Monthly Archives: September 2009

September 9, 2009 · 22:09

Japan’s Self Defeating Attempts to Become Economically Self Sufficient in the 1930s

This is the first of a two part series that explores the similarities of the United States in 2009 to Japan of the early 1930s. It explores the topic of economic self sufficiency or “autarky” and how nations can put the proverbial cart before the horse in terms of seeking ways to become self sufficient. The Japanese chose the path of military conquest seeming to forget the fact that they were dependent on natural resources and manufactured equipment to wage such a war by the nations that they were attacking.

In the early 1930’s Japan’s desired to emulate the economic self-sufficiency of the United States or to achieve autarky controlling its own economic destiny by securing sufficient natural resources. Japanese industrial and military leaders felt that such was needed for economic expansion as well as military preparation and expansion. Key resources such as oil, specialized steels and alloys, iron ore, coking coal, machining tools and even cotton were not readily available in Japan proper.

Japans’ goal was unrealistic based on the differences of the two countries. In the early part of the 20^th century the United States was self-sufficient in most critical natural resources and was a key supplier to the world of oil, iron, coal and grain. Additionally most of the United States’ resources were contained within its borders or provided to it in trade with nations that needed what the United States had to offer in manufactured goods. Japan did not have this. As a nation it had few natural resources on the home islands and even suffered food shortages that resulted in famine at times. It was dependant on other nations for basic natural resources to power its economy and to feed its population. As a result some of its political, economic and military leaders looked to achieve autarky through conquest.

Unfortunately for the Japanese they were surrounded by numerous powers that stood in their way. To the north was Russia, which they vanquished in the 1905 war, but in doing so ended up nearly bankrupt, though they gained the Korean peninsula. However, the Japanese now faced the Soviet Union with its immense military on the Manchurian border and subterfuge in the politics of China by their support of Mao Tse Tung’s Red Chinese forces. The Japanese were able to gain some possessions by participating on the Allied side in WWI at the expense of Germany and China, though they did not achieve all they wanted and felt cheated by the Allies at the Versailles peace conference. The first step was to invade Manchuria and seize its natural resources in 1931. However to gain more than what they could garner in Manchuria the Japanese would have to do so at the expense of China and the Western Colonial powers, France, Britain, the Netherlands and United States. Japan’s quandary was how to achieve autarky without resorting to war with multiple enemies.

The Japanese faced a sort of “chicken or the egg scenario” as to what came first. In order to wage war Japan needed iron ore, coking coal and industrial salt from North China, oil from Borneo and Southeast Asia, cotton from America to make finished products for the American market. Likewise it needed special steels and alloys from the US to supply the war effort. The US was also the primary source of Japan for machine tools and other sophisticated industrial equipment needed for Japanese industry. To go to war the Japanese required the imports of the very nations who stood in their way.

Yet to go to war entailed great risk, Japan did not have the resources, especially oil and metals with which to sustain their war effort without maintaining foreign trade with the very countries that they would have to engage in war. All of these factors together made autarky in the style of the United States unreasonable through military means alone. It is likely that the Japanese could have achieved more by using more skillful diplomacy during the 1930s. Had they built a mutually beneficial alliance with China, did more to exploit the natural resources of Manchuria and negotiated favorable trade deals with the United States they probably would have accomplished more than they did through using military force. Some Japanese reformers attempted to make some of these reforms but were unsuccessful as the military particularly the Imperial Army, the government and industrial concerns became locked into the military option.

By contrast during its growth period the United States did not have to deal with significant military powers as it moved west across North America, only Native American Tribal groups. The only power capable of stopping the United States was Great Britain. While there were tensions between the United States and Great Britain along the Canadian border and Pacific Northwest during the 1850s, the United States never faced a significant external threat. Thus the United States using very little military power gobbled up the continent and established its status as the Hegemon of the Western Hemisphere. Japan could not do what it needed to do unless it negotiated with or conquered the powers that had significant military power to confront the Japanese and economic ability to strangle the Japanese economy.

This period should interest to any student of history, foreign policy and economics. The study of the period of Japanese history needs to be considered by policy makers when considering war to obtain natural resources or critical supplies not indigenous to their country or for which they are dependent on potential hostile suppliers. Like Japan in the 1930s the United States is not currently self sufficient in many natural resources especially oil and is dependent on other nations, especially China for critical items in its economy. Having surrendered much of its industrial capacity and having failed to exploit alternatives to fossil based fuels, especially oil the United States faces a conundrum similar to the Japanese in the early 1930s. The United States is militarily strong yet deeply politically divided and possibly unstable. The United States is dependent on many nations, some who outwardly hostile to us for the very lifeblood of its economy. Like the Japanese the military is singularly incapable of securing all of these resources and engaged in multiple wars that are tying up close to half our ground forces when one considers troops in theater and those unavailable because they slated to go or having just returned from combat deployments. Additionally like the Japanese who were in the midst of the Great Depression the United States is going through what appears to be the worst economic times since that period. Policy makers need to be careful when dealing with situations where economic factors are diminished and natural resources have to be imported to sustain the economy. Autarky is fine if you can do it but the United States has more in common economically with Japan of the 1930s than the we would like to admit. Something to think about.

The second concluding section of this will be published in the next few days, the Deity Herself permitting…

Peace,

Steve+

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Filed under History, Military

Tagged as autarky, china, colonialism, diplomacy, economics, germany, imperial japan, imperial japanese army, imperial japanese navy, imports, manchuria, moa tse tung, natural resources, oil supply, red chinese, self sufficiency, soviet union, united states, war effort, westward expansion of united states, world war i

September 8, 2009 · 23:04

The Uncomfortable Legacy of Colonel General Ludwig Beck

“It is a lack of character and insight, when a soldier in high command sees his duty and mission only in the context of his military orders without realizing that the highest responsibility is to the people of his country.” Ludwig Beck

Ludwig Beck Bundesarchiv Foto

This is one of those uncomfortable posts to write partially because I know that some people will take it completely wrong or ascribe meaning to it that I do not intend. I by training am a military historian, probably better at that than I am theology. One thing that fascinates me in the study of military history is the actions of men in the face of evil and the meetings of such people at the intersections of where military and government policy intersect. It is a timeless theme. The bulk of my study until the past few years was the German Army, particularly that of the Weimar Republic and the Wehrmacht to include policies, leaders, political attitudes and behavior in war and peace. Thus it makes sense for me to look at Colonel General Ludwig Beck who held the post of Chief of the German General Staff during the early part of the Nazi era.

Ludwig Beck is one of those characters in military history that makes professional military officers uncomfortable. Beck is not the perfect example of righteousness nor was he always correct in things that he supported. As an artillery regiment commander he defended the rights of soldiers and officers to be Nazi Party members though he himself was not one. He, like many military officers was a conservative military officer by nature and became Chief of Staff of the Wehrmacht in 1935 two years after Hitler’s ascension to power. Taking office Beck was troubled by some Nazi policies but not by the need for Germany to expand to areas that it had once controlled, he opposed the plan to attack Czechoslovakia not because of any love for the Czech state which he desired to be eliminated, but rather it being a war that Germany could not win. He resigned from his position a Chief of Staff in 1938 when he could not persuade the rest of the General Staff to resign in protest over Hitler’s plan which he felt would be disastrous for Germany. Had the western powers led by Neville Chamberlain not caved at Munich it is likely that the Germans would have suffered badly against the Czech army and fortifications and with the entry of France into the war would have suffered a defeat that would have ended the Hitler regime. In fact German officers who saw the extent of Czech preparations on the frontier following the Munich deal were greatly relieved that they did not have to fight their way into the Czech state.

After his resignation Beck played a key role in the resistance movement. He was involved in the planning for a number of attempts on Hitler’s life. Yet it was his leadership in the July 20^th 1944 attempt on the life of Hitler that ensured his place in history. With Colonel Klaus Von Stauffenberg and others in the General Staff at the Front and in Germany he acted to avert further destruction in Europe and the certain destruction of Germany. The plot, Operation Valkyrie was marred by poor execution and failed to kill Hitler of seize power but for a few hours. The planners had left too much to chance and once Hitler had restored communications the coup attempted ended swiftly. Had the attempt succeeded Beck was in line to become either the leader of Germany or the Head of the Army. Instead while being interrogated after his capture he took his own life depriving Nazi leaders of the ability to put him up for a public trial at which he would have been humiliated and then executed. The Kasserne in Sonthofen where the Bundeswehr MP School and Staff School as well as NATO and EU military schools are located is named for him. It is there, ironically a former Adolf Hitler School that his memory and sacrifice is honored by the nation which emerged from the rubble of World War Two. He is honored in a small museum and with a plaque recognizing his sacrifice.

492 Ludwig Beck Kasserne Sonthofen

The reason that General Beck makes many of us in uniform uncomfortable (and I do include myself) is that he recognized that senior officers, especially those in high command who help set and execute policy cannot isolate themselves in the purely military aspects of the operations. Instead he believed that officers have a higher duty to the constitution and people and not just the military mission that they have been assigned. When he realized that he could not stop Hitler’s invasion of Czechoslovakia he resigned and worked in the obscurity of a small and often divided resistance movement against Hitler. The bulk of the German high command, including many officers idolized in the United States did not recognize the higher duty. Many of these men were consummate professionals who did not support the evil of the Nazi regime and who conducted themselves honorably. Yet they effectively abetted its crimes by not opposing actions of their government that were against international law and morality as well as dangerous from purely a pragmatic military standpoint.

The problem is that military officers in any nation, including ours can face situations such as Beck faced. A military’s character is demonstrated in how leaders deal with such situations. Beck recognized the situation early, the bulk of his fellow officers did not recognize a problem until Germany was embroiled in a war that it could no longer win. Even then most could not mount an opposition to Hitler because they did not want to be considered to be mutineers and violate their oath. The potential to abet evil when military professionals bury their heads by planning and executing purely military aspects of a campaign is great. If they ignore questionable policy or even policies that they know that have been judged by the international community to be illegal or immoral, such as torture of prisoners or waging wars of aggression against countries that have not attacked their nation they become complicit in their nations crimes. This was the case with German Officers who may not have committed any personal crime and even tried to mitigate the evils of the Nazi regime were morally complicit in that evil.

In the United States the military shows its fidelity by remembering our oath to the Constitution and being faithful to it and the people that we serve. As officers we represent all Americans and not just those of our political party, religious faith or social or economic interests, nor any political leader, faction or interest group within the nation. The Constitution, our military regulations, traditions and the Uniform Code of Military Justice are the standard by which we operate and by which we conduct ourselves and tools that protect us when policies or actions taken by the government or people within it violate those codes or international law. The UCMJ makes it clear those officers who take part in, plan or a complicit in illegal actions in war are committing crimes.

When a nation become involved in wars which are non-traditional, revolutionary wars or insurgencies that barriers to professional conduct can be broken down. The Mai Lai massacre committed by 2LT William Calley’s platoon with the certain knowledge and maybe even approval of individuals in the chain of command is one example as were the uncontrolled chaos of prisoner abuse and torture at Abu Ghraib.

Times are difficult and we do not know what the future brings. Stress in societies caused by economic conditions, natural disasters, lawlessness on the streets and divided and ineffective governments sometimes remove the moral restraints of the society and even affect the military. One sees this in Weimar Germany as well as the 4^th Republic in France which had to deal with post World War II economic difficulties, exacerbated by recriminations of political opponents for actions the others did during the war while France was occupied by Germany as well as the wars in Indo-China and Algeria which further divided the nation and the military.

It is in stressful and uncertain times that officers have to be men and women of principle who always uphold the highest traditions of their military as well as be the voice of conscience when governments, political parties, special interests or leaders begin to violate international norms in the conduct of war. Beck was not a perfect officer. He supported some of Hitler’s policies until after his resignation but like much of the resistance believed that the Nazi regime could only end up destroying Germany. It is important to remember that like Ludwig Beck that officers do not need to sacrifice their honor to be faithful to their oath.

Peace, Steve+

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Filed under History, leadership, Military, national security, world war two in europe

Tagged as abu ghraib, adolf hitler, adolf hitler school, algeria, bundeswehr, constitution, czechoslovokia, eu, french 4th republic, french indochina, general ludwig beck, german resistance movement, klaus von stauffenberg, lt william calley, mai lai massacre, military oath, munich agreement, nato, nazi germany, nazi party, neville chamberlain, operation valkyrie, ordungberg sonthofen, sonthofen, ucmj, vietnam war, war crimes, weimar republic, world war ii

September 7, 2009 · 23:27

What Happened? An analysis of the Norfolk Tides in 2009

Pirates Orioles Baseball Oscar Salazar

I have posted a couple of other articles analyzing the performance of the Norfolk Tides in 2009. Now that the season is over with the Tides winning their final game by a score of 4-3 at Durham in 10 innings to finish at .500 for the season I am really going to get into the weeds. First I am going to look at the team’s record each month of the season and note losses of key players during those months.

The Tides began well in April they were 11 and 8 with a .578 winning percentage. On April 21^st Pitcher Brad Bergeson (1-1 2.45 ERA) was promoted to the Orioles.

In May the Tides were almost untouchable winning 23 and losing only 7 driving their record to 34-15 with a .693 winning percentage. On May 13^th Nolan Reimold (.394 9 HRs 27 RBI) was recalled to the Orioles. May 14^th Scott Moore (.252, 7 HRs, 21 RBIs) was injured, on May 29^th Catcher Matt Wieters (.305 5 HRs 30 RBI’s) was called to the Orioles. Pitcher Lance Berken (2-0 1.05 ERA) was promoted on May 26^th.

Jeff Fiorentino 3 Run Home Run

The Tides crashed back to earth in June winning just 9 while losing 19. They still were in first place and had a overall record of 43 wins and 34 losses with a .558 winning percentage. Oscar Salazar (.372, 10 HRs and 43 RBIs) was called up by the Orioles on June 7^th. On June 28^th pitcher David Hernandez (3-2 3.30 ERA) was promoted to Baltimore. It is important to note that after June 7^th the Tides were 8 and 15 with a .347 winning percentage. This is the date that Oscar Salazar was called up and it marks a watershed.

Gary Allenson

July started off better than August but between 14^th and 31^st they went 5 and 13 with a .384 winning percentage. For the month they were 14 and 15 with an overall record of 57-49 and a .537 winning percentage and had fallen into 2^nd place. On July 17^th Justin Christian (.270 3 HRs and 25 RBIs) was injured followed by Jolbert Cabrera on July 17^th (.298, 7 HRs, 50 RBIs) was injured breaking his foot going into home when sent by Gary Allenson on a play that he had little chance of scoring on. On the 29^th Chris Tillman (8-6 2.70 ERA) and reliever Kam Mickolio (3-3 3.50 ERA) were called up by the Orioles.

In August the woes continued as the Tides won 10 and lost 18 giving them a 67-67 and .500 on the year. Once again the Tides had a meltdown, between the 20^th and the 31^st they only won 2 and lost 9 a pathetic .181 winning percentage during that stretch. Even more disheartening three of these games were blown with the Tides leading in the 9^th inning. On August 29^th Joey Gathright (.329 24 Stolen bases) was traded while Michael Aubrey who had come to the Tides from the Cleveland system was promoted to the Orioles on the 18^th.

Injuries: Jolbert Cabrera

The Tides finished the year going 2 and 2 in September and maintain their .500 record to finish the year at 71 and 71. September call ups included Jeff Fiorentino who hit .312 with 12 HRs and 67 RBIs.

The Tides finished 2009 with the 7^th best record in the International League. They had the 2^nd highest team batting average of .272 behind Columbus. Yet they were last in home runs with 79. If one remember that 31 of these were produced by Salazar, Reimold, Moore and Wieters before June 7^th^th in runs scored with 603 of which 239 (39.6%) were produced by the sextet of Salazar, Reimold, Wieters, Moore, Cabrera and Fiorentino. The Tides were 5^th in total hits with 1283, 6^th in On Base Percentage at.330 and 10^th in Slugging percentage at .389.

007 Jeff George was a late season addition to the pitching staff

The Tides had the 7^th best team pitching in the league with a team 3.87 ERA. The ranked 7^th in runs surrendered to opponents with 607 of which 527 were earned runs (80 unearned runs. Tides pitchers gave up the 2^nd most home runs (113) led the league in hit batsmen (77). They were 9^th in walks with 409, 4^th in strikeouts with 998. Only one complete game was recorded by a Tides pitcher that by David Pauley in a game that he lost as the hitting never came through. They had 9 shutouts on the year.

Joey Gathright bunting for a hit

Hitting seems to be the key, after the Tides lost Reimold, Wieters, Salazar and Moore they were 36-56 for a .391 winning percentage. Between those 4 players they hit 31 home runs before they left the team. Salazar 10 in 50 games with 43 RBIs. Reimold with 9 in 31 games with 27 RBIs, Moore, 7 in 32 games with 21 RBIs and Wieters with 5 in 39 games with 30 RBIs. Prior to this they were 35-19 with a .648 winning percentage. However the big drop occurred after Salazar was called up. After Salazar left on June 7^th the Tides had a 36 and 56 record for a .391 winning percentage during that time.

Brandon Snyder Goes Down Swinging

In the field the Tides had 130 errors. If one looks at fielding percentage by position played one can see my instincts about various players were correct. Justin Turner had a .963 fielding percentage at 2^nd base in 80 games committing 13 errors. In only 14 games at short he had 4 errors and a .930 fielding percentage, while at 3^rd he had 4 errors in 15 games and a .893 fielding percentage. The farther Turner got from 2^nd the less effective he was. Other fielders had similar dynamics causing me to wonder about constantly moving infielders around in order to produce utility players when in fact it may be better to focus players on the positions that they play the best and only occasionally move them to other positions for additional experience. I do understand the need for utility players, however you do not produce utility players at AAA. If the player and the team has not yet figured out where the player plays the best and fits the best in the organization then it has probably missed the boat. At AAA it is my opinion that unless a player has been recently converted to a new position, that strengths should be built upon with the goal of having potential starters, All-Stars and Golden Glove players at as many positions as possible. This goes against the utility player mindset that the Tides-Orioles seem to have adopted where the only logical thing they appear to be doing is producing a glut of utility infielders most of who will have little chance of making the majors and little utility outside the minor league system. Winning teams are built on excellence and not utility. Utility players are important to plug holes and give starters a break. You do not win pennants with teams loaded with utility players. The Orioles know what they need at various positions. Melvin Mora is getting old and Brian Roberts has been repeatedly mentioned in trade possibilities. Ty Wigginton is not the best Third Baseman and there is the potential that Luke Scott may not return at first base. Potentially they will have to replace one or more players in their infield next year. Justin Christian could go to second and Brandon Snyder to 1^st. Brandon Pinckney is the only infielder who could be considered a true and reliable utility infielder being pretty solid in every position that he has played including a one inning relief pitcher outing and being a dependable hitter with a .291 batting average.

July 3rd a Win Before the Bottom dropped out

Looking at trends for the Tides:

2009: 71-71 .500 3^rd place

2008: 64-78 .451 2^nd place

2007: 69-74 .483 3^rd place

Last 3 Year 204-223 .478

The Tides last winning season with the O’s is 2005 when they were the Ottawa Lynx skippered by Dave Trembley. Allenson managed the Ottawa in 2003 to a 79-65 record and .549 winning percentage.

Looking at the numbers the Tides early success was based on the incredible hitting and run production on about 6 players, only one that played most of the season with the team, Jeff Fiorentino. The key date to mark is June 7^th when Oscar Salazar was called up by the Orioles. This was not simply do to the numbers, but to “X” factor that he was on the team. Observing the team close up from section 102, row B, seat 2 I saw the impact that he had on the bench and on deck. He provided a a sense of relaxed determination and confidence that had an impact on the players around him. He Salazar not been called up, which I am glad that he was because he deserved to be, I doubt the Tides would have suffered the meltdown that they experienced. When adversity struck it seemed that Gary Allenson checked out emotionally, he exuded little energy and that obviously carried over to the team. Watching the Tides through most of August was painful as the team seemed lifeless as if they had already given up. Scuttlebutt heard around the park indicated that quite a few players were unhappy with the organization. A hint of this was provided by Jim Miller who when finally brought back as a closer indicated how being moved around hurt his game.

Last Home Win Against Gwinnett September 3rd

With Allenson seemingly ineffective during this second half meltdown the organization needs to look at the previous years as well. They need to look at who manages the Tides in relationship to the Orioles and in relation to whoever is manages at Baltimore as there is widespread speculation that Dave Trembley will not be back. The Baltimore organization has no lack of talent at all levels as far as players are concerned, the key now is the field management team at Baltimore and Norfolk. I would think that Baltimore would be wise to get in the hunt for Bobby Valentine who has proven that he can work with and motivate young players and who has signaled that he is ready to return from the land of the Rising Sun. Since the Mets have elected to continue down the path of self-immolation by keeping their losing management team of Minaya and Manuel. The Mets would have been the natural place for Valentine to go so with them out of the picture it would be wise for the Orioles to try to get him.

That is all for tonight.

Peace, Steve+

Going to War: Interlude in Fallujah Reunions, Redirection and a Stay at the Ramadan Inn

USMC 155mm Howitzer firing on Insurgents at Fallujah in 2007

Note: This is the latest installment of my “Going to War” Series. Other postings in this series are located in the Subjects section under “Tour In Iraq.” The series chronicles the tour of Religious Support Team-2 of the Iraq Assistance Group in MNF-West from July 2007-February 2008. We were the first Navy Chaplain and Assistant to work supporting advisers since the Vietnam War.

We woke up to the sound of more outgoing artillery fire. The sun was shining outside as I look out my window at the sky above the California Barrier that protected our “suite” in the south wing of the Ramadan Inn. Climbing out of the decrepit Iraqi bed with the fresh sheets I stumbled over my two tons of gear to look at the time while Nelson slept like a baby in his equally decrepit Iraqi bed. My ever trusty alarm clock showed that it was about 0830, which meant we had gotten maybe 5 hours sleep and missed breakfast. Thankfully I had stockpiled a few pop-tarts and granola bars from the Camp Victory chow-hall the day before. Opening the door and peering out into the hallway I saw it empty and walked across the hall to the head, shower and laundry room to do my morning business. Despite being a Baath Party playground the suites at the Ramadan Inn were not furnished with their own toilet or shower, just a small sink and mirror.

Ramadan Inn

Though the Ramadan Inn had seen better days it was certainly, despite being the playground of Uday and Qusay Hussein it was not exactly a palace like those of their father Saddam. It was somewhat reminiscent of an old and run down motel along Route 666. The floor was a marble type tile and the sand painted concrete building with a flat roof. I strolled over to the head in my PT-sleep clothes and was relieved to be able to relieve myself in a facility that had actual porcelain shitters which flushed using real water. If you have been to Iraq or Afghanistan you know that this is not always the case. The showers were passable being a more European design and the water was hot. I guess even the cold water was hot in Fallujah with temps in the 120s. Once I had gotten up I awakened Nelson, the sleeping beauty. He then went through his morning ritual to make himself presentable to the world. Those who know nelson know that if he can he will take care of his personal hygiene. I ate one of my Strawberry Filled frosted Pop Tarts washed done with water and when Nelson was ready we walked over to the Chaplain office. It was like a maze to get there. We walked across the way a bit, took a right, made a left and went through the normal transient quarters area, took a right went up a block or two, took a left, made another left, wound our way past a decorative lake, took a right, went past a number of buildings before passing a final bank of green porta-johns finding the MEF- Forward Chaplain Office to our right. The sun shone brightly and though not a long walk was relatively warm and by the time we got to the Chaplain Office I was sweating.

fallujah pond Pond at Fallujah

The Chaplain office was like every other facility and was protected by California Barriers or Hesco’s. We were met by RP1 Roland and the Deputy MEF-FWD Chaplain CDR J.P. Hedges. They were most hospitable and offered us water as well as coffee, which my caffeine deprived brain needed badly. After introductions Nelson got together with RP1 Roland and I met with Chaplain Hedges doing the usual butt-sniffing that military professionals engage in when meeting someone for the first time. This ritual usually consists of learning who our mutual friends are, where and with whom we had served in the Navy, where we went to school, something about our families and for Chaplains our faith tradition or denominational affiliation. This is a customary act for chaplains as it is for other communities and specialties in the Navy. On the positive side it is a way of making connection with each other and building relationships. It is also a way or self preservation within the system as sometime there are people that do not have your best interests at heart. However for J.P. and I the meeting was very friendly. We d a lot of shared experiences in the types of duties we had done and we had mutual friends. While we enjoyed conversation he began to introduce me to some of the things that had been going on in country the last few months. After about 30 minutes Chaplain Mike Langston came in. It was Mike who had worked with Peter Dissmore and the Corps Chaplain to bring us out to the west to cover the Marine and Army advisors in Al Anbar Province.

Mike had a couple of orders of business to take care of before he brought Nelson and I into his office and had our reunion. Nelson and I had both worked with Chaplain Langston. It was good to see him again. Nelson had worked for him in Afghanistan and I had been with him at 2nd Marine Division in 2000-2001. He and Chaplain John Kaul arranged for me to take over Headquarters Battalion upon my return to work in a quasi-regimental billet with oversight of the independent battalions Religious Ministry Teams, though not the actual supervision of them. In addition to my regular duties counseling Marines, doing suicide interventions, conducting classes and supporting field exercises they used me, because of my experience to assist and evaluate chaplains who had been fired or relieved of their duties. I got each one for 30-60 days to see if they could be recovered for further service or not. In a sense this transformed me from a relief pitcher to a pitching coach. Chaplain Langston was at a school when 9-11 occurred and during this time I was used as the Deputy Division Chaplain looking at readiness, training and potential deployment of our religious ministry teams with their units. Both Nelson and I had experienced Chaplain Langston as a tough but fair chaplain. What he did expect was that we would be out doing our job and keeping him or his office in the loop on our operations and issues facing us. He did not attempt to micro-manage us.

bunkers_everywhere.jpg.w300h225 Bunkers to Protect Against Indirect Fire at Camp Fallujah

Mike Langston is a prior Marine Corps Infantry Officer who had been a been a Company Commander and battalion staff officer as well as instructor at “The Basic Course” which is the leveling field for all Marine Corps officers regardless of their commissioning source. He played football in college and still has the physique of a defensive lineman. He left active duty and went to seminary and when he was ordained and graduated from seminary entered the Navy Chaplain Corps. He had since risen to the pinnacle of a career for most chaplains having been promoted to Captain, the same as a Colonel for the other services and assigned as the 2^nd Marine Division Chaplain. He is a no-nonsense kind of guy and kind with a high level of energy and emotion. He explained the current situation in the Province was, the locations of the various Marine Regimental Combat Teams (RCT-2 and RCT-6) as well as the one Army Brigade Combat Team, 3^rd Brigade, 4^th Infantry Division as well as the 1^st Light Armor Reconnaissance Battalion and the MEF Aviation and logistics assets were located. He then got down to the specifics of our mission which were pretty simple and suited to our personality as a ministry team. Basically he expected us to manage our own operations in the MEF area of operations. He expected that we coordinate our operations with the teams that we would support and keep his office informed of where we were going and what our general plan of operation was. Since he had worked with both of us and we were both known and trusted quantities he gave us a tremendous amount of operational freedom to do our job. His expectation was that we would be active and get out to the remotest places that we had training and assistance teams of advisors. He told us about an Army team that had been based in Ramadi to do the job with the advisors. He confirmed what Peter Dissmore had told us about this team. They had never left the base in 4 months and basically hung out at the Ramadi main chapel. They managed to get their orders curtailed and left theater never once having contacted or visited any advisory teams.

ega fallujah Monument in the Traffic Circle at Camp Fallujah

We were also told of a change to our projected base of operations. Our original plan of operations had us working out of the former British and Iraqi base at Habbinyah the location of the headquarters of the 1^st Iraqi Division and the Advisors assigned to it. Instead the Colonel in charge of those teams made the call that he could not support the operations of a Chaplain from his location. He held firm on this and the plan was changed so that we would operate from Ta’Qaddum a large air and logistic hub about equidistant between Fallujah and Ramadi. Ta’Qaddum is adjacent to Habbinyah on the south side of the Euphrates. It sits atop an escarpment overlooking the town to the north and Lake Habbinyah in the South. In 1941 it was the site of a siege when the Iraqi military launched a revolt against the British who occupied the country despite it being given independence at the end of World War One. The British we besieged in Habbinyah and the Iraq forces had the high ground atop the escarpment. Unfortunately for the Iraqis and fortunately for the British the British forces had support from the Royal Air Force and the Iraqis had no logistics ability to support their units atop the escarpment. The Iraqi forces were pounded and eventually a relief force arrived from Jordon to break the siege. At TQ as it is known by most Americans we would be housed and taken care of by the 2^nd Marine Logistics Group Chaplain, Commander Pat McLaughlin and his team. We were instructed to make coordination to plan work with the teams supporting the 7^th Iraqi Division, the 2^nd Border Brigade, Iraqi Highway Patrol and the Provincial Police forces while working to build a bridge to the teams of the 1^st Iraqi Division. The change was momentarily upsetting but ultimately it opened the door to the entire province where if we had been co-located with the 1^st Division we may not have gotten out of its operational area.

Following the briefing, he, J.P, RP1 Roland, Nelson and I went to lunch at one of the two major chow halls on the camp where I met up with an old friend. The friend was Captain Luke Fabiunke with whom I had served for 2 years at Marine Security Forces Battalion. Luke was our S-6 and the Communications officer at Security Forces. He was always fun to hang out with and was very supportive of my work as a chaplain there. Luke was in the G-3 Operations shop t the MEF and specifically was working with the section that dealt with the training and advisory teams in the province. It was good to see him and he immediately upon learning our mission asked how he could help. This hook up was one that paid off in spades in the next 6 months. It is a lesson that Chaplains need to build relationships with other staff officers in order to be successful, not just in their current assignment but in many cases later in their careers when they need assistance the most. For me it helped meet my mission of finding and making contact with advisory teams of all types as soon as we hit the ground rather than operating blindly trying to figure our way around the labyrinth that was the operational setting for these teams. I think that I owe Luke a beer or two for his assistance.

Following lunch we got to work. Helped by Chaplain Hedges and RP1 Roland we were issued flight suits and Nelson a couple of sets of Marine Pattern Camouflage uniforms and I was issued two elderly Panasonic Tough Book laptops. One was set up for regular unclassified traffic and the other for classified work dealing with intelligence reports, weather and planning and submitting air movement requests. Despite being a highly technological military when one gets into a combat zone technology assets for oddball teams like ours are sometimes scarce. In fact I understood from Peter back at IAG that most of the Army teams had to share assets with others just to communicate. Chaplain Langston and his staff ensured that we had freedom to be able to do our job without having to inconvenience others to do it. They laptops may have been elderly but they worked. Chaplain Hedges taught me the ins and outs of planning and coordinating the air support from Marine, Army and Air Force aviation assets and helped get us set up to do this. Once again we got what we needed to do our mission.

We spent another three days in Fallujah preparing for the mission and making coordination with staff sections and others that we might have to call upon. We also had a number of reunions with others that both of us had served with. I met Major Andy Niebel and Lieutenant Colonel Dave Ottignon who I had served with a Second Combat Engineer Battalion. They were good friends then and are men for whom I have a tremendous amount of respect. I also met a number of Chaplain with whom I had previously served or knew from other duty stations. One of these was LT Joe Buenviaje, who had been my RP at 1^st Battalion 8^th Marines when I had done my relief pitching job there. Joe had cross-rated from being a Boiler Technician to the RP rating not long before I had met him. We had qualified for the old FMF qualification together and I was able to help him begin his journey to be a Navy Chaplain. I was also blessed and honored to baptize his children at Camp LeJuene. Joe has a heart of gold and did well in Iraq. He got out with his Marines a lot, once almost getting blown up by an explosive device which blew up a highway overpass where they had just been conducting services. With them was a Catholic priest who had likewise just celebrated Mass. They were leaving the site when the explosion hit and following the attack helped to take care of the wounded.

Having a cross on your uniform in a chow hall can lead to interesting situations as well as ministry. Some people will automatically avoid you when they see the cross as if faith and religion was some sort of communicable disease. I admit that there are some religious people and groups across the faith continuum that I think are toxic so I understand this. Likewise there are people have been used, abused or burned by religious leaders or groups and thus want nothing to do with organized or even disorganized religion. There are other people who are afraid that if they say something wrong that the chaplain might come down on them. There are still others who when they see that you are a chaplain ensure that they get together with you and some will even pray for you. Regardless of the situation I always try to be friendly to those around me in a chow hall despite my preference for my introversion. In fact I will attempt to start up conversations with anyone around me if nothing else to let them know that I know that they are there and that they can talk with me.

Some of the people that we supped or dined with were Religious Programs specialists like Nelson….well actually not so much like Nelson. Nelson is one of those one of a kind animals that the Deity Herself cracked the mold when he was out of the oven. These young men and women had been in country various lengths of time and were having as happens in almost every case good or bad experiences working with their chaplain. There are unfortunately a few bad apples that mistreat their RPs and give the rest of us a bad name. Likewise there are bad RPs in the force. Some actually set new lows for military conduct and discipline and give a bad name to the good sailors in the rating. I had one that stole from the offering in Okinawa, forged offering forms, leave papers and burned up a new pickup truck to try to get the insurance money. I had another who tested positive for cocaine upon arriving to my ship and yet another who pretty much stayed one step ahead of the law. I guess it is human nature that we get such folks and unfortunately because there are people like this who serve as Chaplains and RPs there is kind of a guilt by association. As such RPs question the RPs that they know as to how their chaplains treat them and are often wary of a chaplain that they do not know. Nelson assured them that I was “cool” and we had a couple of interesting meals together.

There were a number of times in Fallujah where young sailors or Marines approached me about spiritual issues, family problems or prayer requests. There were even some young men and women who were interesting in becoming chaplains. It was neat to be able to be there in those moments where our lives intersected, maybe for the one and only time.

We spent our last day in Fallujah getting ready for our flight, another really late flight. During the day we heard that an Army CH-47 Chinook had crashed at TQ killing the crew and that the cause was undetermined as to whether it was due to hostile fire or a mechanical problem. Such incidents raise your pucker factor especially when you will be flying into the same place that they crashed. With this in mind we picked up our laundry had some chow, made some final coordination, called and e-mailed our families, did some PT and settled in for the evening waiting for RP1 Roland to pick us up. While outgoing artillery boomed in the distance we sat back in our room at the Ramadan Inn and discussed our plans, as well as wondered out loud what was in store for us.

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Filed under History, iraq,afghanistan, Military, Pastoral Care, Tour in Iraq

Tagged as 1st bn 8th marines, 1st iraqi division, 2nd iraqi border brigade, 2nd marine divsion, 2nd mlg, 3rd bct 4th id, 7th iraqi division, 9-11 2001, advisors, al anbar province, baath party, camp fallujah, camp victory, ch-47, chaplain j p hedges, chaplain joe buenviaje, chaplain michael langston, chaplain Pat McGloghlin, fallujah, habbinyah, iag, ii mef, ii mef fwd, iraq, iraq assistance group, iraqi highway patrol, iraqi provincial police, ist lar, ltcol dave ottignon, luke fabiunke, major andy niebel, marine artillery, marine security forces, military training teams, nelson lebron, panasonic tough book laptop, pop tarts, porta-johns, ramada, ramadi, rct-2, rct-6, religious ministry team, religious program specialists, rmt, route 666, rp1 donnie roland, seige of habbinyah 1941, ta qaddum, the basic course, tq, uday and qusay hussein

September 5, 2009 · 15:28

Managing the “AAA” Franchise: A View from 102

“Baseball is a simple game. If you have good players and if you keep them in the right frame of mind then the manager is a success.” Sparky Anderson

“I believe managing is like holding a dove in your hand. If you hold it too tightly you kill it, but if you hold it too loosely, you lose it.” Tommy Lasorda

This has been an interesting year for the Norfolk Tides. For me the year has been the first where I have had the opportunity to observe the game on nearly a daily basis from field level behind the plate. The proximity of where I sit to the playing field in Section 102, Row B Seat 2 at the Church of Baseball, Harbor Park Parish has given me the chance to sharpen my eye for the nuances of the game. Part of this has been lessons on life, leadership, strategy, player development and the psychology of winning and organizations that win. In fact if you are a regular reader of this website you will likely note that baseball is pervasive in my writings. Likewise the subject of baseball is usually entwined with my local team the Norfolk Tides who inhabit the parish church with me. Thus my closest observations of the game come from watching the Tides. Over the course of the season I have become familiar with the players met a decent number of the starting pitchers on more than one occasion each as well as talked with scouts and former players. Additionally one of the best baseball men round who really needs to be hired as a color man for the Tides radio show is Elliott the Usher. Elliott and I have had numerous discussions regarding strategy, player development and baseball philosophy throughout the season, not always agreeing, but each hearing what the other had to say. Elliott knows the game, knows the players and despite being a Red Sox fan, not that there’s anything wrong with that is a great human being. Thank the Deity Herself that he is not a Dodgers fan, yeech!

So anyway, here are a couple of Padre Steve’s observations about the Tides this year that I think hurt player development and kept them out of the playoffs. Now I don’t think being in the playoff as a minor league team is the end all of life, but it does not hurt the organization. My thesis is that although the Tides suffered an end of July and August collapse that need not have happened and may have hurt a number of player’s chances of making the majors. The collapse was like the old “June Swoon” days of the San Francisco Giants only worse. Yet despite the swoon the Tides continued to maintain one of the highest batting averages in the league and their pitching, though not as reliable as earlier in the season was constantly around the middle of the league. I think that there is a reason for what happened to the reliability of the pitching and it is not because the pitchers suddenly went bad. I’ll explain this further on in this article.

Fielding, in regard to the number of errors committed by the infield was not that much different than their International League South rivals. However it seemed that the errors committed by Tides players tended to come at the worst possible time and often scuttled solid performances by pitchers. My thesis is that this was not a case of the talent available to the team despite mid-season call ups and injuries. Nor is it just because the players did not play as well as they could thus I would take issue with those who would who want to simply blame the collapse on these factors. Did they play a part? Yes, were they the over-riding factor? I don’t think so.

The most important person on a Triple “A” team is the Manager. The manager sets the tone for the team and is the face of the team. The manager is not simply a teacher, but someone who has to have a feel, almost a 6^th sense for how players are doing at given points in the game or season, what their strengths and weaknesses are and what makes them tick…in other words the way that a manager deals with his players is as important to their development and success as is the talent and ability that the players bring to the team when they show up. A minor league manager cannot allow himself to just be a cog in the big league club’s system. The manager needs to be able to make the hard calls of telling the big club what he thinks of where players can fit and when and where they should play. A manager should never be a slave to arbitrary pitch counts, especially if he sees a pitcher is really doing badly early, or if he sees a pitcher doing well enough to complete a game. Psychology is as important as numbers. There are times players need to be handled with great care and other times that they might need a dressing down or boot up their ass, but this must be well thought out and not an arbitrary process. Likewise, there is the emotional tone that a player sets in the clubhouse. There is no right or wrong as to style, but the manager needs to be able to make his style work. If he cannot the cohesion of the club will suffer as will the hardiness of the players, individually and as a team to weather difficult times during the season. All this said it is my belief that Tides manager Gary Allenson was not effective in this, especially during July and August. This is certainly not to be interpreted as a sour grapes kind of accusation. As someone who has had the responsibility for over a hundred personnel, and a couple of million dollars worth of equipment and property as well as regularly dealing with people in life and death circumstances I am sensitive to the weight on a manager’s shoulders and I have taken my share of criticism. The job is not easy and Allenson has had a lot of success during his managing career. So I am not saying that he is a bad manager, but that this year his management of the team was a causal factor in the collapse.

To go into specifics the biggest places that this was apparent was with the pitching staff. When a starter of reliever got in trouble it seemed that Allenson was often disengaged. Maybe he was trying to reach a pitch count with them or maybe trying to teach them how to pitch through difficult situations. Patently these are important in grooming pitchers but cannot be seen as the goal itself. They are rather measurement tool to assess the pitcher’s development and readiness to play at the current level or move up in the organization. However, the tools cannot be allowed to dictate the manager’s decision making process. Observing this close hand watching the pitchers at various points during the game and season and watching Allenson’s body language in the dugout as well as how long it would take to have a reliever ready makes me believe that these were overriding factors in the decision making process.

I do not know if Allenson’s intent was to let pitchers try to work through rough outings without relief every time that they pitch, or if it is something that the Orioles have instructed him to do. Regardless of what it is that plan did not work. The pitching staff became demoralized it was evident in their body language and by what was heard around the park. It is fine to occasionally let a pitcher work through a difficult patch and even get roughed up a bit. That builds character and perseverance, in fact not to do it promotes a false sense of confidence that hurts the pitcher later on. However it is not a good policy to do this in every game as it becomes counterproductive as the pitcher loses confidence because they are not winning. This appeared to be what was happening with Tides pitchers. The psychology of pitchers depends a lot on winning. To take a pitcher out before he gets in trouble while he is ahead is not a bad thing. Winning helps promote a winning attitude that carries over from game to game. Pulling a pitcher before he gets in trouble can be used to the benefit of the pitcher and the team. This is the way of great major league managers including Earl Weaver. Allowing pitchers to be roughed up and have no relief waiting in the bullpen on a regular basis is detrimental to their development and serves no purpose. Thus if a pitcher is beaten and the manager knows it leaving him in the game serves no purpose unless it is simply to preserve the bullpen. If a manager senses that a pitcher is in trouble he should be more like Earl Weaver and get the guy out of the game for his good as well as that of the team. Losing is contagious. Lose a lot, especially when the losses could have been avoided and a team loses its fire and often its heart. Take a look at perennial winning and losing teams and you will find that it is not just the talent that makes a team, it is the management and manner in which they work with the talent available that make them the organizations that they are. Winning organizations promote winning at all levels.

Another aspect of the management of Tides pitchers has been the lack of consistency in developing relief pitchers. It is important to work to individual pitcher’s strengths in how they are employed. If a reliever finds his particular niche then it is incumbent on management to build on this. Relievers are a quirky breed and by the time that they are in Triple “A” ball the management should have a relatively good idea of where they fit in the organization and start preparing them for that role on the big league club. Thus at Triple “A” it is not the best policy to give players shots at all the different relief situations, especially if it takes someone who has the potential to be a great closer out of his game. Case in point for the Tides was the use of Jim Miller. Miller became the Tides closer early in the season and by the All-Star break had 15 saves. When Miller went in during the first half of the season it was almost automatic that he would close the game successfully. After the All-Star break Miller was bounced to middle relief and occasional set up roles as the Orioles according to Gary Allenson “wanted to turn him into a two-inning pitcher, because he’s probably not going to close games in the big leagues.” Miller said recently that he would rather finish games. “That’s what I’ve done my whole career. They wanted to stretch me out, have me throwing 30-35 pitches. If that’s what they want, of course, that’s what I’ll do. But I like closing games.” It was noticeable how uncomfortable Miller was and how his effectiveness went down when moved out of the closer role. I’m a firm believer that if someone does something better than others that you play to strength and build on it. Guys who can close a game and have a closers mindset are rare; those guys need to be coached to be even better and not bounced around. Miller has come into the game in the 9th in close situations since the 31st and has been his old self, even games where he had no chance at a save he shut the opponent down. It may be the case that the Orioles do not need Miller as a closer, however he could be the 8^th inning set up man, not the 5^th to 7^th inning middle reliever and still keep a closer mindset.

Winning organizations know when a player is in his element and from thereon work hard to make him the best at that position and to put complementary players around him. To win an organization needs no only to produce a lot of middle of the road jack of all trades utility players but guys who can become All-Stars. Utility players do not end up on the All-Star team and while important to an organization are not the building blocks of it. I have heard it said that giving infielders experience at a lot of different positions helps them get to the majors. While I believe this has some validity, I think if an infielder is gifted at a certain position, say 2nd, 3rd or shortstop and has the potential to be a starter in that position on the major league club then it imperative that the organization focus on making him the best possible player at that position. Can the player be used at other positions occasionally? Of course, they need to be somewhat versatile but to use a military expression, I think it is best to “train as you fight.” In other words of the player is being groomed for a certain position don’t waste too much time trying him at other positions, or moving him to allow someone who is a utility player to play in his spot. A Triple “A” team might have one of these players on their team at any given time; they should be the linchpin around which utility players are utilized. I think that 2^nd Baseman Justin Turner was this player on the 2009 Tides and should be used in this manner in 2010 as the Orioles prepare to bring him up. Can he play other positions? Certainly, but watching him the further he was moved from 2^nd base the less effective and sure of himself he became.

Next year should be interesting. Several of the late season call ups from Bowie should be good additions to the club, notably outfielders Jonathan Tucker and Dave Krynzel. Guillermo Rodriguez should remain at catcher as he has the potential to develop pitchers and be available on short notice to play in Baltimore as a backup for Matt Wieters. Injured Scott Moore, Donnie Murphy and Justin Christian should be back as should Rhyne Hughes, Brandon Snyder and Brandon Pinckney. Pitchers Chris Waters if not taken up to Baltimore or traded should be back, as should Jake Arrieta, Chris Lambert and Chris George. Andy Mitchell would be an ideal middle to long reliever to follow hard throwing starters with his submarine style delivery. Jim Miller needs to be kept if not brought up to the Orioles or traded, as should Josh Perrault and Troy Patton. Other pitchers on the current staff could still be of use; Bob McCrory seemed to be doing well at the end of the season and as did Ross Wolf. I believe that starter David Pauley is a free agent after this season so I do not know if he will be back. Of the other position players I think it unlikely that 37 year old Jolbert Cabrera comes back and wonder if Melvin Dorta and Blake Davis need to be at Norfolk as both had significant numbers of errors.

If I was the Orioles organization I would re-look to see if Gary Allenson is the man to continue to lead the team. The last half of the season the team has not performed to the level that it could have. Some of this maybe a lot has to do with management. It is possible that Allenson’s superiors in Baltimore are calling the shots at Norfolk and that he wants to manage differently. However my assumption has to be that Allenson was unable to get the team to gel after the loss of players to mid-year injuries and call-ups and did not adjust well to losing so much hitting at that time. Again my take is not that of a disgruntled fan, but an observer trying to make sense of what happened from the end of July until the end of August. My assessment is that it is largely a managerial problem, likely at the field level, though possibly higher in the Orioles organization as well.

It is too easy to criticize a manager and I have tried to be as fair as possible, however a team’s success is always to a great degree dictated by the manager and at the end of the year every organization has to ask itself if it has the right man for the manager’s job. It is incumbent to the organization to do so.

Peace, Steve+

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Filed under Baseball, leadership, philosophy

Tagged as andy mitchell, baltimore Orioles, blake davis, bowie bay socks, brandon p, brandon snyder, bullpen, chris george, chris lam, chris waters, closers, dave krynzel, david pauley, donnie murphy, earl weaver, elliott the usher, gary allenson, guillermo rodriguiez, harbor park, jake arrieta, jim miller, jolbert Cabrera, jonathan tucker, josh perrault, justin christian, justin turner, matt wieters, norfolk tides, pitch counts, pitching, psychology of baseball, relief pitchers, rhyne hughes, scott moore, tommy lasorda, troy patton, utility players

September 3, 2009 · 23:41

September Comes to Harbor Park: A New Month and a New Team

Batter Up: September Comes to Harbor Park

Fans of Triple “A” Baseball teams in the International League and Pacific Coast League understand that the on the 1^st of September the Major League Team will expand their roster. With the roster expansion at the Major League level there is a ripple effect and sometimes even a “sucking sound” as the Triple “A” affiliates have some of their most promising players taken up to the big leagues.

On some teams this process may be a season long process, especially if the Major League team is lacking depth, talent or is suffering from injuries to key players. However it is the roster expansion in September that changes the Triple “A” team significantly and all at once. A couple of things happen during this time. First and the most obvious is that key players are taken up to the Major League franchise. For some players this may be a repeat trip having been called up for a brief amount of time earlier in the season. For others it is their introduction to the big leagues and intended to give them Major League experience before going back down to the minors to continue working on their game the following year. For all it will be the opportunity for the Major League club to see them on the field, in the clubhouse and evaluate them to see where or if they have a place on the big club. The move up does not always mean that the organization will even keep the player; some might be traded or given their outright release.

Chris George in His Win

Simultaneous to the Major League call up the Triple “A” roster is reinforced by players from Double “A” and occasionally even single “A” farm teams. Again this is a similar process where players are given the chance to play at a higher level and be evaluated by the staff. The same dynamics apply as with the Major League team, except that for some players this is their last hurrah, they are being called up to fill a roster position and will be off the team or out of baseball the following year. In lower levels of Minor League ball the end of the season frequently sees those of marginal ability weeded out to make room for draft picks, college players and other prospects to have a place in the organization.

From my view from Section 102, Row B, Seat 2 at the Church of Baseball Harbor Park Parish the September 1^st call-up is the culmination of a season of call-ups and trades which began early and continued right up to the end of August. The Norfolk Tides inhabit the Parish Church with me and my friends, Elliott the Usher, Barry the Scorekeeper, Chip the Usher, Terri the Usher, Marty the Card Dealer, Kenny the Pretzel Guy aka “Crabmeat,” as well as Ray and Charlie and their crew from the Vietnam Veterans of Virginia who man the Beer stand on the concourse behind home plate and several thousand others depending on which night the services are held. The Tides are the Triple “A” affiliate of the Baltimore Orioles.

034 Robby Hammock Doubles against Charlotte

The past few years the Orioles have been engaged in a rebuilding process which for many has been long and painful and is not yet complete. They began in the lower “A” level and progressively worked their way up so that their minor league organization is one of the best in baseball at least as far as talent and prospects are concerned. Some of that talent had filtered up to Baltimore by the beginning of the year but the Orioles were still a very weak team as they entered the season. By May the team was calling up members of the Tides, Outfielder Nolan Reimold and Catcher Matt Wieters were among the first to go along with pitchers Brad Bergeson, Lance Berken. Others would follow throughout the year so that even before the call up at least a dozen former members of this year’s Tides team including pitchers David Hernandez, Chris Tillman and Kam Mickalio were up with Baltimore, or who like Oscar Salazar made the Orioles and were traded and are still in the big leagues. There were others who were traded at the very end of August including Joey Gathright who went to the Red Sox and Freddy Guzman who went to the Yankees. There were a number of players who had season ending injuries that might have been called up including Justin Christian, Scott Moore and Jolbert Cabrera. Cabrera’s injury may be a career ender as he turns 37 in December.

score Safe!

The players called up on September 1^st were pitchers Dennis Safrate, Matt Albers and Alberto Castillo. Outfielder Jeff Fiorentino who is arguably the MVP for the Tides this year was also called up. Unfortunately for Fiorentino the Orioles have a stocked outfield of Nick Markakis, Adam Jones and Nolan Reimold so it unlikely that he will stay up beyond the regular season. It is expected that the O’s will call up several more players on September 8^th following the end of the International League season. There is talk of a couple of pitchers, perhaps Chris Waters and Jim Miller as well a catcher and Second Baseman Justin Turner.

For us in the Church of baseball it meant that we had a season that was very good and really bad. The Tides were probably the best team in Triple “A” at the beginning of the season. By early June they had a large division lead and had close to .700 winning percentage. With hitting which included power and speed the Tides have had one of the top batting averages in the league all year, even at the end of the season. Currently they are batting .274 as a team only .001 behind Columbus which is at .275. The pitching staff was solid but after call ups and injuries mid-season became less effective about the same time the Tides lost most of their power hitters. This resulted in a All-Star break the team began slump in which the Tides ended up dropping back to 3^rd place and a winning percentage of just above .500.

The Tides have 5 games to finish out the season. The new players are beginning to show some life and the Orioles and Tides management will beginning planning for the 2010 campaign. Of particular interest to me are catcher Guillermo Rodriguez an excellent defensive catcher with a better bat than we have seen at that position sin a long time with the exception of Matt Wieters and outfielder Jonathan Tucker just up from AA Bowie where he was on the Eastern League All-Star team this year. He is much like Joey Gathright, a speedy contact hitter with excellent range in the outfield and I expect that Jonathan will be patrolling the outfield for the Tides in 2010. Recently acquired Rhyne Hughes has added punch to the lineup at First Base hitting home runs in his last two games and I would not be surprised to see the Orioles keep him around.

Moon over Harbor Park

September has started better for the Tides and for the first time since August 6^th. The win streak has improved the Tides record to 70-68 moving them back to a .507 winning percentage, currently in 3^rd place in the IL South. In the three games the Tides have outscored their opponents 21-3 defeating Charlotte 10-0, Gwinnett 8-1 and 3-2. Andy Mitchell, Chris George and Chris Lambert got the wins in strong performances. Tides relievers were excellent allowing no runs. Jim Miller rang up his 17^th save tonight having reclaimed his rightful place as the Tides closer. The two wins over Gwinnett have dropped that former rival from Richmond to 2 games back of Durham for the I South Title with 4 games left to play.

Friday night the Tides will play their last home game of the season at the Church of Baseball, Harbor Park parish at 7:15 against these same Braves hoping to put another nail in the Braves Title hopes.

Peace,

Steve+

The Guadalcanal Campaign and the Beginning of Joint Operations

The Guadalcanal campaign was the first experiment by the United States of conducting a “joint” campaign in modern warfare involving Naval and Naval Air, Ground combat units, Army air assets and amphibious operations. The campaign involved numerous land, sea and air battles. It was under the command of Admiral Nimitz as CINCPACFLTand included commanders for ground, air and sea forces engaged. For brevity and simplicity sake I will discuss the campaign and sea even though they are interconnected with the sea and air campaigns directly affecting the outcome of the land campaign.

Designated OPERATION WATCHTOWER and aptly called OPERATION SHOESTRING the campaign was launched on short notice, approved on 2 July the commanders of the operation first learned of it on 7 July. Utilizing the 1^st Marine Division, which would later be reinforced by the Americal Division, landed on Guadalcanal and the neighboring island of Tulagi on 7 August. The Marines took Tulagi after a brief but bloody fight and the few Japanese troops on Guadalcanal fled inland allowing the Marines to seize the airfield. Unfortunately, the commander of the supporting US carrier task force, Admiral Frank Fletcher fearing danger to his carriers and withdrew following the landings. The forces in direct support were surprised by a Japanese cruiser force under Admiral Mikawa losing 3 American and 1 Australian heavy cruiser in one of the worst American naval defeats in history at the Battle of Savo Island. The next morning the transports, many still full of supplies left the Marines. Admiral Fletcher’s action, which left the Marines without air cover and carrier support gave the Marines a new term, still in use today, for being left high and dry: “to be Fletchered.”

The Land Battles: The Japanese quickly responded sending in Naval Landing forces which went in light without all their troops or equipment. The Ichiki detachment was wiped out in the battle of the Tenaru (Ilu) river on 20 August. The Kawaguchi detachment of 3,500 men landed in two groups, again short of men, material and equipment landed in the closing days of August and attempted to seize the now operational “Henderson” field on September 13to 14^th after one of its supporting units had been destroyed by the 1^st Raider Battalion in a small amphibious assault. Kawaguchi’s attack was disjointed and his units dispersed. He was defeated in detail by the Marines in the Battle of “Edson’s ridge” or “Bloody Ridge.” The Marines attacked and destroyed another Japanese force at the Mataniko river on 9 October. The Marines were further reinforced by the 7^th Marine Regiment while Kawaguchi was reinforced by the HQ of 17^th Army under General Hyakutake who brought the 2^nd Division onto the Island under the command of General Maruyama. Kawaguchi would then be relieved and sent home following disagreements with Maruyama and his chief of staff prior to the next major Japanese attack which took place 23-25 October along the same ridgeline that Kawaguchi had assaulted. Though the Japanese now had 15,000 troops with good artillery support, the attacks were fierce but uncoordinated. Defended by 7^th Marines under Chesty Puller as well as troops from the recently arrived Americal, the Marines again effectively destroyed the attacking Japanese force. Despite additional reinforcements of the 38^th Division, the Japanese, due to severe food, supply and ammunition shortages would not make any more major attempts to take the airfield. The Americans would shift to the offensive with the Army XIV Corps composed of the 25^th Division, Americal Division and Second Marine Division under Major General Lawton J “Lightening Joe” Collins commanding in December.

The Sea Battles: The sea campaign in the waters surrounding Guadalcanal would be marked by some of the bloodiest sea battles in the history of the US Navy. So many ships from both navies would be sunk offshore that the waters would become known as “Ironbottom Sound.” Following the previously mentioned “Battle of Savo Island” the Americans lost the carrier Saratoga to torpedo damage and the Wasp was sunk while escorting a convoy. In the Battle of Eastern Solomon’s of 24 August the Americans have the Enterprise knocked out of action for 2 months and while sinking a Japanese light carrier and inflicting heavy aircraft losses on the Japanese.The Americans surprised a Japanese force on 11 October off Cape Esperance sinking a heavy cruiser and destroyer and heavily damaging a second heavy cruiser. The Japanese effort, now directed by Yamamoto brought battleships to support operations around Guadalcanal, including bombardments of the airfield on 13-14October in support of Maruyama. The attacks damaged but did not close Henderson field which was able to continue air support to the Marines and soldiers. On 26 October a carrier engagement would be fought, the Battle of Santa Cruz Islands would be a tactical Japanese victory sinking the Hornet and damaging Enterprise, while losing no ships. Two Japanese carriers were damaged but they lost a large number of pilots and aircrews who could not be readily replaced. They also not succeed in their amphibious efforts to retake the island or Henderson field, gaining the Americans badly needed time. On 13 November the Japanese attempted to repeat the bombardment of Henderson field but would be stopped from doing so by a task force under Admiral Daniel Callaghan. The First Naval Battle of Guadalcanal cost the Japanese the battleship Hiei and two destroyers, additionally many of the transports bringing Japanese reinforcements would be sunk by aircraft from Henderson field and Enterprise. The Americans lost 2 cruisers and 4 destroyers sunk and every other ship save the destroyer Fletcher damaged. Admiral Callaghan and Admiral Scott, the victor of Cape Esperance were both killed. The following night the Japanese would lose the battleship Kirishima to the USS Washington task group under the command of Admiral Willis Lee. Further Japanese naval activity would be limited to attempts to reinforce the island with destroyers; during one of these operations on 29 November they would clash with a force of American cruisers and destroyers at Cape Tassafaronga, sinking 1 cruiser and badly damaging three more at the cost of one destroyer, but was unable to complete his supply run. Though the Americans lost more total warships, the Japanese could not replace what they lost.

Air Operations: The air operations would be decisive to the effort, land based aircraft of the Japanese played a key role in destroying some US shipping and sinking warships in waters off Guadalcanal however they could not maintain air superiority over the island which was maintained and increased by the Americans as Henderson field’s capacity grew and additional Army, navy and Marine aircraft were stationed there. Naval air was extremely important in the sea battles around the island.

Japanese Reaction: The Japanese reaction was one of dismay; they could not fulfill their promise to the emperor to retake the island. They had lost many ships and aircraft as well as ground troops. From this time on the Japanese would go over to a strategic defensive in the Pacific. Japanese losses were devastating as they could not be made up.

Importance for the Americans: This was important in a number of ways. For the navy it showed that they could defeat Japanese surface ships in night engagements and gave the navy great experience as it moved forward in the South and Central Pacific. American carrier air crews had become experienced and gained superiority over the Japanese. On the ground the myth of the Japanese “superman” was destroyed, yet American commanders also began to appreciate the skill, endurance and tenacity of the Japanese soldier in future operations.

Importance for Joint Operations: The campaign also was a triumph for the Americans in the fact that they were able to overcome inter-service rivalries undertake a difficult operation against a stronger opponent far from major fleet logistics and support basis. To be sure this was Joint Operations in its infancy and until the arrival of significant Army forces on the island to relieve the Marines was for the most part a Navy, Marine Corps and Army Air Corps operation. When Major General Lawton “Lightning Joe” Collins assumed command of the island from Marine Major General Alexander Vandergrift it became a true-inter service operation and the beginning of Joint Operations.

The Treaty Cruisers: A Warship Review

Note: Since childhood I have loved naval history and the study of various types of warship design throughout history. My favorite period is really from the Spanish-American War through the mid 1970’s. I find the leaps in Naval design and architecture, weapons and fire control systems and the diversity of the types of ships built absolutely fascinating. Not only initial designs but the various modifications and modernizations of various ships or classes of ships went through during their service careers. The cruisers of the inter-war period were some of the most ascetically pleasing warships to ever grace the high seas. They were well proportioned, and graceful while still looking every part the warship. This is something that many ships in our modern era lack, despite the fact that their armament despite limited gun power is formidable. With VLS launchers and Harpoon Missile tubes they pack a punch, but unlike the old cruisers, their offensive teeth are hidden. I had the privilege of serving aboard the USS HUE CITY CG-66 which is about the same size and displacement of the Chester Class

I think I actually began reading Naval history back in 2^nd or 3^rd grade, and it was not uncommon for me to spend hours at the public library going through reference stacks to read old issues of “Jane’s Fighting Ships” and the main collection to check out every book on Naval Warfare and warships that I could find. One of the most interesting types of ship to me was the Heavy Cruisers built under the restrictions of the Washington Naval Treaty. The treaty had several major provisions but today I only deal with the restrictions on Heavy Cruisers, the response of treaty nations to the limitations and the combat summary of each class. This is all pretty much out of the deep recesses of my sometimes dark mind and tonight I didn’t have to crack a book to write this. It’s thanks to having one of those phonographic memories that just keeps going around and around. This is another one of the things that I am passionate about. Anchor’s Away! Peace, Steve+

atago

IJN Atago

The Washington Naval Conference of 1921-1922 set a number of limits on warship construction and fleet composition. One of the ship types limited by the treaties was cruisers, notably heavy cruisers. These ships, descended from the Armored Cruisers developed by the navies of the great powers prior to the First World War were considered a major part of each of the navies of the signatory nations. The armored cruisers had 8-10 inch guns and a relatively substantial armored belt. The type was not particularly successful as with few exceptions they were used in fleet actions where they were under-gunned and under-armored. They were most successfully used in overseas service against raiders or commerce. The most famous of the type were the German Scharnhorst and Gneisenau of the German Far East Squadron. Smaller and faster than a battleship, the type had developed by the 1920s into a ship that could be used for fleet screening and scouting as well as showing the flag in foreign waters where many were found. The Washington treaty did not limit numbers of these ships as it did Battleships and Aircraft Carriers, but it did place maximums on the gun size and displacement of individual ships. A heavy cruiser could be armed with 8 inch guns and were limited to 10,000 tons displacement. Of course this led to compromises in the designs of the ships which frequently gave up protection for speed.

USS Pensacola

The Americans were the leaders in the development of the treaty cruisers. The Japanese only built one class of cruiser, the Kako class which complied with the terms of the treaty. They mounted 6- 8” guns and displaced about 8,600 tons. They were fast but because of their light displacement were top-heavy. Subsequent classes, the Nachi and Atago classes violated the tonnage limits by as much as 4,000 tons while the Japanese reported them as 10,000 tons. They were armed with 10-8”guns in five turrets, had good protection and also mounted 12 24” “Long Lance” torpedo tubes. Two subsequent cruisers of the Kumano and Tone classes were built in the 1930s. The Kumano class of about 13,000 tons were initially classed as “light cruisers” mounting 15- 6” guns prior to being re-armed with 10-8” guns. The Tone’s mounted 8- 8”guns in 4 turrets all mounted forward leaving the entire aft section for use as a seaplane launching area; the Tone class carried 8 float planes for fleet scouting.

HMS Exeter

The British treaty cruisers abided by the limits included the York and Exeter, of the same displacement and armament as the Kako class except they were slower, a common feature of British ships which were generally slower than their American and Japanese counterparts. The later County class ships were armed with 8- 8” guns and were distinctive looking having three funnels. The County class included such famous ships as the Norfolk, Suffolk and Dorsetshire which played critical roles in the chase and sinking of the German Battleship Bismarck. Australia had two Counties, the Australia and Canberra which did most of their service in the Pacific. The Counties were armed with 8- 8” guns and were distinctive with their three funnels. They were slower than their Japanese or American counterparts.

USS Houston with President Roosevelt Aboard

The first American treaty cruisers the Pensacola and Salt Lake City of about 9,500 tons with an unusual arrangement of 10- 8” guns mounted in 4 turrets. However it was the Chester class which was the quintessential U.S. Treaty Cruiser design. These ships, and the later Astoria class, also displaced 9,500-10,000 tons and mounted 9- 8” guns in three turrets. A further “treaty” cruiser was Wichita, converted from a St. Louis class light cruiser. All were fast but were lacking in armored protection and none mounted the torpedoes found in Japanese or British ships. Some of the more notable ships in the U.S. treaty classes included the Houston which served as the Flagship of the Asiatic Fleet which was sunk at the Battle of the Java Sea. The Augusta which took Franklin D Roosevelt to Argentia for the signing of the Atlantic Charter in 1941; The San Francisco which helped stop the Japanese fleet in a point blank encounter in the Naval Battle of Guadalcanal and Indianapolis which with just weeks left in the war having completed the secret mission to deliver the Atomic bomb was sunk by a Japanese submarine.

PrinzEugen-2 Prinz Eugen

The Germans did not build true “heavy cruisers” until the late 1930’s and their ships, the Hipper, Blucher and Prinz Eugen mounted 8- 8” guns and displaced about 19,000 tons. The German “Pocket Battleships” Deutschland, Graf Spee and Admiral Scheer, mounted 6-11” guns on a hull of about 11,000 tons (officially 10,000) in compliance with the Treaty of Versailles restrictions on German battleships. They were designed to outgun and be more heavily armored than the heavy cruisers and be faster than battleships, much more in the Armored Cruiser tradition. During the war the German Navy reclassified them as Heavy Cruisers. None of these ships were built under the treaty limits for cruisers.

HMS Suffolk

These ships saw distinguished service throughout the war. The British ships remained their only heavy cruiser design throughout the war. The ships took part in the sinking of the Graf Spee and Bismarck. They also suffered heavily; York was sunk at Crete and Exeter in the Java Sea. Cumberland and Dorsetshire were sunk by Admiral Nagumo’s carriers which had attacked Pearl Harbor, in the Indian Ocean. Canberra was sunk at the Battle of Savo Island off Guadalcanal. Some of the British Ships remained in service until the 1950s and all eventually we paid off and sent to the breakers.

The Japanese ships were involved in almost every major action of the Pacific war. Fast, heavily armed and manned by well trained crews they dominated almost every surface action of the early war in the Pacific. The were key at the Battle of Java Sea and Savo Island where they annihilated Allied or American cruiser and destroyer squadrons. In action so often they were destroyed leaving only two marginally operational at the end of the war. Three of the four Kako class were lost in the Solomon’s. They were all involved at Savo Island, and the last survivor, Aoba was lost at in harbor to U.S. air strikes at Yokosuka at the close of the war. The Nachi class saw considerable service and were the workhorses of the Japanese cruiser force. They were the principle executioners of the ABDA fleet in the Java Sea battles and continued their service until late 1944 and the end of the war. Nachi and Ashigara were sunk in the aftermath of Leyte Gulf while Haguro fought the last surface action of a major Japanese combatant in a surface action of the war against a British force in 1945 and was sunk. and Myoko survived the war in a damaged condition being surrendered in Singapore. The Chokai class also served throughout the war and three of the four were lost at Leyte Gulf. The Atago and Maya were lost to the U.S. Submarines Darter and Dace, Chokai in the action at Samar to combined U.S. destroyer and air attacks from TAFFY-3. Takao survived the war in a damaged condition having been torpedoed at Leyte Gulf but making port. Of the later cruisers Mikuma was sunk at Midway and Mogami survived almost unimaginable damage in that battle. Mogami was sunk by the resurrected Pearl Harbor Battleships at the Battle of Surigo Strait while Kumano and Suzaya were lost off Samar. Chikuma and Tone also served in many battles, it was Tone’s float plane which was delayed in launching and discovered the U.S. carriers at Midway too late. Chikuma too was lost at Samar; Tone was sunk at anchor at Yokosuka in 1945. Leyte Gulf in a sense could be described as the “Death Ride” of the Japanese Cruiser force.

The U.S. cruisers fought valiantly in nearly every engagement of the Pacific war and a few in the Atlantic. Houston was immortalized by her actions with ABDA in the Java Sea against hopeless odds. Astoria, Vincennes and Quincy were sunk in the Savo Island debacle. Northampton and Chicago lost also in later actions in the Solomon’s. San Francisco and Portland fought toe to toe with the Japanese Battleships Hiei and Kirishima in the epic Naval Battle of Guadalcanal, inflicting so much damage on Hiei that she was later sunk by American Aircraft the following day. Indianapolis met an unlikely fate at the close of the war being sunk by a Japanese submarine after returning from a secret mission delivering the Atomic bomb. A series of unfortunate events led to her loss not being noted with the result that most of the survivors of the sinking being lost to the elements and shark attacks while waiting days for rescue. Others survived horrific damage from “Long Lance” torpedoes and Kamikaze attacks. Following the war the Pensacola’s were expended as targets and the remaining ships placed in “mothballs” until the late 1950s when all were scrapped. Some artifacts of San Francisco including her mast are at “Land’s End” park in that city.

uss san francisco USS San Fransisco Returning After the Naval Battle of Guadalcanal

Of all the navies involved only the United States Navy and German Kriegsmarine built or attempted to build new classes of heavy cruisers during the war. The US Navy brought out the Baltimore Class which was highly successful and built upon lessons learned from the Treaty Cruisers and the follow on Oregon City class which incorporated design improvements based on experience with the Baltimore Class. Some of these ships would be converted into the first US Guided Missile Cruisers. The later Des Moines Class the largest class of all gun cruisers ever built with fully automated 8″ gun systems. Of these ships only Salem survives in Quincy MA as a museum ship, sadly the Des Moines which had been slated to become a Museum ship in Milwaukee was scrapped in 2007 .

No treaty cruiser survives today. Their service, heroic, unceasing and tireless service is remembered only by their surviving crews and a few naval historians and buffs. The epic damage control actions of the San Francisco are still taught at the Naval Surface Warfare School. They have passed into history, of those sunk some have been rediscovered, the Ballard expedition discovered and photographed the wrecks of Astoria and Quincy and their Australian consort Canberra in the waters of “Iron Bottom Sound” off Guadalcanal. The German “Prinz Eugen” though not a treaty cruiser survived the war and was expended as a target in the Atomic bomb tests. Her wreck lies capsized and submerged at Bikini Atoll. An attempt to salvage her by a German group was abandoned and one of her screws was brought back and placed on display near Kiel, Germany.

Though all had design drawbacks due to the treaties, the American and British ships performed magnificently and without their service, especially in the early days of the war history today might be different. Here’s to gallant ships and steadfast crews. May they never be forgotten.

Peace,

Steve+

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Monthly Archives: September 2009

Japan’s Self Defeating Attempts to Become Economically Self Sufficient in the 1930s

The Uncomfortable Legacy of Colonel General Ludwig Beck

What Happened? An analysis of the Norfolk Tides in 2009

Going to War: Interlude in Fallujah Reunions, Redirection and a Stay at the Ramadan Inn

Managing the “AAA” Franchise: A View from 102

September Comes to Harbor Park: A New Month and a New Team

The Guadalcanal Campaign and the Beginning of Joint Operations

The Treaty Cruisers: A Warship Review

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