Tag Archives: admiral bill halsey

October 28, 2020 · 02:38

“Where is Third Fleet? The World Wonders”: The Battle off Samar and the Battle of Cape Engano

Friends of Padre Steve’s World,

I am finishing up a series of posts about the Battle of Leyte Gulf. This one is about the Battle of Samar and Battle of Cape Engano in which a force of Japanese carriers with very few aircraft were used to lure the main part of the American Third Fleet under Admiral William “Bull” Halsey away from the vulnerable troop transports and supply ships supporting the invasion while the Japanese Center Force under Vice Admiral Takeo Kurita’s still powerful Center Force reversed course following the drubbings it had taken during the Battle of Palawan Passage and the Battle of the Sibuyan Sea, was no longer considered a threat by Admiral William “Bull” Halsey commanding the Third Fleet. That was understandable because during those battles Kurita lost on of the two most powerful battleships in the world, the Musashi, four powerful heavy cruisers, and two destroyers. Other ships were damaged but not enough so to remain operational.

USS Heermann and USS Samuel B. Roberts laying a Smokescreen at the Battle off Samar

The Battle off Samar was momentous battle and study in the principle of unity of command, a principle which the Americans violated with nearly catastrophic results.

Eventually I will write a detailed account of the epic Battle off Samar to conclude the series properly but that will have to wait. Today has been a busy day with medical appointments, working around the house, coordinating more contracting work, and working on the index of my book. Wednesday will be a busy day at work, teaching classes for newly reported sailors, sitting in on meetings dealing with sexual or other abuse cases, and doing some counseling while catching up on administrative work, and coordinating additional counseling cases. Thursday and Friday will be busy because of more contract work in the house, and more work on the index and photos for my book. PrY for me a sinner.

Peace

Padre Steve+

The Battle of Leyte Gulf, the largest and most widespread naval battle in history is a fascinating for so many reasons at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of naval warfare. It was an air, sea, and undersea battle on such a massive scale that had never been seen before, and probably never be seen again.

It was full unclear command structures, which violated the principle of Unity of Command; confusing, and mistaken communications; the fog of war, acts of valor from outnumbered forces who defeated superior, yet confused enemies, the perfectly conducted execution of a Japanese Task Force by Battleships raised from the mud of Pearl Harbor, and the intentional sacrifice of a Japanese Carrier Task Force as a decoy, so that Japan’s battleships might provide a victory. Despite the unclear communications, unclear command structures, and fog of war the United States Navy was victorious.

Admiral Kurita’s Center Force had doubled back and went through the San Bernardino Strait to surprise the Escort Carriers of Taffy-3, part of 7th Fleet which expected that Halsey’s Third Fleet was still guarding San Bernardino Strait with the Battleships of Vice Admiral Willis Lee’s Task Force 34.

Instead, Halsey took the bait of the Japanese carriers, and assuming that Kurita’s Force was no longer a threat left San Bernardino Strait undefended without informing 7th Fleet, part of Douglas MacArthur’s command, not Admiral Chester Nimitz’s command. The mistake was discovered when Kurita’s Force surprised Rear Admiral Clifton Sprague’s Taffy-3.

USS Gambier Bay Under Attack (above) IJN YamTo and Chokai (below)

The appearance of Kurita’s Force surprised the Americans leading to one of the most cryptic and mistaken messages to be sent in American military history. Due to the confusion of what was happening Admiral Nimitz sent a message to Halsey, which was decoded improperly, causing even more confusion and recriminations. When Halsey received the message his battleships were almost in range of Admiral Jisaburo Ozawa’s decoy Northern Force, of carriers without air groups. Since throughout the war in the Pacific the Japanese always considered their carriers, and used them as their primary striking force, Halsey was correct in assuming that they were still the primary Japanese’s striking force, but he was wrong.

But still, this message remains one of the most confusing and infuriating ever sent to the commander of a fleet in action with the enemy fleet nearly in sight:

“TURKEY TROTS TO WATER GG FROM CINCPAC ACTION COM THIRD FLEET INFO COMINCH CTF SEVENTY-SEVEN X WHERE IS RPT WHERE IS TASK FORCE THIRTY FOUR RR THE WORLD WONDERS.” Admiral Nimitz to Admiral Halsey

After Admiral William “Bull” Halsey felt that he had heavily damaged the Center Force during the Battle of the Sibuyan Sea he withdrew the Fast Battleships of Task Force 34 from the San Bernardino Strait in order to use them in a surface engagement against Ozawa’s Northern Force. Halsey assumed that Ozawa’s carriers were the main threat to the American invasion forces. However he did not know that Ozawa’s carriers had very few aircraft embarked and that the Northern force was in fact a decoy, designed to draw him away from Kurita’s Center Force and the two task forces of the Admiral Nishimura’s and Shima’s Southern force of Battleships, cruisers and destroyers.

The Zuikaku under attack at Cape Engano

When Halsey’s aircraft reported the Center Force withdrawing the previous day he believed that the threat had been removed. He wrote in his memoirs “I believed that the Center Force had been so heavily damaged in the Sibuyan Sea that it could no longer be considered a serious menace to Seventh Fleet.” Thus he moved with haste to intercept, engage and destroy Ozawa’s Northern force and its carriers and battleships. Halsey believed that his engagement against the Northern force would culminate when his fast battleships destroyed whatever Japanese surface forces remained.

It was not a bad assumption. Ever since the early days of the Pacific war the truly decisive engagements had been decided by carriers. Unfortunately for the American sailors of Taffy-3, the group of Escort Carriers, destroyers and destroyer escorts which encountered Kurita’s Center force which had doubled back overnight and passed through the San Bernardino Strait surprising Rear Admiral Thomas Kinkaid’s task group of “Jeep” Carriers.

The Battle off Samar

The unequal battle that ensued off Samar was a near run thing for the Americans. Had Kurita not been confused about what forces he was facing and pressed his attacks he may have inflicted painful damage on the actual invasion forces. However after a morning of battle, in which Taffy-3’s destroyers, destroyer escorts, aircraft and even the Jeep carriers themselves inflicted heavy damage on the Japanese force, Kurita withdrew, losing the heavy cruisers Chokai, Suzuya, Kumano, and Chikuma, and seriously damaged every Battleship except Yamato.

Admiral William “Bull” Halsey

However as Taffy-3 battled for its life against Kurita’s battleships, cruisers and destroyers Halsey’s carrier air groups were pounding Ozawa’s hapless carriers and their escorts. About 0800 on the 25th Kinkaid’s desperate messages began to reach Nimitz and Halsey. However since Halsey did not believe just how serious the situation was he continued to pursue Ozawa’s force. When he received Nimitz’s message he was incensed. The message “TURKEY TROTS TO WATER GG FROM CINCPAC ACTION COM THIRD FLEET INFO COMINCH CTF SEVENTY-SEVEN X WHERE IS RPT WHERE IS TASK FORCE THIRTY FOUR RR THE WORLD WONDERS was composed of three parts. The preface “Turkey trots to water” was padding, as was the last part “the world wonders.”

Light Carrier Zuiho under attack

However the communications officer on Halsey’s flagship only removed the first section leaving “Where is Third Fleet, the world wonders.” Halsey was flabbergasted and though the battleships of Task Force 34 were almost in range of the Japanese force he sent them south to relieve Kinkaid’s beleaguered force. However by the time Vice Admiral Willis Lee’s battle line arrived Kurita had withdrawn, losing 3 heavy cruisers sunk, three heavy cruisers and one destroyer heavily damaged.

Zuikaku being abandoned

Of the Northern Force, all of the Japanese carriers were sunk along with a light cruiser and a number of destroyers, but Kurita’s heavy forces escaped. Among the Japanese losses was the carrier Zuikaku the last surviving carrier of the Pearl Harbor attack. Naval historian Samuel Elliott Morrison wrote:

“If TF 34 had been detached a few hours earlier, after Kinkaid’s first urgent request for help, and had left the destroyers behind, since their fueling caused a delay of over two and a half hours, a powerful battle line of six modern battleships under the command of Admiral Lee, the most experienced battle squadron commander in the Navy, would have arrived off the San Bernardino Strait in time to have clashed with Kurita’s Center Force… Apart from the accidents common in naval warfare, there is every reason to suppose that Lee would have “crossed the T” and completed the destruction of Center Force.”

The Battle off Samar and Battle of Cape Engano closed the epic extended Battle of Leyte Gulf. The victory of the US Navy was decisive even without the final destruction of Kurita’s forces. The remnants of the Japanese forces would never mount a serious offensive threat again. The survivors would be hunted down over the next 9 months, some sunk by submarines, other in surface engagements, still more to air attacks at Okinawa and in Japanese ports.

Halsey received much criticism for his decision to withdraw TF 34 from San Bernardino Strait. However in his defense the action exposed one of the key problems in any kind of warfare, the problem of seams and divided lines of command. Kinkaid’s escort carriers belonged to 7th Fleet which came under the operational control of Douglas MacArthur’s Southwest Pacific Region while Halsey commanded 3rd Fleet under Admiral Nimitz’s Central Pacific region. This created a situation where two fleets belonging to two regions under two separate commanders were attempting to fight a single battle. The principle of unity of command and unity of effort was violated with nearly disastrous result.

Today, in the Pacific all US forces are under US Pacific Command, ensuring unity of command, although forces fro US Strategic Command, Special Forces Command or other units would come under its direction. In the Middle East it is a different situation, because the lines of command and authority of US European Command, African Command, and Central Command all intersect, which means that any operation must be carefully coordinated to ensure unity of command without compromising the effectiveness of our forces or our allies. Thus, some 66 years later we can still learn lessons from history that are still applicable to military operations today.

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Filed under History, imperial japan, leadership, Military, Navy Ships, US Navy, World War II at Sea, world war two in the pacific

Tagged as admiral bill halsey, admiral chester nimitz, admiral jisaburo ozawa, admiral takeo kurita, admiral willis lee, battle of cape engano, battle of leyte gulf, battle of sibuyan sea, battle off samar, douglas macarthur, ijn chikuma, ijn chokai, ijn kumano, ijn suzuya, ijn yamato, ijn zuiho, ijn zuikaku, Rear Admiral Thomas Kincaid, seventh fleet, taffy-3, task force 34, task force 38, third fleet, unity of command

November 15, 2019 · 00:27

Against Insurmountable Odds: The Naval Battle of Guadalcanal, part Two

Friends of Padre Steve’s World,

Last night I wrote about the opening engagement of the Naval Battle of Guadalcanal. Despite the heroic battle to protect the Marines on Guadalcanal I the early morning hours of November 13th, the situation in the White House was akin to the setbacks at Omaha Beach a year and a half later. The temptation to withdraw the Marines who had already won a foothold on the island and who had withstood several major Japanese assaults was strong, but time played a role that superseded American political realities.

IJN Kinugusa
On the morning of the 13th, following the defeat of Rear Admiral Hiraoki Abe’s Force, Vice Admiral Nobutake Kondo pressed home the attack. On the 13th, his transport force, carrying the Imperial Army 38th Division, protected by the destroyers of Rear Admiral Gunichi Mikawa ran the gauntlet of Marine Corps, Navy, and Army Air Force aircraft stationed at Henderson Field which according to the Japanese plan should have been rendered inoperative on the night of the 12th and 13th. Mikawa pressed ahead despite heavy losses and though losing seven of the eleven transports landed a sizable number of troops on Guadalcanal despite losing most of their supplies and equipment.

As the sun set on the night of the 13th another bombardment Force under Rear Admiral Shoji Nishimura came in under the cover of darkness to fire 500 eight inch shells at the airfield. Damage was moderate, some aircraft were destroyed, but Henderson Field Remained in action, its aircraft continuing to inflict heavy casualties of the Japanese landing forces, and their escorts, including the heavy cruisers Kinugusa, Maya, Chokai, and Suzuya, light cruisers Isuzu and Tenryu, and six destroyers. Mikawa sent Maya and Suzuya to shell Henderson Field while his other ships attempted to screen the transports. In the following action seven of the eleven transports were sunk, with many of their troops transferred to destroyers which delivered them to Guadalcanal without most of their supplies and equipment. During his withdraw, most of Mikawa’s ships were damaged by aircraft from Henderson Field, including Kinugusa which was mortally wounded by Marine and Navy aircraft from Henderson Field and USS Enterprise.

IJN Battleship Kirishima

Despite the losses and under pressure from Tokyo to retake the Guadalcanal, Admiral Yamamoto ordered Admiral Kondo, with a reconstructed bombardment Force to attack Henderson Field. That task force was centered on the battleship Kirishima, though Kondo’s flagship was the heavy cruiser Atago. This force was more powerful than Abe’s, with one battleship, 2 heavy and 2 light cruisers as well as nine destroyers.

By now the Americans were rushing to get every available ship to Guadalcanal, despite the doubts that it could hold. Against the advice of many officers, Vice Admiral William “Bull” Halsey directed the battleships USS Washington and South Dakota, along with the destroyers USS Preston, Walke, Benham, and Gwin none of which had operated together before until that night. The battleships were selected because nothing else was available, the spdestroyers, each because they had more fuel. They were under the command of Rear Admiral Willis Lee aboard Washington.

Early in the morning of the 15th the task forces of Kondo and Lee joined battle. The US destroyers, operating in the van succeeded in their task of screening the battleships at heavy loss to themselves. Preston, Walke, and Benham were sunk or mortally wounded. The South Dakota was put out of the action by a mistake by her Chief Engineer coupled with accurate Japanese gunfire. Now operating alone and undetected, Washington opened fire on Kirishima hitting her with between 9 and 20 16” shells. Mortally wounded Kirishima became the second battleship lost by the Imperial Navy in the war. Kondo retreated, and the following morning the four surviving transports beaches themselves under air attack from Henderson Field.

Washington Firing and Broadside at Kirishima
From that point on Japanese missions were limited to resupply of forced on Guadalcanal or their evacuation. Many other bloody battles remained to be fought, it after November 15th 1942, the issue of who should control Guadalcanal was not no longer in doubt.

Peace,

Padre Steve+

The Battle of Cape Engano: Victory in Spite of Miscommunications and the Lack of Unity of Command

Friends of Padre Steve’s World,

I am finishing up a series of posts about the Battle of Leyte Gulf. This one is about the Battle of Cape Engano in which a force of Japanese carriers with very few aircraft were used to lure the main part of the American Third Fleet under Admiral William “Bull” Halsey away from the vulnerable troop transports and supply ships supporting the invasion. It was a momentous battle and study in the principle of unity of command, which the Americans violated with nearly catastrophic results.

Eventually I will write something about the epic Battle off Samar to conclude the series properly but that will have to wait. Today has been a busy day working around the house and taking care of things long needed. Maybe I will do some work on my lack of

Peace

Padre Steve+

Unclear command structures, confusing, and mistaken communications, acts of valor from outnumbered forces who survived, and the intentional sacrifice of a carrier task force as a decoy, so that battleships might provide a victory. Despite the unclear communications and unclear command structures, the United States Navy was victorious. But still, this message remains one of the most confusing and infuriating ever sent to the commander of a fleet in action with the enemy fleet nearly in sight:

After Admiral William “Bull” Halsey felt that he had heavily damaged the Japanese Center Force during the Battle of the Sibuyan Sea he withdrew the Fast Battleships of Task Force 34 from the San Bernardino Strait in order to use them in a surface engagement against Admiral Jisaburo Ozawa’s Northern Force. Halsey assumed that Ozawa’s carriers were the main threat to the American invasion forces. However he did not know that Ozawa’s carriers had very few aircraft embarked and that the Northern force was in fact a decoy, designed to draw him away from Vice Admiral Takeo Kurita’s Center and the two task forces of the Southern force.

The Zuikaku under attack at Cape Engano

When Halsey’s aircraft reported the Center force withdrawing he believed that the threat had been removed. He wrote in his memoirs “I believed that the Center Force had been so heavily damaged in the Sibuyan Sea that it could no longer be considered a serious menace to Seventh Fleet.”Thus he moved with haste to intercept, engage and destroy the Northern force and its carriers and battleships. Halsey believed that his engagement against the Northern force would culminate when his fast battleships destroyed whatever Japanese surface forces remained.

It was not a bad assumption. Ever since the early days of the Pacific war the truly decisive engagements had been decided by carriers. Unfortunately for the American sailors of Taffy-3, the group of Escort Carriers, destroyers and destroyer escorts which encountered Kurita’s Center force which had doubled back overnight and passed through the San Bernardino Strait surprising Rear Admiral Thomas Kinkaid’s task group of “Jeep” Carriers.

The Battle off Samar

Admiral William “Bull” Halsey

Light Carrier Zuiho under attack

Zuikaku being abandoned

All the Japanese carriers were sunk along with a light cruiser and a number of destroyers, but Kurita’s heavy forces escaped. Among the Japanese losses was the carrier Zuikaku the last surviving carrier of the Pearl Harbor attack. Naval historian Samuel Elliott Morrison wrote:

The Battle of Cape Engano closed the epic extended battle of Leyte Gulf. The victory of the US Navy was decisive even without the final destruction of Kurita’s forces. The remnants of the Japanese forces would never mount a serious offensive threat again. The survivors would be hunted down over the next 9 months, some sunk by submarines, other in surface engagements, still more to air attacks at Okinawa and in Japanese ports.

Halsey received much criticism for his decision to withdraw TF 34 from San Bernardino Strait. However in his defense the action exposed one of the key problems in any kind of warfare, the problem of seams. Kinkaid’s escort carriers belonged to 7th Fleet which came under the operational control of Douglas MacArthur’s Southwest Pacific Region while Halsey commanded 3rd Fleet under Admiral Nimitz’s Central Pacific region. This created a situation where two fleets belonging to two regions under two separate commanders were attempting to fight a single battle. The principle of unity of command and unity of effort was violated with nearly disastrous results.

The Last Of the Carriers that Held the Line Found: USS Hornet Discovered 17,000 Feet Below the Pacific

Quadruple 1.1 inch Anti-Aircraft Gun Mount on USS Hornet

Friends of Padre Steve’s World,

The crew and research teams on the late Paul Allen’s research vessel, the RV Petrel made a tremendous maritime discovery in late January near where Hornet sank following massive damage sustained during the Battle Of the Santa Cruz Islands on October 26th 1942.

USS Hornet CV-8 Building at Newport News VA

Hornet as Completed off Hampton Roads shortly after Her Commissioning

The USS Hornet CV-8 was the third ship of the Yorktown Class and is sometimes referred to as her own one ship Hornet Class. Laid down on 25 September1939 under the Naval Expansion act of May 17^th 1938, Hornet was part of the pre-war naval build up authorized by President and Congress. The previous Yorktown design was used to speed construction. Hornet was slightly modified from her sisters Yorktown and Enterprise being 15 feet longer, 5 feet wider in the beam and displacing about 1000 tons more than her near sisters. Her anti-aircraft armament was also slightly improved. As with her near sisters Hornet had good protection except that her underwater protection was weak. However, as would be born out in combat Hornet like her sisters would prove to be extraordinarily tough.

Hornet in Rough Seas Preparing to Launch the Doolittle Raid

Hornet was launched on 14 December 1940 and commissioned 25 October 1941 with Naval Aviation pioneer Captain Marc A Mitscher Commanding. Hornet conducted her initial training and air group qualifications while operating out of Norfolk. On February 2^nd two Army Air Corps B-25 Medium Bombers were loaded aboard. As Hornet put to sea the bombers were launched to the astonishment of the crew. Hornet departed Norfolk for the Pacific where she embarked 16 B-25s under the command of Colonel Jimmy Doolittle. Hornet’s own air group was stowed in the hanger bay. On April 2^nd Hornet departed from San Francisco for a rendezvous with Admiral Halsey’s Task Force 16 and her sister ship Enterprise. As the ship departed Mitscher informed the crew of their mission. Hornet would launch Colonel Doolittle’s aircraft against the heart of the Imperial Japanese Empire, Tokyo.

Hornet Launching B-25

The plan was for the task force to sail to 400 miles from Japan and launch the bombers. Enterprise was to provide air cover for the task force while Hornet’s air group was inaccessible while the bombers remained aboard. On the morning of 18 April the task force was spotted by a Japanese patrol boat. The craft was quickly dispatched by the heavy cruiser USS Nashville but not before the craft had reported the presence of the task force. Though the task force was still 600 some miles from Japan Halsey ordered that Doolittle’s aircraft be launched against Tokyo. The attack while militarily insignificant came as a major surprise to the Japanese who anticipating a raid by naval aircraft believed that any attack could not take place until the following day. Even more significantly the attack stunned the Japanese military establishment, especially the Navy. The attack would provoke Admiral Yamamoto to attack Midway in order to draw out the American carriers and destroy them.

Hornet Arrives at Pearl Harbor Before Midway

Hornet along with Task Force 16 sailed back to Pearl Harbor arriving a week later and the mission would remain secret for over a year. The task force steamed to assist the Yorktown and Lexington at the Battle of Coral Sea but that battle was over before they could arrive. The task force returned to Pearl Harbor on the 26^th of May and sail on the 28^th for Midway. Hornet’s air group was plagued with bad luck. Torpedo Squadron 8, or Torpedo 8 commanded by LCDR John Waldron found and attacked the Japanese task force losing all aircraft and all pilots save one. 6 new TBF Avengers from her air group operating from Midway met with heavy losses in their attack against the Japanese. Only one pilot from Torpedo 8 with Waldron’s group survived, Ensign George Gay. Hornet’s dive bombers followed bad reports of the location of the Japanese carriers and took no part in the action. Many would have to ditch in the ocean as they ran out of fuel. Hornet’s air group would help sink the Japanese Heavy Cruiser Mikuma and heavily damaged Mogami on the 6^th. The Battle of Midway was one of the major turning points of the war. The Japanese had lost six carriers which had attacked Pearl Harbor along with their aircraft and many of their highly trained pilots and flight crews. Coupled with their losses at Coral Sea the Japanese suffered losses that they could ill afford and could not easily replace.

Following Midway Hornet had new radar installed and trained out of Pearl Harbor until order to the Southwest Pacific to take part in the struggle for Guadalcanal. By the time she arrived she was the only operational American carrier in the Pacific. Enterprise had suffered bomb damage at the Battle of Easter Solomons on August 24th; Saratoga was damaged by a submarine torpedo on August 31^stand the Wasp was sunk by a submarine on September 15^th. In the space of 3 weeks the United States Navy had lost 3/4^ths of its operational carriers in the waters off of Guadalcanal. Hornet now faced the Japanese alone, providing much of the badly needed air support for the Marines fighting ashore.

Hornet Under Attack: Note “Val” Dive Bomber about to crash ship

The Enterprise rejoined Hornet following hasty repairs off the New Hebrides Islands on October 24^th. On the 26^th they joined battle with a Japanese task force of 4 carriers centered on the veterans Shokaku and Zuikaku. The Hornet’s aircraft attacked and seriously damaged Shokaku even as Japanese torpedo planes and dive bombers launched a well coordinated attack against Hornet. Hornet was hit by three bombs, two torpedoes and had two bomb laden Val dive bombers. On fire and without power her damage control parties fought to regain control of the ship and extinguish the fires that blazed aboard her.

Hornet’s Damaged Island and Main Mast

USS Northampton Preparing to take Hornet under Tow

With this hit Hornet’s list increased and she was abandoned even as she was hit by another bomb. With Japanese ships in the area it was decided to scuttle the ship. Escorting destroyers hit her with 9 torpedoes and over 400 rounds of 5” shells. As Hornet blazed in the night her escorts withdrew and a Japanese surface force arrived. The destroyers Makigumu and Akigumo finished the heroic but doomed ship off with four of their 24” “Long Lance” torpedoes. She sank beneath the waves at 0135 hours on October 27th.

140 members of her crew went down with their ship.

Hornet Being Abandoned by Her Crew

In her last fight Hornet’s aircraft along with those of Enterprise mauled the air groups of Shokaku and Zuikaku, again inflicting irreplaceable losses among their experienced air crews. In the battle Hornet was hit by 4 bombs, two aircraft, 16 torpedoes and over 400 rounds of 5” shells, more hits than were sustained by any other US carrier in a single action during the war. She was stuck from the Navy list on 13 January 1943 and her gallant Torpedo 8 was awarded the Navy Presidential Unit Citation “for extraordinary heroism and distinguished service beyond the call of duty” in the Battle of Midway. Her name was given to the Essex Class carrier CV-12.

The new Hornet served throughout the war and served well into the Cold War. She now rests as a Museum ship at Alameda California. There is currently no Hornet in commission today. With two new Gerald Ford Class carriers approved, one to be named Enterprise, it might be a a good thing to name the next of the class Hornet.

The USS Hornet Association website is here: http://www.usshornetassn.com/

The Museum site is here: http://www.uss-hornet.org/

Until tomorrow,

Peace,

Padre Steve+

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Filed under aircraft, History, Military, Navy Ships, US Navy, World War II at Sea, world war two in the pacific

Tagged as admiral bill halsey, admiral marc mitscher, admiral yamamoto, b-25 bomber, battle of coral sea, battle of eastern solomons, battle of midway, battle of santa cruz islands, general jimmy doolittle, guadalcanal, ijn akigumo, ijn makigumo, ijn shokaku, ijn zuikaku, lcdr john waldron, mikuma, mogami, naval station norfolk, newport news naval shipyard, Paul Allen, RV Petrel, TBD Devastator, tokyo raid 1942, torpedo 8, uss enterprise cv-6, uss hornet cv-12, uss hornet cv-8, uss lexington, uss saratoga, uss wasp, uss yorktown cv-5

May 29, 2014 · 19:05

The Thin Gray Line: The USS Yorktown, USS Enterprise and USS Hornet, the Carriers that Held the Japanese at Bay in 1942

USS Yorktown CV-5

Seldom in the annals of war is recorded that three ships changed the course of a war and altered history. Winston Churchill once said about Fighter Command of the Royal Air Force during the Battle of Britain: “Never in the field of human conflict was so much owed by so many to so few” however I would place the epic war waged by the three carriers of the Yorktown class against the Combined Fleet and First Carrier Strike Group, the Kido Butai of the Imperial Japanese Navy between December 1941 and November 1942 alongside the epic fight of the Royal Air Force against Hitler’s Luftwaffe.

The Carriers of the Yorktown Class hold a spot in United States Naval History nearly unequaled by any other class of ships, especially a class that numbered only three ships. Designed and built in the mid 1930s they were the final class of pre-war carriers commissioned by the navy. The ships were built incorporating the lessons learned with Langley, Lexington, Saratoga and Ranger and had features that would become standard in the design of US Aircraft Carriers. As such they were the template for future classes of ships beginning with the Essex Class until the advent of the super carriers of the Forrestal Class.

USS Hornet CV-8

The ships heritage was evident in their names. Yorktown, the lead ship of the class named after the victory of Washington and Rochambeau over Cornwallis at Yorktown, Enterprise named after the sloop of war commanded by Stephen Decatur in the war against the Barbary Pirates, and Hornet after another famous Brig of War commanded by James Lawrence which defeated the British ship Peacock in the War of 1812.

They displaced 19.800 tons with a 25,000 full load displacement. Capable of 32.5 knots they were the Navy’s first truly successful class of carriers built from the keel up. The ships could embark over aircraft and could steam long distances without refueling. Protection was good for their era and the ships proved to be extraordinarily tough when tested in actual combat. In speed and air group capacity the only carriers of their era to equal them were the Japanese Hiryu and Soryu and the larger Shokaku and Zuikaku. British carriers of the period were about the same size but were slower and carried a smaller and far less capable air group though their protection which included armored flight decks was superior to both the American and Japanese ships.

USS Enterprise CV-6

Next week we will remember the epic battle of Midway, where these three gallant ships inflicted a devastating defeat on the Japanese First Carrier Strike Group. I believe that it is appropriate to go into that week remembering those ships and the brave sailors and aviators who made their triumph at Midway possible. the The links below are to articles about these three gallant ships.

They Held the Line: The USS Yorktown CV-5, USS Enterprise CV-6 and USS Hornet CV-8, Part One

They Held the Line: The USS Yorktown CV-5, USS Enterprise CV-6 and USS Hornet CV-8, Part Two the Hornet

Peace,

Padre Steve+

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Filed under History, Military, Navy Ships, world war two in the pacific

Tagged as admiral bill halsey, admiral chester nimitz, admiral frank fletcher, admiral marc mitscher, admiral raymond spruance, admiral william halsey, admiral yamamoto, b-25 bomber, battle of coral sea, battle of eastern solomons, battle of leyte gulf, battle of midway, battle of philippine sea, battle of santa cruz islands, bombing six, cdr wade mccloskie, doolittle raid, formosa, general jimmy doolittle, gilbert islands, guadalcanal, hiei, ijn akagi, ijn shokaku, ijn zuikaku, IJS Soryu, iwo jima, japan, lcdr john waldron, lcdr max lesie, lt dick best, makin island raid, mikuma, mogami, nasa, naval battle of guadalcanal, naval station norfolk, naval unit citation, newport news naval shipyard, okinawa, Part Two the Hornet « Padresteve's World…Musings of a Passionate Moderate, pearl harbor, presidential unit citation, scouting six, space shuttle enterprise, star trek, TBD Devastator, They Held the Line: The USS Yorktown CV-5, tokyo raid 1942, torpedo 6, torpedo 8, uss enterprise cv-6, USS Enterprise CV-6 and USS Hornet CV-8, uss enterprise ncc-1701, uss hornet cv-12, uss hornet cv-8, uss lexington, uss saratoga, uss wasp, uss yorktown cv-5

October 25, 2013 · 23:56

The Battle of Cape Engano

The Zuikaku uder attack at Cape Engano

When Halsey’s aircraft reported the Center force withdrawing he believed that the threat had been removed. He wrote in his memoirs “I believed that the Center Force had been so heavily damaged in the Sibuyan Sea that it could no longer be considered a serious menace to Seventh Fleet.” Thus he moved with haste to intercept, engage and destroy the Northern force and its carriers and battleships. Halsey believed that his engagement against the Northern force would culminate when his fast battleships destroyed whatever Japanese surface forces remained.

The Battle off Samar

Admiral William “Bull” Halsey

Light Carrier Zuiho under attack

Zuikaku being abandoned

Halsey received much criticism for his decision to withdraw TF 34 from San Bernardino Strait. However in his defense the action exposed one of the key problems in any kind of warfare, the problem of seams. Kinkaid’s escort carriers belonged to 7th Fleet which came under the operational control of Douglas MacArthur’s Southwest Pacific Region while Halsey commanded 3rd Fleet fell under Admiral Nimitz’s Central Pacific region. This created a situation where two fleets belonging to two regions under two separate commanders were attempting to fight a single battle. The principle of unity of command and unity of effort was violated with nearly disastrous results.

Peace

Padre Steve+

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Filed under History, Military, Navy Ships, US Navy, world war two in the pacific

Tagged as admiral bill halsey, admiral chester nimitz, admiral takeo kurita, admiral thomas kinkaid, battle of cape engano, battle of leyte gulf, battle of the sibuyan sea, battle off samar, ijn zuiho, ijn zuikaku, taffy-3, task force 34, vice admiral willis lee, Vice-Admiral Jisaburō Ozawa

October 23, 2013 · 22:33

Leyte Gulf: The Greatest Naval Battle in the History of the World

USS Gambier Bay being attacked by Japanese Surface Forces battle

I will break into Leyte Gulf and fight to the last man…would it not be shameful to have the fleet remaining intact while our nation perishes?” Vice-Admiral Takeo Kurita – 1944

”In case opportunity for destruction of a major portion of the enemy fleet is offered, or can be created, such destruction becomes the primary task.”

Admiral Chester Nimitz – In his order to Halsey, prior to the Battle of Leyte Gulf – October 1944

The Old Battleships of the 7th Fleet

Sixty-nine years ago the largest and most geographically expansive naval battle ever fought began. A few days before the forces of General Douglas MacArthur’s Southwest Pacific command and Admiral Chester Nimitz’s Central Pacific command joined to invade and liberate the Philippines from the Japanese. It was less than three years since Japan had attacked Pearl Harbor and two and a half years after MacArthur had left the Philippines vowing “I shall return.”

The Japanese knew that the battle for the Philippines was a must win. An American victory would ensure that Japan would be cut off from the vital natural resources of Indo-China, the Dutch East Indies and Borneo, particularly oil, without which it could not remain in the war.

The Imperial Navy was tasked to work with land based air forces to thwart the invasion by drawing off the American Fast Carrier task forces and allowing heavy surface forces to seek out and destroy potentially vulnerable troop transports and supply ships in Leyte Gulf.

It was a complicated plan, but one which had a chance of disrupting the American invasion, and came perilously close to doing so.

Admiral Jisaburo Ozawa’s Northern force of four aircraft carriers without viable air groups was a decoy. Vice Admiral Shoji Nishimura and Vice Admiral Kiyohide Shima commanded separate task forces both committed to breaking into Leyte Gulf through Surigo Strait. Vice Admiral Takeo Kurita who commanded the main effort, the powerful Center Force which was to break into Leyte Gulf through San Bernardino Strait. Vice Admiral Takijirō Ōnishi commanded the Philippines based 1st Air Fleet which turned to the use of Kamikazes as a means to destroy American warships.

Kamikaze attack

The US forces included the American Third Fleet commanded by Admiral William “Bull” Halsey was the primary naval force composed of the Fast Carrier Task Forces and fast battleships. Adusmiral Thomas Kinkaid commanded the 7th Fleet which was the invasion force and its escorts, including a number of carrier task forces built around the Escort Carriers and the old battleships of Jesse Oldendorf’s Task Group. The latter included a number of the survivors of the Pearl Harbor attack including the USS West Virginia, USS California, USS Tennessee, USS Maryland and USS Pennsylvania. Oldendorf’s flagship, the USS Mississippi was not at Pearl Harbor but likewise one of the “old ladies” of the fleet.

The battle was unique because of how long it went and how many separate engagements were included. Not counting patrol craft, submarines and auxiliaries close to 300 warships and nearly 2000 aircraft were engaged in 5 separate engagements waged by surface ships, naval air forces and submarines.

USS St Lo blows up after being hit by Kamikaze

The battles included an engagement in which American Submarines took on the Center Force, naval aircraft engaged the Center and Southern Forces, the old battleships fought the last battleship against battleship engagement in history, heavy surface forces engaged and were repulsed by light forces and a decoy force which would suffer terribly would keep the bulk of the best American forces out of the main battle. It would also see the first coordinated use of Kamikaze suicide attack aircraft by Japan.

USS West Virginia

Tonight I am linking a number of articles that I have written previously about this amazing battle. In the next few days I will add a couple new articles to the collection.

The Battle of Leyte Gulf: Introduction and the Battle of Palawan Passage

The Battle of Leyte Gulf: Sinking the Musashi

Slaughter at Surigao: The Old Ladies get their Revenge

For those unfamiliar with the battle that would like a deeper treatment than I provide in these links I recommend The Battle of Leyte Gulf 23-26 October 1944 by Thomas C Cutler, The Last Stand of the Tin Can Sailors: The Extraordinary World War II Story of the U.S. Navy’s Finest Hour by James Hornfisher, Battle Of Leyte Gulf by Edwin P Hoyt, Leyte: June 1944-January 1945 (History of United States Naval Operations in World War II) by Samuel Elliott Morrison and Battle of Surigao Strait by Anthony P Tully. Hoyt and Morrison’s books were the first that I ever read on the subject back when I was in Junior High School but for an overview I think Cutler’s work is better. The other two works present interesting and informative views of two of the decisive engagements of the battle.

As I said in the next few days I plan on adding more articles on this fascinating battle. If things work out I should have something on the Battle off Samar, the Battle of Cape Engano and the Kamikaze debut.

Have a nice night and never forget the sacrifice of all of the brave sailors.

Peace

Padre Steve+

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Filed under History, Military, Navy Ships, US Navy, world war two in the pacific

Tagged as admiral bill halsey, admiral chester nimitz, admiral jisaburo ozawa, admiral thomas kinkaid, battle of cape engano, battle of leyte gulf, battle of palwan passage, battle of surigao strait, battle off samar, douglas macarthur, edwin p hoyt, ijn musashi, ijn yamato, james hornfisher, philippines, samuel elliott morrison, san bernardino strait, Takeo Kurita, thomas cutler, uss california, uss maryland, uss mississippi, uss pennsylvania, USS Samuel B Roberts, uss st lo, uss tennessee, uss west virginia, vice admiral jesse oldendorff, vice admiral Kiyohide Shima, Vice Admiral Shoji Nishimura, Vice Admiral Takeo Kurita, Vice Admiral Takijirō Ōnishi

December 28, 2009 · 23:59

They Held the Line: The USS Yorktown CV-5, USS Enterprise CV-6 and USS Hornet CV-8, Part Two the Hornet

USS Hornet CV-8 Building at Newport News VA

This is part two of a three part series about the USS Yorktown Class Aircraft Carriers. Part one serves as an introduction as well as the story of the lead ship of the Class, the USS Yorktown CV-5. Part One about the Yorktown is located here: https://padresteve.wordpress.com/2009/12/27/they-held-the-line-the-uss-yorktown-cv-5-uss-enterprise-cv-6-and-uss-hornet-cv-8-part-one/

Hornet as Completed off Hampton Roads shortly after Her Commissioning

Hornet in Rough Seas Preparing to Launch the Doolittle Raid

Hornet Launching B-25

The plan was for the task force to sail to 400 miles from Japan and launch the bombers. Enterprise was to provide air cover for the task force while Hornet’s air group was inaccessible while the bombers remained aboard. On the morning of 18 April the task force was spotted by a Japanese patrol boat. The craft was quickly dispatched by the heavy cruiser USS Nashville but not before the craft had reported the presence of the task force. Though the task force was still 600 some miles from Japan Halsey ordered that Doolittle’s aircraft be launched against Tokyo. The attack while militarily insignificant came as a major surprise to the Japanese who anticipating a raid by naval aircraft believed that any attack could not take place until the following day. Even more significantly the attack stunned the Japanese military establishment, especially the Navy. The attack would provoke Admiral Yamamoto to attack Midway in order to draw out the American carriers and destroy them.

Hornet Arrives at Pearl Harbor Before Midway

Hornet along with Task Force 16 sailed back to Pearl Harbor arriving a week later and the mission would remain secret for over a year. The task force steamed to assist the Yorktown and Lexington at the Battle of Coral Sea but that battle was over before they could arrive. The task force returned to Pearl Harbor on the 26^th of May and sail on the 28^th for Midway. Hornet’s air group was plagued with bad luck. Torpedo Squadron 8, or Torpedo 8 commanded by LCDR John Waldron found and attacked the Japanese task force losing all aircraft and all pilots save one. 6 new TBF Avengers from her air group operating from Midway met with heavy losses in their attack against the Japanese. Only one pilot from Torpedo 8 with Waldron’s group survived, Ensign George Gay. Hornet’s dive bombers followed bad reports of the location of the Japanese carriers and took no part in the action. Many would have to ditch in the ocean as they ran out of fuel. Hornet’s air group would help sink the Japanese Heavy Cruiser Mikuma and heavily damaged Mogami on the 6^th. The Battle of Midway was one of the major turning points of the war. The Japanese had lost six carriers which had attacked Pearl Harbor along with their aircraft and many of their highly trained pilots and flight crews. Coupled with their losses at Coral Sea the Japanese suffered losses that they could ill afford and could not easily replace.

Following Midway Hornet had new radar installed and trained out of Pearl Harbor until order to the Southwest Pacific to take part in the struggle for Guadalcanal. By the time she arrived she was the only operational American carrier in the Pacific. Enterprise had suffered bomb damage at the Battle of Easter Solomons on August 24th; Saratoga was damaged by a submarine torpedo on August 31^st and the Wasp was sunk by a submarine on September 15^th. In the space of 3 weeks the United States Navy had lost 3/4^ths of its operational carriers in the waters off of Guadalcanal. Hornet now faced the Japanese alone, providing much of the badly needed air support for the Marines fighting ashore.

Hornet Under Attack: Note “Val” Dive Bomber about to crash ship

The Enterprise rejoined Hornet following hasty repairs off the New Hebrides Islands on October 24^th. On the 26^th they joined battle with a Japanese task force of 4 carriers centered on the veterans Shokaku and Zuikaku. The Hornet’s aircraft attacked and seriously damaged Shokaku even as Japanese torpedo planes and dive bombers launched a well coordinated attack against Hornet. Hornet was hit by three bombs, two torpedoes and had two Vals dive into her with their bombs. On fire and without power her damage control parties fought to regain control of the ship and extinguish the fires that blazed aboard her.

Hornet’s Damaged Island and Main Mast

Assisted by the heavy cruiser Northampton which took her in tow her crew brought the fires under control and were close to restoring power when another Japanese strike group found her and put another torpedo into her. With this hit Hornet’s list increase and she was abandoned even as she was hit by another bomb. With Japanese ships in the area it was decided to scuttle the ship. Escorting destroyers hit her with 9 torpedoes and over 400 rounds of 5” shells. As Hornet blazed in the night her escorts withdrew and Japanese forces after attempting to take her under tow put four of their 24” “Long Lance” torpedoes into the doomed ship at long last sinking her.

Hornet Being Abandoned by Her Crew

In her last fight Hornet’s aircraft along with those of Enterprise mauled the air groups of Shokaku and Zuikaku again inflicting irreplaceable losses among their experienced air crews. In the battle Hornet was hit by 4 bombs, two aircraft, 16 torpedoes and over 400 rounds of 5” shells, more hits than were sustained by any other US carrier in a single action during the war. She was stuck from the Navy list on 13 January 1943 and her gallant Torpedo 8 was awarded the Navy Presidential Unit Citation “for extraordinary heroism and distinguished service beyond the call of duty” in the Battle of Midway. Her name was given to the Essex Class carrier CV-12. The new Hornet served throughout the war and served well into the Cold War. She now rests as a Museum ship at Alameda California.

The USS Hornet Association website is here: http://www.usshornetassn.com/

The Museum site is here: http://www.uss-hornet.org/

If you liked this article you might want to also read the following articles on this site:

The Battleships of Pearl Harbor

The Transitional Carriers: USS Ranger CV-4 and USS Wasp CV-7

The First Aircraft Carriers Part One: The First American Flattops- Langley, Lexington and Saratoga

The Treaty Cruisers: A Warship Review

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Filed under History, Military, Navy Ships, world war two in the pacific

Tagged as admiral bill halsey, admiral marc mitscher, admiral yamamoto, b-25 bomber, battle of coral sea, battle of eastern solomons, battle of midway, battle of santa cruz islands, general jimmy doolittle, guadalcanal, ijn shokaku, ijn zuikaku, lcdr john waldron, mikuma, mogami, naval station norfolk, newport news naval shipyard, TBD Devastator, tokyo raid 1942, torpedo 8, uss enterprise cv-6, uss hornet cv-12, uss hornet cv-8, uss lexington, uss saratoga, uss wasp, uss yorktown cv-5

Tag Archives: admiral bill halsey

“Where is Third Fleet? The World Wonders”: The Battle off Samar and the Battle of Cape Engano

Against Insurmountable Odds: The Naval Battle of Guadalcanal, part Two

The Battle of Cape Engano: Victory in Spite of Miscommunications and the Lack of Unity of Command

The Last Of the Carriers that Held the Line Found: USS Hornet Discovered 17,000 Feet Below the Pacific

The Thin Gray Line: The USS Yorktown, USS Enterprise and USS Hornet, the Carriers that Held the Japanese at Bay in 1942

They Held the Line: The USS Yorktown CV-5, USS Enterprise CV-6 and USS Hornet CV-8, Part One

They Held the Line: The USS Yorktown CV-5, USS Enterprise CV-6 and USS Hornet CV-8, Part Two the Hornet

They Held the Line: The USS Yorktown CV-5, USS Enterprise CV-6 and USS Hornet CV-8, Part Two the Hornet

The Battle of Cape Engano

Leyte Gulf: The Greatest Naval Battle in the History of the World

They Held the Line: The USS Yorktown CV-5, USS Enterprise CV-6 and USS Hornet CV-8, Part Two the Hornet

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