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Bloody Savo: Disaster at Guadalcanal

USS Quincy under attack off Savo Island

On August 8th 1942 the U.S. Task Force supporting the invasion of Guadalcanal was tired. The crews of the ships had been in continuous combat operations conducting naval gunfire support missions, fending off numerous Japanese air attacks and guarding against submarine attacks for two days.  The force commanded by Admiral Richmond K. Turner was still unloading materials, equipment and supplies needed by the men of the 1st Marine Division who they had put ashore on the morning of the seventh.

On the afternoon of the eighth Turner was informed by Admiral Frank “Jack” Fletcher that he was pulling his carrier task force out of action. Fletcher alleged that he did not have enough fighter aircraft (79 remaining of an original 98) and as low on fuel.  The carriers had only been in action 36 hours and Fletcher’s reasons for withdraw were flimsy.  Fletcher pulled out and left Turner and his subordinate commanders the responsibility of remaining in the area without air support with the transports still full of badly needed supplies and equipment.

Admiral Gunichi Mikawa

As the American drama played out, the Japanese moved forces into position to strike the Americans.  Admiral Gunichi Mikawa commander of the 8th Fleet and Outer South Seas Force based at Rabaul New Britain quickly assembled a force of 6 heavy cruisers, the 14,000 ton Atago Class Chokai, and the four smaller ships of the Kako Class, the Aoba, Kako, Kinugasa and Furutaka, the light cruisers Yubari and Tenryu and the destroyer Yunagi.   Mikawa raised his flag aboard Chokai and the force sped down “the slot” which ran the length of the of the Solomon’s chain mid day on the seventh.

The Americans had warning of their coming. The first sighting was by B-17s before the Japanese forces had reached Rabaul.  The second was the elderly U.S. Navy submarine S-38 at 2000 on the 7th when they were 550 miles away not far from Rabaul.  This report was discounted because it would not be unusual to find a number of fleet units steaming near a major naval base and fleet headquarters.  The last which should have alerted the allies was a sighting by a Royal Australian Air Force patrol aircraft on the morning of the 8th.  However the pilot did not report the sighting until he returned from his mission returned to his base and had his tea.  The eight hour delay in reporting the information as well as errors in it which reported 2 submarine tenders as part of the force lulled the Allied forces into believing that the Japanese were setting up a seaplane base and posed no threat to the invasion forces. It was a fatal error of reporting and judgment by the pilot.

USS Astoria on August 8th off Guadalcanal 

In the absence of good information Turner deployed his support ships to cover the three entrances into what soon would be known as Iron Bottom Sound.  He placed the Anti Aircraft Cruiser USS San Juan and Australian Light Cruiser HMAS Hobart to the east with two destroyers under the command of Rear Admiral Norman Scott. To protect the south west entrance into the sound south of Savo Island Turner placed the Heavy Cruisers USS Chicago, HMAS Australia and HMAS Canberra and two destroyers under the command of Rear Admiral R.A.C. Crutchley RN who in theory commanded the screening force.  To the north of Savo he deployed the Heavy Cruisers USS Vincennes, USS Astoria and USS Quincy and two destroyers under the tactical direction of Captain Frederick Riefkohl aboard Vincennes. To the west of Savo he placed two destroyers to act as picket ships.  Unfortunately these ships radar sets were insufficient and would fail to pick up the approaching enemy.

Allied Dispositions 

During the early evening Turner recalled Crutchley to his flagship for consultations of what to do regarding Fletcher’s retreat.  Crutchley came over in his flagship the Australia denuding the southern force of its commander as well as one of its three heavy cruisers.  He left the commanding officer of Chicago Captain Howard D. Bode in tactical command but Bode did not have his ship take the lead position in the patrol assuming Crutchley would return bymidnight.

Mikawa launched float planes to scout the locations of the American ships and to provide illumination once the battle began.  Some of these aircraft were spotted but no alert measures were taken as many assumed the Japanese to be friendly aircraft.  Many commanding officers were asleep or resting away from the bridge of their ships, lookouts were tired and not expecting the Japanese and Condition Two was set in order to provide some of the tired crews a chance to rest.

Light Cruiser Yubari illuminating American cruisers at Savo Island 

Admiral Mikawa now new the Allied disposition and ordered his ships to battle stations at 0045.  At 004 he sighted and passed astern of USS Blue the southern picket which also failed to detect the Japanese force.  Mikawa assumed that the destroyer might have reported his presence, briefly turned north but turned back to his original course when a lookout allegedly spotted a destroyer to his northeast.  He gave the order to attack at 0132 and promptly spotted the American destroyer USS Jarvis which had been heavily damaged and without radio communications was making her way toAustralia for repair and passed her after some ships fired torpedoes and raced toward the southern force at 26 knots.  With the southern force just a few miles away Mikawa ordered his ships to commence firing at 0136 and at 0138 torpedoes had been launched.

Mikawa’s flagship heavy Cruiser Chokai

Even now the southern force was unaware of Mikawa until at 0143 the destroyer USS Patterson on the far side of the action saw Mikawa’s ships bearing down a mere 5000 yards from the force. Her commander radioed “STRANGE SHIPS ENTERING HARBOR” but the alert came too late.  As Patterson signaled her warning Japanese float planes dropped their illumination flares silhouetting the Chicago and Canberra as the Japanese cruisers opened fire at ranges from 4500 to 9000 yards.  At 0143 Canberra was struck by to torpedoes and 24 shells, mostly 8” from the cruisers. Her Captain was killed and she was mortally wounded.  The Japanese brushed off the attempts of Patterson and the other southern force destroyer the USS Bagley to intervene bypassing them quickly and shifting their fire to Chicago. Chicago was stuck by a torpedo at 0147 and a single hit from a cruiser which caused little damage. Chicago briefly engaged the Yunagi at 0151 which had been sent back to cover the Japanese as they moved north.  With his ship crippled Captain Bode failed to warn the northern force of the Japanese attack.

Mikawa’s lookouts spotted the northern group at 0144 and changed course. The maneuver was badly executed and left the Japanese in two columns as they swiftly closed on the Americans.  Mikawa’s flagship Chokai launched torpedoes at 0148 and Astoria the cruiser closest to the Japanese set general quarters at 0145 and at 0150 the Japanese illuminated her with searchlights and opened fire. Astoria under the direction of her gunnery officer returned fire at 0152 ½ just before her Captain came to the bridge unaware of the situation. He ordered a cease fire until he could ascertain who he was firing at assuming the Japanese to be friendly ships.  He delayed 2 minutes and ordered fires commenced at 0154 but the delay was fatal. Astoria had opened fire on the Chokai which then had time to get the range on the American cruiser and hit her with an 8” salvo which caused fires which provided the other Japanese ships an aiming point.

Japanese artist depiction of attack on US Navy Cruisers at Savo Island

Astoria was left burning and heavily damaged barely maintaining headway but attempted to fight on scoring a hit on Chokai’s forward turret even as the Japanese opened up on the next cruiser in line the USS Quincy.  Quincy caught between the two Japanese columns.  Aoba illuminated her with her searchlight and Japanese forces opened fire. The gunnery officer order Quincy to return fire getting two salvos off before her skipper Captain Samuel Moore came to the bridge, briefly ordered a cease fire assuming that he was firing on Americans and turned on his running lights.  Quincy was ripped by salvo after salvo which killed Captain Moore and nearly everyone in the pilothouse just as a torpedo ripped into her engineering spaces turning them into a sealed death trap forcing the engineer to shut down the engines.  Burning like a Roman candle Quincy was doomed she was ordered abandoned and capsized and sank at 0235. However Quincy did not die in vain, at 0205 two of her 8” shells hit Chokai causing enough damage the Admiral’s chart room that Mikawa would order a withdraw at 0220 which spared the now defenseless American transports.

Vincennes the lead ship and flagship was next in the line of death.  Captain Reifkohl order General Quarters sounded not long after the Japanese illuminated the southern group.  At 0150 Vincennes was lit up by the searchlights of three Japanese ships which opened fire on her. Vincennes returned fire at 0153 hitting Kinugasa before she was hit starting fires on her scout planes mounted on their catapults. The Japanese mauled Vincennes, three possibly four torpedoes ripped into her as shells put ever gun out of action. At 0215 she was left burning and sinking by the Japanese who soon withdrew from the action.  Ordered abandoned she sank at 0250.

Canberra being evacuated by the Patterson and Blue

Canberra struggled against the odds but was abandoned and was sent to the bottom by an American torpedo at 0800.  Astoria also struggled for life but the damage was too great and she was abandoned sinking at 1215.  Mikawa withdrew up the sound but on his return the Heavy Cruiser Kako 70 miles from home was sunk by torpedoes from the American submarine S-44 sinking in 5 minutes.

The Americans and Australians lost 4 Heavy Cruisers sunk and one heavily damaged as well as two destroyers damaged.  Killed on the various ships Quincy-389, Vincennes-342, Astoria235, Canberra-85, Ralph Talbot-14, Patterson-10, and Chicago-2.

It was an unmitigated disaster, an allied force destroyed in less than 30 minutes time.  Boards of inquiry were held and Captain Bode hearing that he shouldered much blame killed himself in 1943.

It was a rude awakening to a Navy which had believed that technical advances would give it victory and which was not yet in the words of Admiral King “sufficiently battle minded.”  It was the first of many equally bloody battles in the waters aroundGuadalcanal.

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Background to “The Pacific” Part One: The Guadalcanal Campaign and the Beginning of Joint Operations

The Battle of Bloody Ridge

Note: This is the first of a series that I will post on the campaign in the Pacific.  Some are older articles that I wrote for my Masters Degree program and others will be new material dealing with specific topics in this long neglected campaign.  I was watching the second episode this evening and found it quite powerful…so much that I was in tears as the Marines of 1st Marine Division and John Basilone came aboard the troop transport and went to the Mess Deck.  I have served with the Marines for around six years including with Marine advisers in Iraq and been the Chaplain for the USS HUE CITY which is named after the Battle of Hue City.  I love the Marines and this series has touched me already.  I hope everyone watches it on HBO.

The Guadalcanal Campaign and the Beginning of Joint Operations

Marines on Guadalcanal

The Guadalcanal campaign was the first experiment by the United States of conducting a “joint” campaign in modern warfare involving Naval and Naval Air, Ground combat units, Army air assets and amphibious operations. The campaign involved numerous land, sea and air battles. It was under the command of Admiral Nimitz as CINCPACFLT and included commanders for ground, air and sea forces engaged.  For brevity and simplicity sake I will discuss the campaign and sea even though they are interconnected with the sea and air campaigns directly affecting the outcome of the land campaign.

Designated OPERATION WATCHTOWER and aptly called OPERATION SHOESTRING the campaign was launched on short notice, approved on 2 July the commanders of the operation first learned of it on 7 July. Utilizing the 1st Marine Division, which would later be reinforced by the Americal Division, landed on Guadalcanal and the neighboring island of Tulagi on 7 August.  The Marines took Tulagi after a brief but bloody fight and the few Japanese troops on Guadalcanal fled inland allowing the Marines to seize the airfield.  Unfortunately, the commander of the supporting US carrier task force, Admiral Frank Fletcher fearing danger to his carriers and withdrew following the landings. The forces in direct support were surprised by a Japanese cruiser force under Admiral Mikawa losing 3 American and 1 Australian heavy cruiser in one of the worst American naval defeats in history at the Battle of Savo Island. The next morning the transports, many still full of supplies left the Marines.  Admiral Fletcher’s action, which left the Marines without air cover and carrier support gave the Marines a new term, still in use today, for being left high and dry: “to be Fletchered.”

Japanese dead of the Ichiki Detachment after the Battle of the Tenaru (Ilu) River

The Land Battles: The Japanese quickly responded sending in Naval Landing forces which went in light without all their troops or equipment. The Ichiki detachment was wiped out in the battle of the Tenaru (Ilu) river on 20 August.  The Kawaguchi detachment of 3,500 men landed in two groups, again short of men, material and equipment landed in the closing days of August and attempted to seize the now operational “Henderson” field on September 13 to 14th after one of its supporting units had been destroyed by the 1st Raider Battalion in a small amphibious assault.  Kawaguchi’s attack was disjointed and his units dispersed.  He was defeated in detail by the Marines in the Battle of “Edson’s ridge” or “Bloody Ridge.”

Chesty Puller

The Marines attacked and destroyed another Japanese force at the Mataniko river on 9 October.  The Marines were further reinforced by the 7th Marine Regiment while Kawaguchi was reinforced by the HQ of 17th Army under General Hyakutake who brought the 2nd Division onto the Island under the command of General Maruyama.  Kawaguchi would then be relieved and sent home following disagreements with Maruyama and his chief of staff prior to the next major Japanese attack which took place 23-25 October along the same ridgeline that Kawaguchi had assaulted. Though the Japanese now had 15,000 troops with good artillery support, the attacks were fierce but uncoordinated. Defended by 7th Marines under Chesty Puller as well as troops from the recently arrived Americal, the Marines again effectively destroyed the attacking Japanese force.

Sergeant John Basilone USMC with Medal of Honor

Despite additional reinforcements of the 38th Division, the Japanese, due to severe food, supply and ammunition shortages would not make any more major attempts to take the airfield.  The Americans would shift to the offensive with the Army XIV Corps composed of the 25th Division, Americal Division and Second Marine Division under Major General Lawton J “Lightening Joe” Collins commanding in December.

The US Navy paid a heavy price for the victory at Guadalcanal. Here the USS Wasp sinks after being hit by Japanese torpedoes

The Sea Battles: The sea campaign in the waters surrounding Guadalcanal would be marked by some of the bloodiest sea battles in the history of the US Navy.  So many ships from both navies would be sunk offshore that the waters would become known as “Ironbottom Sound.” Following the previously mentioned “Battle of Savo Island” the Americans lost the carrier Saratoga to torpedo damage and the Wasp was sunk while escorting a convoy. In the Battle of Eastern Solomon’s of 24 August the Americans have the Enterprise knocked out of action for 2 months and while sinking a Japanese light carrier and inflicting heavy aircraft losses on the Japanese. The Americans surprised a Japanese force on 11 October off Cape Esperance sinking a heavy cruiser and destroyer and heavily damaging a second heavy cruiser. The Japanese effort, now directed by Yamamoto brought battleships to support operations around Guadalcanal, including bombardments of the airfield on 13-14October in support of Maruyama. The attacks damaged but did not close Henderson field which was able to continue air support to the Marines and soldiers.  On 26 October a carrier engagement would be fought, the Battle of Santa Cruz Islands would be a tactical Japanese victory sinking the Hornet and damaging Enterprise, while losing no ships. Two Japanese carriers were damaged but they lost a large number of pilots and aircrews who could not be readily replaced. They also not succeed in their amphibious efforts to retake the island or Henderson field, gaining the Americans badly needed time.  On 13 November the Japanese attempted to repeat the bombardment of Henderson field but would be stopped from doing so by a task force under Admiral Daniel Callaghan.  The First Naval Battle of Guadalcanal cost the Japanese the battleship Hiei and two destroyers, additionally many of the transports bringing Japanese reinforcements would be sunk by aircraft from Henderson field and Enterprise.  The Americans lost 2 cruisers and 4 destroyers sunk and every other ship save the destroyer Fletcher damaged. Admiral Callaghan and Admiral Norman Scott, the victor of Cape Esperance were both killed.  The following night the Japanese would lose the battleship Kirishima to the USS Washington task group under the command of Admiral Willis Lee.  Further Japanese naval activity would be limited to attempts to reinforce the island with destroyers; during one of these operations on 29 November they would clash with a force of American cruisers and destroyers at Cape Tassafaronga, sinking 1 cruiser and badly damaging three more at the cost of one destroyer, but was unable to complete his supply run.  Though the Americans lost more total warships, the Japanese could not replace what they lost.

USAAF B-17E over the Solomons

Air Operations: The air operations would be decisive to the effort, land based aircraft of the Japanese played a key role in destroying some US shipping and sinking warships in waters off Guadalcanal however they could not maintain air superiority over the island which was maintained and increased by the Americans as Henderson field’s capacity grew and additional Army, navy and Marine aircraft were stationed there.  Naval air was extremely important in the sea battles around the island.

Beached and destroyed Japanese transport ship at Guadalcanal

Japanese Reaction: The Japanese reaction was one of dismay; they could not fulfill their promise to the emperor to retake the island.  They had lost many ships and aircraft as well as ground troops. From this time on the Japanese would go over to a strategic defensive in the Pacific.  Japanese losses were devastating as they could not be made up.

Importance for the Americans: This was important in a number of ways. For the navy it showed that they could defeat Japanese surface ships in night engagements and gave the navy great experience as it moved forward in the South and Central Pacific. American carrier air crews had become experienced and gained superiority over the Japanese.  On the ground the myth of the Japanese “superman” was destroyed, yet American commanders also began to appreciate the skill, endurance and tenacity of the Japanese soldier in future operations.

Importance for Joint Operations: The campaign also was a triumph for the Americans in the fact that they were able to overcome inter-service rivalries undertake a difficult operation against a stronger opponent far from major fleet logistics and support basis.  To be sure this was Joint Operations in its infancy and until the arrival of significant Army forces on the island to relieve the Marines was for the most part a Navy, Marine Corps and Army Air Corps operation.  When Major General Lawton “Lightning Joe” Collins assumed command of the island from Marine Major General Alexander Vandergrift it became a true-inter service operation and the beginning of Joint Operations.

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