyu (Shiratsuyu), Lieutenant Commander Kimmatsu Hashimoto

2nd Supply Unit, Captain Matsuo Eguchi

San Clemente Maru (oiler), Captain Eguchi

Toa Maru (oiler)

The force that was the true heart of the Japanese Navy in early 1942 was the First Carrier Striking Force which at Pearl Harbor and in the months following had run roughshod over all Allied opposition.  Initially composed of 6 flattops the force was reduced to four when the Shokaku was heavily damaged and Zuikaku’s air group decimated at the Battle of the Coral Sea on 8 May 1942.  Nevertheless it was still a formidable and experienced force in its own right.  Commanded by Vice Admiral Chuichi Nagumo it was composed of the following units:

FIRST CARRIER STRIKING FORCE (1st Air Fleet), VADM Chuichi Nagumo

Carrier Group, VADM Nagumo

CarDiv 1

CV Akagi  (flagship, Akagi) 21 Zero fighters, 21 dive bombers, 21 torpedo bombers

CV Kaga (Kaga) 21 Zero fighters, 21 dive bombers, 30 torpedo bombers

CarDiv 2 – RADM Tamon Yamaguchi

CV Hiryu (flagship, Hiryu) 21 Zero fighters, 21 dive bombers, 21 torpedo bombers

CV Soryu (Hiryu) 21 Zero fighters, 21 dive bombers, 21 torpedo bombers

Support Group – RADM Hiroaki Abe CruDiv 8

CA Tone (flagship, Tone)

CA Chikuma (Tone)

2nd Section, BatDiv 3 –

BB Haruna (Kongo)

BB Kirishima (Kongo)

Screen (DesRon 10) – RADM Susumu Kimura

CL Nagara (flagship, Nagara)

DesDiv 4 – 4 DDs

DesDiv 10 – 3 DDs

DesDiv 17 – 4 DDs

Supply Group – 5 oilers, 1 DD

The Invasion Force under the command of Vice Admiral Nobutake Kondo was a formidable surface strike group in its own right and was built around 2 Fast Battleships, 9 Heavy Cruisers and a light carrier.

MIDWAY INVASION FORCE, (2nd Fleet), VADM Nobutake Kondo

Invasion Force Main Body

CruDiv 4 (less 2nd section)

CA Atago (flagship, Takao),

CA Chokai (Takao)

CruDiv 5 (less 2nd section)

CA Myoko (Myoko)

CA Haguro (Myoko)

BatDiv 3 (less 2nd section) –

BB Kongo (Kongo)

BB Hiei (Kongo)

Screen (DesRon 4) – RADM Shoji Nishimura

CL Yura (flagship, Nagara)

DesDiv 2 – 4 DDs

DesDiv 9 – 3 DDs

Carrier Group Zuiho (CVL) — 12 Zero fighters, 12 torpedo bombers; 1 DD

Supply Group – 4 oilers, 1 repair ship

Close Support Group – VADM Takeo Kurita

CruDiv 7

CA Kumano (flagship, Mogami)

CA Suzuya (Mogami)

CA Mikuma (Mogami)

CA Mogami (Mogami)

DesDiv 8 – 2 DDs 1 oiler

Transport Group – RADM Raizo Tanaka

12 transports carrying troops

3 patrol boats carrying troops

1 oiler

Escort (DesRon 2) – RADM Tanaka

CL Jintsu (flagship, Jintsu)

DesDiv 15 – 2 DDs

DesDiv 16 – 4 DDs

DesDiv 18 – 4 DDs

Seaplane Tender Group – RADM Riutaro Fujita

Seaplane Tender Div 11

Chitose (CVS) — 16 fighter seaplanes, 4 scout planes

Kamikawa Maru (AV) — 8 fighter seaplanes, 4 scout planes

1 DD;

1 patrol boat carrying troops

Minesweeper Group

4 minesweepers

3 submarine chasers

1 supply ship

2 cargo ships

The Northern Force which was assigned to the invasion and occupation of Attu and Kiska was commanded by Vice Admiral Moshiru Hosogaya included the carriers Ryujo and Junyo which had they accompanied the First Carrier Striking Force might have given the Japanese the edge that they would have needed to recover when that force was destroyed on June 4th.  This force was composed of the following units:

NORTHERN (Aleutians) FORCE (5th Fleet) — VADM Moshiro Hosogaya

Northern Force Main Body

CA Nachi (flagship, Myoko)

Screen –

2 DDs

Supply Group –

2 oilers, 3 cargo ships

Second Carrier Striking Force — RADM Kakuji Kakuta

Carrier Group (CarDiv 4)

CVL Ryujo (flagship, Ryujo) — 16 Zero fighters, 21 torpedo bombers

CV Junyo (Junyo) — 24 Zero fighters, 21 torpedo bombers

Support Group (2nd section, CruDiv 4) –

CA Maya (Takao)

CA Takao (Takao)

Screen (DesDiv 7) –

3 DDs

1 oiler

Attu Invasion Force — RADM Sentaro Omori

CL Abukuma (flagship, Nagara)

DesDiv 21 –

4 DDs

1 minelayer

1 transport carrying troops

Kiska Invasion Force — Capt. Takeji Ono

CruDiv 21 –

CL Kiso

CL Tama 

AMC Asaka Maru (auxiliary cruiser)

Screen (DesDiv 6) –

3 DDs

2 transports carrying troops

Minesweeper Div. 13 –

3 minesweepers

Submarine Detachment — RADM Shigeaki Yamazaki

SubRon 1 – I-9 (flagship)

SubDiv 2 — 3 submarines

SubDiv 4 — 2 submarines

Note all Japanese Fleet information obtained online at http://www.microworks.net/pacific/orders_of_battle/midway_japan.htm

These forces were augmented by a submarine screening force and land based naval air forces stationed at Wake and Kwajalein.

The plan was complicated and depended on the Americans reacting exactly as the plan anticipated them doing.  Yamamoto never expected that the Americans would be waiting for his forces and had knowledge of his plans due to the efforts of U.S. Navy code breakers under the direction of Commander Joseph Rochefort and the Fleet Intelligence Officer Captain Edwin Layton had broken the top secret Japanese Navy JN-25 Code.  Thus despite the massive amount of forces involved the plan was seriously flawed and left the advanced forces vulnerable to unexpected American moves.

Next: Calculated Risk: The American Forces and Strategy at Midway

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The Naming of a New Aircraft Carrier and the Centrality of the Navy in Future National Security Strategy

USS HUE CITY CG-66 Enforcing the UN Oil Embargo against Iraq in April 2002

“Control of the seas means security. Control of the seas means peace. Control of the seas can mean victory. The United States must control the sea if it is to protect our security.” —John F. Kennedy

“For in this modern world, the instruments of warfare are not solely for waging war. Far more importantly, they are the means for controlling peace. Naval officers must therefore understand not only how to fight a war, but how to use the tremendous power which they operate to sustain a world of liberty and justice, without unleashing the powerful instruments of destruction and chaos that they have at their command.” Admiral Arleigh Burke

Over the Memorial Day weekend Secretary of the Navy Ray Mabus announced the naming of the second ship in the Gerald R. Ford class aircraft carrier.  The name selected was significant as the ship will be named the USS John F. Kennedy CVN-79, her namesake being President John F. Kennedy who served as a junior officer in the Second World War commanding a Patrol Torpedo Boat, PT-109 in the Solomon Islands. Kennedy’s boat was rammed and split in two by the Japanese Fubuki class destroyer Amagiri in the early hours of August 2nd 1943.  Over a period of six days he made herculean efforts to save his crew and was awarded the Navy Marine Corps Medal and the Purple Heart.

The United States has always been a seafaring nation and today the vast majority of our commerce is borne by ships from the world over. The United States learned during the Revolution and the War of 1812 the importance of sea power when the Royal Navy for all intents and purposes rules the waves. Even the land victory of Washington at Yorktown was sealed by the intervention of the French Fleet which prevented the British from evacuating the garrison.  During the Civil War the Union Navy was the deciding factor as it blockaded Southern ports and forced the Mississippi River cutting the Confederacy in two and sealing its fate even as Confederate armies battled Union forces in the bloodiest battles ever seen on this continent. The Navy was the deciding factor in the Spanish American War sweeping the Spanish Navy from the seas and dooming its garrisons around the world.  The U.S. Navy began the First World War late but by the end was the ascendant naval power in the world and was one of the major reasons that the British in spite of the superiority that they had at the time agreed to the Washington and later London Naval accords.  When the Second World War erupted the United States was in the beginning stages of a Naval build up to reinforce and replace the fleet that was still dominated by the ships built prior to the Naval treaties.   In the Pacific the Japanese Navy steamrolled its scattered and ill equipped opposition while in the Atlantic German U-Boats decimated convoys very nearly breaking the back of Great Britain and the Soviet Union. However it was the Navy initially stretched to its limits by the Two Ocean War which regained the initiative which in an unprecedented build up of Naval Power defeated its adversaries and safeguarded the vast convoys of merchant ships carrying American troops and equipment into battle and bringing American Lend Lease aid to reach Britain and the Soviet Union. During the Cold War, Korea and Vietnam the Navy was a flexible and mobile response force to crises around the globe military, diplomatic and humanitarian, often diffusing situations without a shot having to be fired in anger and eliminating the need for large numbers of ground forces. In the 1980s the Navy secured the Gulf of Sirte against the threats of Libya’s Colonel Gaddafi and kept the Persian Gulf open during the Tanker Wars initiated by Iran on merchant ships transiting the Gulf. American naval power was again on display during the Gulf War and subsequent United Nations sanctions on Iraq.  After 9-11 the Navy has been a response force around the globe in the War on Terrorism as well as numerous natural disasters and humanitarian crises. When a crisis develops which might require a military response the first questions on the mind of every Presidential administration has been where is the nearest Carrier Strike Group and Marine Expeditionary unit.  Today the Navy supports military operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, and the Horn of Africa and against piracy.

The vast majority of the world’s populations now live on the littorals, or the land areas adjacent to the ocean.  The bulk of world commerce is maritime commerce; the United States depends on secure sea lanes to support our economy.

While sea power is essential to American national power, diplomatic, economic and military large standing armies are not. Yes our land forces must be strong and in quality the best in the world. At the same time whenever we have committed large numbers of land forces to ill defined campaigns we have squandered national power and prestige in wars that have been at best stalemates and at worst strategic defeats. This of course excemts the two World Wars where those large land forces were engaged they had a specific mission that was directly tied to national strategy.

We have come to a place in our national life where our strategic thinking still largely influenced by the World Wars and the Cold War has to be modified.  The major land wars launched by the Bush administration in Iraq and Afghanistan have proven incredibly costly in terms of manpower and economics and it is clear that the Obama administration and bipartisan Congress will seek to disengage sooner rather than later from those wars.  One knows that once those wars are over that land forces will shrink as plans are already on the table with cuts already beginning in some services.

Of course one has to ask what the military should be composed of in light of a coherent national security strategy that takes into account the full spectrum of threats to our nation many of which are not military in a traditional sense. To sustain large numbers of land forces on foreign territory is expensive and often fraught with peril when there are changes in the leadership of allied nations on which we depend for the basing of such forces. Even forward deployed Air Force assets are subject to these constraints.  Such basing was necessitated by the Soviet threat during the Cold War.  All previous overseas conflicts were viewed by American leaders as expeditionary in nature, land forces would go in with a specific goal for a limited time. If forces were left in place they were generally small and of a constabulary nature.

Only the Navy-Marine Corps team provides the flexibility to provide a rapid military or humanitarian response to overseas contingencies.  Critics call it “gunboat diplomacy” but then we have found what we are doing is not sustainable and we need an alternative.  That alternative is the Sea Services, which also include the Coast Guard and Merchant Marine.  The Bush administration reduced the Navy in terms of ships and personnel in order to support land wars of questionable strategic value, even turning thousands of Sailors into soldiers to support Army missions in Iraq and Afghanistan without reducing and even expanding the requirements of Naval forces.  This was a mistake of unmitigated proportions, no strategic goal that we have accomplished in either Iraq or Afghanistan could not have been accomplished by the Navy and Marine Corps and contingents of Special Forces, military and civilian advisors and the CIA.

Theodore Roosevelt had a saying, “speak softly and carry a big stick.” He was not an isolationist by any means; he advocated engagement with the world but also protections, military, economic and ecological for Americans.   A strong Navy was central to his thinking as were good relations with other nations.  He understood the importance of the Navy in supporting American interests. In his annual address to Congress on December 6th 1904 he stated:

“In treating of our foreign policy and of the attitude that this great Nation should assume in the world at large, it is absolutely necessary to consider the Army and the Navy, and the Congress, through which the thought of the Nation finds its expression, should keep ever vividly in mind the fundamental fact that it is impossible to treat our foreign policy, whether this policy takes shape in the effort to secure justice for others or justice for ourselves, save as conditioned upon the attitude we are willing to take toward our Army, and especially toward our Navy. It is not merely unwise, it is contemptible, for a nation, as for an individual, to use high-sounding language to proclaim its purposes, or to take positions which are ridiculous if unsupported by potential force, and then to refuse to provide this force. If there is no intention of providing and keeping the force necessary to back up a strong attitude, then it is far better not to assume such an attitude.”

Roosevelt understood better than most of his peers around the world of the necessity of worldwide engagement and the protection of American interests.  As interdependent as the United States and our allies are on international cooperation in anti-terrorism, humanitarian response and the free flow of commerce the Sea Services have to be the primary means of response.  Land forces are important but it is clear that they will need to be reorganized and rebuilt after the long and arduous conflicts that they have shouldered and ultimately they are dependent on the Navy for the bulk of their support when deployed overseas.

Any new national security strategy must prioritize our nation’s goals with diplomatic, intelligence, military and economic assets. We must leverage power and not squander it.  Naval forces are among the most flexible and economic means of exercising the military aspects of such strategy and are not hostage to unstable governments as are forward deployed land forces.   Naval power leverages national power in ways that forward deployed land forces cannot and are far more connected to goodwill than are ground forces which are seen by many around the world as occupying forces.

British Maritime strategist Julian Corbett in his book Some Principles of Maritime Strategyprovides a clear understanding of how sea power is best suited to the principle of a true national strategy for a maritime nation which emphasized limited and asymmetrical warfare.  Such strategy sustained the British Empire until it allowed itself to become mired in the trenches of Flanders and the shores of Gallipoli during the First World War killing off the flower of the nation’s youth and nearly bankrupting the nation and alienating much of the empire.

Corbett maintained that naval forces were best suited to controlling lines of communications, focus on the enemy, and maneuver for tactical advantage.  He also believed that naval forces best suited the political, economic and financial dimensions of waging war as well as war’s technological and material aspects.  One key aspect of this was the Corbett believed that continental war where large land armies are deployed inherently act against opponents limiting their political aims and increase the chance of total war with all of its destructive effects.  Corbett understood, as Clausewitz did before him the primacy of politics in war and necessity to devise appropriate strategies to protect the national interests while emphasizing efficiency in battle while preserving costly assets.

Ultimately the United States is a maritime power. When we try to become a continental power by engaging in protected land wars overseas we lose our strategic and economic advantage.  One can argue that we would not be in Iraq or Afghanistan today had it not been for the deployment of land and air forces on the Arabian Peninsula following the Gulf War.

The new USS John F. Kennedy when completed will be one of the key platforms of American power projection in the middle part of this century and it is important that we strengthen and modernize the Navy so that it might meet the tasks required of it by our nation and our friends around the world.  It is imperative that we as a nation remember our heritage and return to it as we develop a strategy that is at last freed from the World War and Cold War model.  The time for that is now.

Peace

Padre Steve+

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The First Modern Destroyers: The Imperial Japanese Navy Fubuki Class

IJNS Fubuki

The Imperial Japanese Navy set the standard for destroyer construction in the 1920. While the United States Navy and British Royal Navy were fully stocked with their First World War design destroyers the Imperial Navy’s General Staff issued a requirement for a class of large destroyers which would complement the new classes of modern cruisers being built for the navy. The requirement called for a 2000 ton ship capable of 39 knots with a 4000 mile range at 14 knots that could carry a large number of torpedoes and a heavy gun armament. The program was designed to give the numerically inferior Imperial Navy a qualitative superiority against any opponent.

WWII Office of Naval Intelligence images for Fubuki Class variants

The 24 ship Fubuki Class was such a quantum leap over other contemporary destroyers that the Imperial Navy referred to them as the Special Type. Their large size, heavy armament and high speed made them equal to many of the light cruisers of the time. The design was modified to carry more guns and torpedoes on an increased displacement and the result was a 388 foot long 1750 ton ship armed with six 5” 50 caliber guns in weather proof and splinter proof mounts.  On the initial 10 ships of the class the guns could only be elevated 40 degrees which made them less than effective as anti-aircraft guns but in the succeeding two groups of ships the mounts were an improved type which allowed them to elevate each gun separately to 75 degrees.  The ammunition magazines were below the gun mounts and ammunition was passed to the guns by hoists.  This gave them a decided edge in rate of fire over other destroyers which had open or partially shield mounts dependant on ammunition passers carrying ammunition to them.

Close up of IJNS Sagiri

The light anti-aircraft armament when built was two Type 93 13mm machine guns.  In the years before the war and during the war this was increased in some cases up to twenty-two 25mm anti-aircraft guns and 10 of the Type 93 machine guns. In 1944 surviving ships of the class had their X- 5” gun mount removed to facilitate more of the 25mm guns, radar and additional depth charge capacity.

IJNS Ikazuchi

The nine 24” torpedo tubes in triple mounts were able to be reloaded while in battle a capability not shared by other destroyers.  They carried a total of 18 torpedoes which initially were the Type 8 but these were replaced by the oxygen powered Type 93 “Long Lance” torpedoes before the war. These torpedoes had a higher speed, longer range and heavier warhead than torpedoes produced by other navies.  These torpedoes would become the scourge of Allied navies during the war in the brutal surface engagements of 1942.

IJNS Yugiri

Due to the modifications made to the design which put more armament on a smaller displacement than the original design made them unstable in heavy seas and resulted in longitudinal hull weakness that resulted in the class being rebuilt between 1935 and 1937. The rebuild increased their displacement to 2050 tons standard and over 2400 tons full load and resulted in a slight reduction of their speed.

IJNS Hibiki

The class was built in three groups and each is sometimes referred to as a separate class as each incorporated improvements over the preceding group. The first 10 ships of the class which are sometimes referred to as the Fubuki Class were of less complex design than subsequent ships. They were feet long had a smaller bridge and exposed gunfire control room.  The second group of 10 ships commonly referred to as the Ayanami Class had an enlarged bridge structure which enclosed previous exposed positions to include the gunfire control room, range finders and included a range finder tower.  They also were the first ships to receive the improved Type B gun mounts.  The final subtype of the class, the Akatsuki Class comprised just 4 ships and was distinguished by a smaller forward funnel, larger boilers and unique splinter proof torpedo tube mount housing.

IJNS Ayanami

The ships of the class participated in every major campaign of Japan’s war in the Pacific as well as operations against China in the 1930s. One ship the Miyuki was lost in a collision with another destroyer in August 1934. All remaining ships of the class except the Hibiki and Ushio were lost in action during the war. Four the Fubuki, Ayanami, Yuguri and Ataksuki were sunk in surface actions. Eight ships the Usogumo, Shirakumo, Isonami, Shikinami, Sagiri, Sazanami, Inazuma, and Ikazuchi were lost to Allied submarines.  Seven ships the Shirayuki, Hatsuyuki, Murakumo, Uranami, Asagiri, Oboro and Akebono were sunk by aircraft and two the Shinonome and Amagiri fell victim to mines.

The demilitarized IJNS Ushio after the war

Hibiki was given to the Soviet Union following the war and served in that Navy until either 1953 or 1963 depending on the source. She was scrapped. Ushio surrendered to the Allies was demilitarized and scrapped in 1948.

The Amagiri played a role in the life of future President John F Kennedy when she rammed and sank his PT-109 in the Blackett Strait on August 2nd 1943. Her commanding officer at the time Lieutenant Commander Kohei Hanami attended Kennedy’s inauguration in 1961.

The Fubuki Class destroyers set a standard in destroyer construction that other navies around the world sought to emulate. Fast and powerful they and their crews fought gallantly in the Second World War and though in a losing cause deserve to be remembered.

 

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