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The Importance of not Letting Political Problems become Military Problems: The Example of George Marshall and Omar Bradley

George Marshall 

Friends of Padre Steve’s World,

A short thought for this Sunday. General Omar Bradley said, “Wars can be prevented just as surely as they can be provoked, and we who fail to prevent them, must share the guilt for the dead.”

I wrote yesterday about my concerns with the leaders of the major world powers in relation to the crises in Syria and North Korea, in which the military option seems to be spoken of more often than any other. But ultimately these are political problems that will require much more than a military solution, for an ill-thought out through military action almost always results in worse problems. If these political problems in Syria and North Korea are not addressed as that, they will end by opening a Pandora’s Box of unintended consequences that will most likely be worse than we could imagine. If military action is necessary, it must be thought through and done in conjunction with a plan to not only win the war, but to win the peace as well. General George Marshall, whose guiding hand helped the Allies win the Second World War, and whose leadership as Secretary of State helped Europe recover from that war, paving the way to decades of peace and prosperity so correctly noted: “A political problem thought of in military terms eventually becomes a military problem.” It is kind of like Abraham Maslow’s “law of the instrument” in which he noted “I suppose it is tempting, if the only tool you have is a hammer, to treat everything as if it were a nail.”

So far the words coming out of the mouth of President Trump and his Secretary of State are all about the military option, and the President’s proposed cuts to the State Department and other agencies of “soft power” will ensure that when push comes to shove that the only tool he will have will be that of the military.

Until Tomorrow

Peace

Padre Steve+

 

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The Content of their Character: Brigadier General Benjamin O. Davis Sr. US Army and General Benjamin O. Davis Jr. US Air Force

Brigadier General Benjamin O Davis in France 1944

“I have a dream that my four little children will one day live in a nation where they will not be judged by the color of their skin, but by the content of their character.” Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.

American History would not be the same without the life, work and prophetic ministry of Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. Dr. King was born in a time when most of the country was segregated when “separate by equal” was simply façade to cover the lie that in no way did African Americans have equal rights or privileges in the United States. Dr King was born less than 60 years after the secession of the Southern states from the Union and the beginning of the American Civil War. Though that blood conflict had freed the slaves it had not freed African Americans from prejudice, violence and discrimination.  When Dr. King began his ministry and was thrust upon the national stage as the strongest voice for equal rights and protections for blacks the discrimination and violence directed towards blacks was a very real and present reality in much of the United States.

However there were cracks beginning to appear in the great wall of segregation in the years preceding Dr. King’s ascent to leadership as the moral voice of the country in the matter of racial equality. In baseball Jackie Robinson became the first African American player in Major League Baseball opening a door for others who would become legends of the game as well as help white America begin its slow acceptance of blacks in sports and the workplace.

Likewise the contributions of a father and son Brigadier General Benjamin O. Davis Sr. and General Benjamin O. Davis Jr. were advancing the cause of blacks in the military which eventually led to the desegregation of the military in 1948.  The impact of these two men cannot be underestimated for they were trailblazers who by their lives, professionalism and character blazed a trail for African Americans in the military as well as society.

Benjamin O. Davis Sr. was a student at Howard University when the USS Maine exploded and sank in Havana Harbor.  He volunteered for service and was commissioned as a temporary 1st Lieutenant in the 8th United States Volunteer Infantry. He was mustered out of service in 1899 but enlisted as a private in the 9th United States Cavalry one of the original Buffalo Soldiers regiments.  He enlisted as the unit clerk of I troop of 3rd Squadron and was promoted to be the squadron Sergeant Major. He was commissioned while the unit was deployed to the Philippines and assigned to the 10th Cavalry.  He was assigned in various positions throughout his career including command, staff and instruction duties including as Professor of Military Science and Tactics in various ROTC programs.  He reached the rank of rank of temporary Lieutenant Colonel and Squadron Commander of 3rd and later 1st Squadron 9th Cavalry from 1917-1920 in the Philippines before reverting to the rank of Captain on his return as part of the post World War I reduction in force.  He continued to serve during the inter-war years and assumed command of the 369th Infantry Regiment New York National Guard in 1938. He was promoted to Brigadier General on 25 October 1940 becoming the first African American elevated to that rank in the United States Army and was assigned as Commander 4th Brigade 2nd Cavalry Division. He later served in various staff positions at the War Department and in France and was instrumental in the integration of the U.S. Military. He retired after 50 years service in 1948 in a public ceremony with President Harry S. Truman presiding. He was a member of the American Battle Monuments Commission from 1953-1961 and died in 1970.

Colonel Davis with his son Cadet Benjamin O Davis Jr.

His son Benjamin O. Davis Jr. was appointed to West Point in 1932.  He graduated and was commissioned in 1936 graduating 35 out of 278, the fourth African American graduate of West Point. During his time at the Academy most of his classmates shunned him and he never had a roommate.  Despite this he maintained a dogged determination to succeed.  The Academy yearbook made this comment about him:

“The courage, tenacity, and intelligence with which he conquered a problem incomparably more difficult than plebe year won for him the sincere admiration of his classmates, and his single-minded determination to continue in his chosen career cannot fail to inspire respect wherever fortune may lead him.”

He was denied entrance to the Army Air Corps because of his race and assigned to the Infantry first to the all lack 24th Infantry Regiment at Ft Benning where he was not allowed in the Officers Club due to his race. Upon his commissioning the Regular Army had just 2 African American Line Officers, 2nd Lieutenant Davis and his father Colonel Davis. After completion of Infantry School he was assigned as an instructor of Military Science and Tactics and the Tuskegee Institute.  In 1941 the Roosevelt Administration moved to create a black flying unit and Captain Davis was assigned to the first black class at the Tuskegee Army Air Field and in March 1942 one his wings as one of the first 5 African Americans to complete flight training.  In July 1942 he was assigned as Commanding Officer of the 99th Pursuit Squadron which served in North Africa and Sicily flying Curtiss P-40 Warhawks. He was recalled to the United States in September 1943 to command the 332nd Fighter Group. However some senior officers attempted to prevent other black squadrons from serving in combat alleging that the 99th had performed poorly in combat. Davis defended his squadron and General George Marshall ordered an inquiry which showed that the 99th was comparable to white squadrons in combat and during a 2 day period over the Anzio beachhead the pilots of the 99th shot down 12 German aircraft.

Colonel Benjamin O Davis Jr (left) with one of his Tuskegee Airmen

Davis took the 332nd to Italy where they transitioned to P-47 Thunderbolts and in July 1944 to the P-51 Mustang which were marked with a signature red tail. During the war, the units commanded by Davis flew more than 15,000 sorties, shot down 111 enemy planes, and destroyed or damaged 273 on the ground at a cost of 66 of their own planes. Their record against the Luftwaffe was outstanding and their protection of the bombers that they escorted was superb with very few bombers lost while escorted by them men that the Luftwaffe nicknamed the Schwarze Vogelmenschen and the Allies the Red-Tailed Angels or simply the Redtails. Davis led his Tuskegee Airmen to glory in the war and their performance in combat helped break the color barrier in the U.S. Military which was ended in 1948 when President Truman signed an executive order to end the segregation of the military. Colonel Davis helped draft the Air Force plan and the Air Force was the first of the services to fully desegregate.

Lieutenant General Benjamin O Davis Jr

Colonel Davis transitioned to jets and let the 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing against Chinese Communist MIGs in the Korean War.  He was promoted to Brigadier General in 1954 and served in numerous command and staff positions. He retired in 1970 with the rank of Lieutenant General and was advanced to General while retired by President Clinton in 1998.  He died in 2002 at the age of 89.

The legacy of Benjamin O. Davis Senior and Benjamin O. Davis Junior is a testament to their character, courage and devotion to the United States of America. They helped pioneer the way for officers such as General Colin Powell and helped change this country for the better.  During times when discrimination was legal they overcame obstacles that would have challenged lesser men.  Benjamin O. Davis Junior remarked “My own opinion was that blacks could best overcome racist attitudes through achievements, even though those achievements had to take place within the hateful environment of segregation.”

Such men epitomize the selfless service of so many other African Americans who served the country faithfully and “by the content of their character” triumphed over the evil of racism and helped make the United States a more perfect union.

Peace

Padre Steve+

 

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Marshall, Eisenhower and Senior Military Leadership

Great military leaders are the products of the militaries in which they serve.  This begins in their early career and includes their education, training, assignments as well as the men that they serve under in their formative years.  They are shaped by the character, doctrine and organization of the military that they serve and are products of the times that they live and serve. Even the difference of a few years can make a major difference in the career path and development of a leader.  Such was the case with two of the great figures of the US Army in World War Two Generals of the Army George Marshall and Dwight David Eisenhower.

George Marshall

The careers of Marshall and Eisenhower prior to the Second World War were somewhat similar but also included major differences that would shape them for their roles in the war.  Marshall was commissioned 13 years prior to Eisenhower in 1902.  As a result he served his early years in a peacetime army marked by slow promotion.  Marshall was promoted to Captain in 1916 after serving 14 years as a Lieutenant despite attendance at the Army Staff College then called the Infantry and Cavalry School.  As an infantry officer he served in the Philippines for 2 years and served in various battalion and regimental level staff positions. Marshall’s career also included as assignments working with the National Guard and State militias.   His skills as a planner brought him to France as Assistant Chief of Staff for the 1st Infantry Division and later the American Expeditionary Force (AEF) under General Pershing.

While serving in these positions he was promoted rapidly to Major, Lieutenant Colonel and Colonel. In France he worked with the training, supply and operations of the American Forces as well as coordination with the French and British. His skills were invaluable and he played a major role in the rapid transition of the AEF from the St Michel salient to the Meuse-Argonne and though he reduced in rank when the war ended he was appointed aide-de-camp to Pershing in 1919.

During the 1920 Marshall served as Executive officer of the 15th Infantry Regiment in China and on his return to the United States he was assigned to the Army War College during which time his first wife died.  Following her death he would become Director of the Academic Department of the Infantry School.  His tenure at the War College was marked by his training numerous officers who would later become generals, including Eisenhower. He played a key role in the Preparation of the book “Infantry in Battle” which became a standard textbook for Army infantry officers.  He then served as senior instructor for the Illinois National Guard from 1933-1936 and was promoted to Brigadier General in 1936. After his promotion he worked to improve the Civilian Conservation Corps.  His organizational talents were recognized by President Franklin D Roosevelt and he was appointed Chief of Staff of the Army in 1939.  Marshall’s career is unique; he never served in command of anything more than a company. His positions above the company level were all in staff or instructor duty. In our current military an infantry officer or other combat arms officer who never commanded a maneuver unit at battalion, regiment or division level would never become a General and certainly never become Chief of Staff of the Army or Commandant of the Marine Corps.  Marshall was a brilliant organizer, leader, judge of men and visionary in understanding the necessity of coalitions and inter-dependence of nations in the modern world.  His organizational leadership skills, ability to pick the right officers for key positions and his political and diplomatic acumen made him one of the foremost military leaders in US Military history.

Dwight D Eisenhower

Eisenhower was commissioned in 1915 less than two years prior to the entry of the US into the First World War. Like Marshall was commissioned as an Infantry officer and his career progressed in normal fashion until the entry of the United States into the war.  Though Eisenhower never served in France, he was assigned to training troops and became one of the early leaders of the Armored Forces until they were disbanded after the war.  In the rapidly expanded wartime army Eisenhower was promoted from 2nd Lieutenant to Lieutenant Colonel in less time than Marshall spent as a 2nd Lieutenant.

During his tenure in the Tank Corps he served with George Patton, commanded a tank battalion and was executive officer of an armored brigade.  Following the disestablishment of the Tank Corps Eisenhower served as an infantry regiment executive officer in Panama.  In this position he was schooled by General Fox Conner in classic military theory.   It was fortunate for Eisenhower in that he was able to serve with and was able to gain seasoning and education under an excellent officer. Eisenhower returned to the United States and commanded an infantry battalion at Fort Benning and following this served on the faculty of the Infantry School under Marshall who would remember him at the beginning of World SWar Two.

His subsequent career was somewhat mundane. He served on the Battle Monument’s Commission under Pershing and then on the staff of the Assistant Secretary of War.  However both of these assignments put him in the eye of other important officers and officials.  Eisenhower was then transferred to the Philippines where he served as Chief of Staff to Douglas MacArthur from 1935-39. He returned to the US to serve concurrently as the regimental Executive Officer and a battalion commander in the 15th Infantry regiment and later Chief of Staff to the Commander of 3rd Army.  Through his excellent work in every assignment he gained the attention of Conner, Pershing and eventually Marshall. While at the Infantry school he helped prepare Pershing’s memoirs.  His experience with MacArthur in Washington and the Philippines helped prepare him for the myriad of difficult personalities with which he would deal with as Supreme Commander of Allied Forces in Europe. In 1941 he came to Washington to serve under Marshall at the WPA.

As far as who was the better officer, opinions vary; there are arguments to be made for both yet Eisenhower himself seemed to subordinate himself to Marshall.  Omar Bradley says of Marshall “if there ever was an indispensable man in time of national crisis, he was that man.” (A Soldier’s Story p.205) However both Marshall and Eisenhower were excellent officers and each played a vital role in the Allied victory.   However their careers were markedly different. In fact one could say that they were “apples and oranges.” Marshall served entirely as a staff officer and instructor after his service as a company officer.  Eisenhower served in numerous command positions as well as staff jobs. Their careers would intersect and had commonalities but each was shaped by their different experiences in the Army.

In World War Two Marshall seems to have fewer critics.  However this seems to more a result of Eisenhower’s exposed position in Europe where he was comparatively junior to many of the officers that that he would command.  He also had to deal with the competing interests of such strong personalities as Marshall, Patton, Roosevelt, Churchill, DeGaulle and Montgomery while fighting the Germans. This has lent him to criticism from both British and American officers as well as various historians.  But these observations are based on wartime experience and not their early careers.   Field Marshall Alan Brooke seems to have had more respect for Marshall and many in the British high command showed little respect toward Eisenhower.

“Better” in the military is in the eye of the beholder and often dependant on assignments as well as the superiors that one works for.  From a traditional point of view Eisenhower had the better career path with command at battalion and executive officer at regiment levels. However Marshall’s career provided him with a wider spectrum in dealing with senior staff, school, reserve component, government civilian agencies and Washington bureaucracy and politics that Eisenhower did not experience until Marshall tapped him in 1941 to work with the WPA. Their personalities were different and they dealt with subordinates in different manners, but both successfully managed their subordinates. Eisenhower was able to manage Patton and Montgomery while working in Churchill’s back yard, while others such as DeGaulle walking through his door.  Both men were uniquely suited to work with each other and in the positions that they found themselves during the war and one has a hard time imagining a better partnership in command.

The interesting thing to me is Marshall’s career.  In the current era he would never rise to the heights that he served.  Since the Second World War no officer who has not served command in major combat arms units at all levels has risen to be Chief of Staff of the Army, Air Force, Commandant of the Marine Corps or Chief of Naval Operations.  Nor has any risen to the Chairmanship of the Joint Chiefs of Staff or major Combatant Command such as EUCOM, CENTCOM or PACOM.  Of we look at Marshall and his impact one has to ask if “punching tickets”in the combat arms  is necessarily optimal  when it comes to managing the organization at the service level.  While it is proven that command is a great asset to senior command in combatant commands it may not be as necessary for the chief of a service.  One can ask if an officer who has served in staff and instructor positions, especially those where they have to deal with politicians, civilian agencies, as well as active and reserve component forces as well as an instructor and writer of doctrine could not serve as successfully in a position such as the Army Chief of Staff or the Commandant of the Marine Corps as an officer who has had the “well rounded career.”

In the light of George Marshall these are valid questions to ask. Might someone who has had the ability to step back and examine the personnel, logistics and training of a force as well as having experience with reserve component and civilian agencies could conceivably serve as effectively as an officer who has served rotating between command and staff positions.  In today’s world the staff oriented officer would also have experience dealing with industry and intelligence.  While I do not advocate such a change I think it would be wise to consider officers such as Marshall for these service level positions.

Following the war Marshall would become Secretary of State and help rebuild Europe while serving under Eisenhower how had become President of the United States.

Peace,

Padre Steve{

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Lessons in Coalition Warfare: Admiral Ernest King and the British Pacific Fleet

The genesis and strategy of British Royal Navy’s participation in the Pacific in 1945 is a little studied aspect of the Pacific campaign.  Prior to 1945 the participation of the Royal Navy in the Pacific ended at the Battle of the Java Sea.  After that the Royal Navy operated in the Indian Ocean in support of British operations in Burma and against German surface raiders. Michael Coles in “Ernest King and the British Pacific Fleet: The Conference at Quebec, 1944 (Octagon) published in The Journal of Military History January 2001, 65, 1 Research Library pp. 105-129 provides a good analysis of the Allied decision to allow the Royal Navy a role in the Pacific and the objections of Admiral Ernest King to the proposal.

The renewal of the Royal Navy’s Pacific role began at the 1944 Octagon Conference where the Allied Joint Staff made the decision to bring the Royal Navy back to the Pacific. Admiral Ernest King was the only dissenter in the question of Royal Navy operations in the Pacific.  The strategic aspects of this decision are seldom addressed by most who chronicle the Pacific war.[i] William Kimball in “Forged in War: Roosevelt Churchill and the Second World War” never mentions the naval strategy discussed at the Octagon conference. Samuel Elliott Morison in “The Two-Ocean War” described the decision for the Royal Navy to enter the Pacific as “important” and outlines King’s opposition to it without addressing strategic considerations.[ii] John Costello in “The Pacific War” described how Churchill insisted on the Royal Navy being committed to operations against Japan and how Roosevelt’s agreed to “to avoid a bitter clash.”[iii] Likewise Williamson Murray and Allen R. Millett in “War to Be Won” note that one of the goals of Octagon was “to determine the level and nature of British in the air-naval war in the Pacific.” However they do so as do the others without addressing the naval strategy.[iv] Max Hastings mentions Octagon in “Retribution: The Battle for Japan, 1944-1945” again without specific reference to naval strategy.  However later in the book later discusses the Royal Navy’s limitations in ships, manning, logistics and operational art as it entered the Pacific campaign.[v] Other writers chronicle British operations in the Pacific but usually focus in the gallantry and determination of the Royal Navy and not its weaknesses.[vi]

Coles’ article is invaluable to understand the decision in relation to the political, military and economic considerations which influenced both King’s opposition to the deployment and the performance of the British fleet in the Pacific.  Coles analyzes tensions between King and the other participants at Octagon. He judges King to be more realistic and informed regarding Royal Navy capabilities and more importantly its limitations than British leaders especially Churchill.[vii]

King was surprised at Roosevelt’s decision to accept Churchill’s offer of the Royal Navy without prior discussion by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.  Coles notes that King may have kept silent at subsequent meetings of the Combined Chiefs, because he either assumed that his positions were logical and apparent to all or that he believed that Churchill was lying about his navy’s capabilities. Of course it was politically impossible for King to suggest such.[viii]

King’s realism on the subject was a directly related to the political tensions between American and British visions for the outcome of the Pacific war, and the pressing strategic considerations necessitated by Japanese offensives in Burma and China. The British goal of re-establishing colonial rule in Southeast Asia was a major bone of contention.  Many Americans believed that the British goals were “aimed primarily at the resurgence of British political and economic ascendancy in South East Asia and restoration of British prestige.”[ix] Yet the US wanted to defeat Japan’s formidable Army in Asia without the sacrifice of large numbers of American troops or material which necessitated British participation.[x] The introduction of large numbers of American troops on the Asian continent was impossible due to the lineation of the US Army to 90 divisions, most of which were engaged in Europe.  Likewise US domestic issues regarding war production and the Navy’s share of it in relations to changing wartime conditions was a major concern for King.  King and the Navy argued for high naval production while others including George Marshall were beginning to question it, especially if the British could provide “make substantial Naval forces available in the Pacific.”[xi]

American Lend Lease aid to Britain was another issue.  Roosevelt calculated that the US needed Britain to be active in post-war Europe, this required significant post war aid. Roosevelt viewed “vigorous participation” by the Royal Navy as a means to gain congressional support in spite of the fact that Britain could no longer play a global military role without US support.[xii] One of the problems faced in the Pacific was how British mandated modifications to weapons systems supplied by the United States caused problems in production and caused shortages in key weapons systems, especially naval aircraft.  Coles’ notes how King had problems with this and wondered if supplying the Royal Navy’s Pacific operations “represented the most effective use of American industrial capacity.[xiii] However King did not chose to argue this point at the conference, once again demurring to President Roosevelt.

The most compelling factor discussed by Coles was the operational and logistic problems related to the deployment, supply and operation of the Royal Navy. There were a number of problems that the Royal Navy faced as it deployed to the Pacific.  First among them was the fact that the Royal Navy was in large part short-legged and cold water Navy.  Its ships were designed mainly for service in the Atlantic and Mediterranean and ill-suited for the Pacific. The Royal Navy did not have the operational experience of the Americans in regard to Fast Carrier Task Forces, especially coordination of refueling and resupply operations or coordination of air group operations.  Admiral Philip Vian insisted that “Before joining the Americans…we needed to be adept at using a great many more aircraft at a time, and for longer periods.”[xiv] Max Hastings’ noted that the Royal Navy was “overstretched and war weary”[xv] and Coles goes to great lengths to illustrate British weakness while analyzing tensions in the British-American relationship particularly the shift in the relationship as the Americans took the leading role.

King had the foresight to recognize that the British contribution would be more of a liability than help.[xvi] The principal Royal Navy purpose in the Pacific was political, not military and Coles asks if it helped or hindered “the achievement of the respective nations’ policy objectives.” Coles does not believe that it helped; that in fact the Royal Navy would not have been able to continue had the war continued.  He quoted a British liaison officer who wrote that the Royal Navy would have “been unable to continue operations because of lack of logistic support.”[xvii] Coles calls the Royal Navy’s effort in the Pacific an “expensive instrument of failed policy” and that Admiral King seemed to have recognized this better than others, arguing that King’s opinions were not based on simple personal prejudice.[xviii]

Coles uses an excellent mix of primary and secondary sources including diaries, operational reports, histories and journal articles from American and British sources to document his work providing ample references throughout his article. His work is important in recognizing the importance strategy plays in making political decisions in coalition warfare.  Likewise he places value on individuals such as King who are able to recognize the strategic aims and limitations in coalition warfare by various partners.

Though the Royal Navy’s participation in the Pacific War was a relatively insignificant in terms of its overall role in the war it provides lessons for our time. Coalition warfare requires that members of the coalition be able to function our time we can see a similar situation where many of the NATO forces in Afghanistan are dependent on the US for most of their operational and logistic support. It also requires that the members of the coalition have a firm grip on the overall strategy and understand the capabilities and limitations of each.  In Afghanistan the United States faces a situation where it needs capable alliance partners.  It does not have the force capacity to go it alone and political support for additional troops has weakened in congress and in the public.  It is a somewhat similar situation to the Second World War where the United States needed significant British participation in the Asian ground war to ensure that the United States would not have to make major commitments to on the Asian mainland.  Likewise it was needed to get congressional support for post war aid to Britain.  Likewise George Marshall and others wondered if the British could provide significant naval support which would alleviate the need for high naval production which they questioned.  Strategy and the desired end state must be central to how coalitions fight wars.

 


[i] See Spector, Ronald H. Eagle Against the Sun: The American War With Japan. The Free Press and Division of MacMillan, Inc. New York, NY 1985. Spector nowhere mentions the British Navy in his history of the campaign  and in his short reference to Octagon he does not mention the debate over the Royal Navy’s inclusion in the campaign. p.419

[ii] Morison, Samuel Eliot. The Two Ocean War: A Short History of the United States Navy in the Second World War. An Atlantic Monthly Press Book, Boston MA 1963. pp. Morrison does also mention some of the specific actions of Royal Navy in the Pacific. Pp.423-424.

[iii] Costello, John. The Pacific War: 1941-1945 Quill Publishers, New York, NY 1981. p.495.

[iv] Murray, Williamson and Millett, Allan R. A War to Be Won: Fighting the Second World War.  The Belknap Press of Harvard University, Cambridge, MA. 2000. pp.484-485.

[v] Hastings, Max. Retribution: The Battle for Japan, 1944-1945. Alfred A Knopf, New York, NY 2008. Originally published in Great Britain as Nemesis: The Battle for Japan, 1944-45, Harper Press, London, 2007.  p.112-113 and 400-402.

[vi] “Ernest King and the British Pacific Fleet: The Conference at Quebec, 1944 (Octagon). By Michael  Coles.  Published in The Journal of Military History January 2001, 65, 1 Research Library. p.127

[vii] Ibid. pp.111-112

[viii] Ibid. p.111

[ix] Ibid. p.113

[x] Ibid. p.114

[xi] Ibid. p.117

[xii] Ibid. p.118

[xiii] Ibid. p.120 Coles describes several instances where the “Anglicized” systems delayed deliveries and lengthened transportation to operational British units.  Modifications included flight helmets, radios and aircraft modifications. He also discusses how ineffectively the British used the large number of Escort Carriers provided by the US.

[xiv] Ibid. p.123

[xv] Hastings. p.400

[xvi] Coles. p.127. This is something that Morison does with utmost deference to the British.

[xvii] Ibid. p.128

[xviii] Ibid. p.129

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