Tag Archives: military culture

Mahan, Halleck, and the Beginning of American Military Thought

Friends of Padre Steve’s World

Something a bit different. Again this is a part of one of the chapters of my Gettysburg and Civil War text, but this time dealing with two men who were the first American military theorists, Dennis Hart Mahan, the father of Alfred Thayer Mahan the great naval strategist and Henry Wager Hillock. Both men contributed to American military thought for over a century until they and their French-Swiss mentor Henri Jomini’s theories were overtaken by those of the Prussian Carl von Clausewitz. 

They both are interesting characters and both had an influence on American history today ion large part due to their influence on the education of most of the generals who conducted the Civil War, and in the case of Halleck in advising Abraham Lincoln during the war. 

I hope that you enjoy

Peace

Padre Steve+

West_Point

Background 

As we continue to examine the Civil War as the first modern war we have to see it as a time of great transition and change for military and political leaders. As such we have to look at the education, culture and experience of the men who fought the war, as well as the various advances in technology and how that technology changed tactics, which in turn influenced the operational and strategic choices that defined the characteristics of the Civil War and wars to come.

The leaders who organized the vast armies that fought during the war were influenced more than military factors. Social, political, economic, scientific and even religious factors influenced their conduct of the war. The officers that commanded the armies on both sides grew up during the Jacksonian opposition to professional militaries, and for that matter even somewhat trained militias. The Jacksonian period impacted how officers were appointed and advanced. Samuel Huntington wrote:

“West Point was the principal target of Jacksonian hostility, the criticism centering not on the curriculum and methods of the Academy but rather upon the manner of how cadets were appointed and the extent to which Academy graduates preempted junior officer positions in the Army. In Jacksonian eyes, not only was specialized skill unnecessary for a military officer, but every man had the right to pursue the vocation of his choice….Jackson himself had an undisguised antipathy for the Academy which symbolized such a different conception of officership from that which he himself embodied. During his administration disciple faltered at West Point, and eventually Sylvanus Thayer, the superintendent and molder of the West Point educational methods, resigned in disgust at the intrusion of the spoils system.” [1]

This is particularly important because of how many officers who served in the Civil War were products of the Jacksonian system and what followed over the next two decades. Under the Jackson administration many more officers were appointed directly from civilian sources than from West Point, often based on political connections. “In 1836 when four additional regiments of dragoons were formed, thirty officers were appointed from civilian life and four from West Point graduates.” [2]

While this in itself was a problem, it was made worse by a promotion system based on seniority, not merit. There was no retirement system so officers who did not return to the civilian world hung on to their careers until they quite literally died with their boots on. The turnover in the highest ranks was quite low, “as late as 1860, 20 of the 32 men at or above the rank of full colonel held commissions in the war of 1812.” [3] This held up the advancement of outstanding junior officers who merited promotion and created a system where “able officers spent decades in the lower ranks, and all officers who had normal or supernormal longevity were assured of reaching higher the higher ranks.” [4]

Robert E. Lee was typical of many officers who stayed in the Army. Despite his success Lee was constantly haunted by his lack of advancement. While he was still serving in Mexico having gained great laurels, including a brevet promotion to Lieutenant Colonel, the “intrigues, pettiness and politics…provoked Lee to question his career.” He wrote, “I wish I was out of the Army myself.” [5]

In 1860 on the brink of the war, Lee was “a fifty-three year-old man and felt he had little to show for it, and small hope for promotion.” [6] Lee’s discouragement was not unwarranted, for despite his exemplary service, there was little hope for promotion and to add to it, Lee knew that “of the Army’s thirty-seven generals from 1802 to 1861, not one was a West Pointer.” [7]

The careers of other exemplary officers including Winfield Scott Hancock, James Longstreet, and John Reynolds languished with long waits between promotions between the Mexican War and the Civil War. The long waits for promotion and the duty in often-desolate duty stations on the western frontier, coupled with family separations caused many officers to leave the Army. A good number of these men would volunteer for service in 1861 a go on to become prominent leaders in both the Union and Confederate armies. Among these officers were such notables as Thomas “Stonewall” Jackson, Ulysses S. Grant, William Tecumseh Sherman, Henry Halleck, George McClellan and Jubal Early.

The military education of these officers at West Point was based very technical and focused on engineering, civil, and topographic, disciplines that had a direct contribution to the expanding American nation. What little in the way of formal higher level military education West Point cadets received was focused the Napoleonic tactics and methods espoused by Henri Jomini as Clausewitz’s works had yet to make their way to America. Dennis Hart Mahan taught most military theory and tactics courses being taught at the academy in the formative years of so many of the men who would lead the armies that fought the American Civil War.

Many Americans looked on the French, who had been the allies of the United States in the American Revolution, favorably during the ante-bellum period. This was especially true of the fledgling United States Army, which had just fought a second war with Great Britain between 1812 and 1815, and “outstanding Academy graduates in the first half of the nineteenth century, such as Halleck and Mahan, were sent to France and Prussia to continue their education. Jomini was considered as the final word on the larger aspects of military operations, and American infantry, cavalry, and artillery tactics imitated those of the French Army.” [8]

Dennis_Hart_Mahan

Respected but Never Loved: Dennis Hart Mahan

Mahan, who graduated at the top of the West Point class of 1824 was recognized as having a brilliant mind very early in his career, as a third classman that “he was appointed an acting assistant professor of mathematics.” [9] Following his graduation the brilliant young officer was sent by the army to France, where he spent four years as a student and observer at the “School of Engineering and Artillery at Metz” [10] before returning to the academy where “he was appointed professor of military and civil engineering and of the science of war.” [11] It was a position that the young professor excelled as subjected “the cadets…to his unparalleled knowledge and acid disposition.” [12]

Mahan spent nearly fifty years of his life at West Point, including nearly forty years as a faculty member he could not imagine living life without it. Thus he became “morbid when the Academy’s Board of Visitors recommended his mandatory retirement from the West Point Faculty” and on September 16th 1871 the elderly Mahan “committed suicide by leaping into the paddlewheel of a Hudson River steamer.” [13]

While he was in France Mahan studied the prevailing orthodoxy of Henri Jomini who along with Clausewitz was the foremost interpreter of Napoleon and Napoleon’s former Chief of Staff Marshal Ney. When we look at Mahan’s body of work in his years at West Point, Jomini’s influence cannot be underestimated. Some have noted, and correctly so, that “Napoleon was the god of war and Jomini was his prophet” [14] and in America the prophet found a new voice in that of Dennis Hart Mahan.

Thus, if one wants to understand the underlying issues of military strategy and tactics employed by the leaders of the Civil War armies, the professional soldiers, as well as those who learned their trade on the battlefield of America, one has to understand Jomini and his American interpreter Mahan.

Unlike the Prussian Clausewitz, whose writings were still unknown in America, Jomini saw the conduct of war apart from its human element and controlled by certain scientific principles. The focus in principles versus the human element is one of the great weaknesses of traditional Jominian thought.

The basic elements of Jominian orthodoxy were that: “Strategy is the key to warfare; That all strategy is controlled by invariable scientific principles; and That these principles prescribe offensive action to mass forces against weaker enemy forces at some defensive point if strategy is to lead to victory.” [15] Like Clausewitz, Jomini interpreted “the Napoleonic era as the beginning of a new method of all out wars between nations, he recognized that future wars would be total wars in every sense of the word.” [16] In his thesis Jomini laid out a number of principles of war including elements that we know well today: operations on interior and exterior lines, bases of operations, and lines of operation. Jomini understood the importance of logistics in war, envisioned the future of amphibious operations and his thought would be taken to a new level by Alfred Thayer Mahan, the son of Dennis Hart Mahan in his book The Influence of Sea Power on History.

To be fair, Jomini foresaw the horrific nature of the coming wars, but he could not embrace them, nor the concepts that his Prussian counterpart Carl von Clausewitz regarding the base human elements that made up war. “Born in 1779, Jomini missed the fervor of the Revolutionary generation and the romantic world view that inspired its greatest theorist, Jacques Antoine Guibert. He came to intellectual maturity during a period of codification and quest for stability in all spheres of life, including the waging of war.” [17] Jomini expressed his revulsion for the revolutionary aspects of war, and his desire to return to the limited wars of the eighteenth century:

“I acknowledge that my prejudices are in favor of the good old times when the French and English guards courteously invited each other to fire first as at Fontenoy, preferring them to the frightful epoch when priests, women. And children throughout Spain plotted the murder of individual soldiers.” [18]

Jomini’s influence was great throughout Europe and was brought back to the United States by Mahan who principally “transmitted French interpretations of Napoleonic war” [19] especially the interpretation given to it by Henri Jomini. However, when Mahan returned from France he was somewhat dissatisfied with some of what he learned. This is because he understood that much of what he learned was impractical in the United States where a tiny professional army and the vast expenses of territory were nothing like European conditions in which Napoleon waged war and Jomini developed his doctrine of war.

It was Mahan’s belief that the prevailing military doctrine as espoused by Jomini:

“was acceptable for a professional army on the European model, organized and fighting under European conditions. But for the United States, which in case of war would have to depend upon a civilian army held together by a small professional nucleus, the French tactical system was unrealistic.” [20]

Mahan set about rectifying this immediately upon his return to West Point, and though he was now steeped in French thought, he was acutely sensitive to the American conditions that in his lectures and later writings had to find a home. As a result he modified Jominian orthodoxy by rejecting one of its central tenants-primary reliance on offensive assault tactics.” [21] Mahan wrote, “If the offensive is attempted against a strongly positioned enemy… it should be an offensive not of direct assault but of the indirect approach, of maneuver and deception. Victories should not be purchased by the sacrifice of one’s own army….To do the greatest damage to our enemy with the least exposure of ourselves,” said Mahan, “is a military axiom lost sight of only by ignorance to the true ends of victory.” [22]

However, Mahan had to contend with the aura of Napoleon, which affected the beliefs of many of his students and those who later served with him at West Point, including Robert E. Lee. “So strong was the attraction of Napoleon to nineteenth-century soldiers that American military experience, including the generalship of Washington, was almost ignored in military studies here.” [23] It was something that many American soldiers, Union and Confederate would pay with their lives as commanders steeped in Napoleon and Jomini threw them into attacks against well positioned and dug in opponents well supported by artillery. Lee’s assault on Cemetery Ridge on July 3rd1863 showed how little he had learned from Mahan regarding the futility of such attacks, and instead trusted in his own interpretation of Napoleon’s dictums of the offense.

Thus there was a tension in American military thought between the followers of Jomini and Mahan. The conservative Jominian interpretation of Napoleonic warfare predominated much of the officer corps of the Army, and within the army “Mahan’s decrees failed to win universal applause.” [24] However, much of this may have been due in part to the large number of officers accessed directly from civilian life into the army during the Jacksonian period. Despite this, it was Dennis Hart Mahan who more than any other man “taught the professional soldiers who became the generals of the Civil War most of what they knew through the systematic study of war.” [25]

When Mahan returned from France and took up his professorship he became what Samuel Huntington the “American Military Enlightenment” and he “expounded the gospel of professionalism to successive generations of cadets for forty years.” [26]Some historians have described Mahan by the “star professor” of the Military Academy during the ante-bellum era. [27] Mahan’s influence on the future leaders of the Union and Confederate armies went beyond the formal classroom setting. Mahan established the “Napoleon Club,” a military round table at West Point.[28] In addition to his writing and teaching, Mahan was one of the preeminent influences on the development of the army and army leadership during the ante-bellum period.

However, Mahan and those who followed him such as Henry Halleck, Emory Upton and John Bigelow who were the intellectual leaders of the army had to contend with an army culture which evidenced “a distain for overt intellectual activities by its officers for much of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries….Hard fighting, hard riding, and hard drinking elicited far more appreciation from an officer’s peers that the perusal of books.” [29]

Mahan dominated the academy in many ways. For the most part Mahan ran the academic board, an institution that ran the academy, and “no one was more influential than Mahan in the transition of officership from a craft into a profession.”[30] Mahan was a unique presence at West Point who all students had to face in their final year before they could graduate and become a commissioned officer. “His Engineering and Science of War course was the seedbed of strategy and tactics for scores of cadets who later became Civil War Generals.” [31] That being said most of what Mahan taught was the science of engineering related to war and he “went heavy on the military engineering and light on strategy” [32] relying primarily on Jomini’s work with his modifications for the latter.

The prickly professor was “respected by his students but never loved.” One student described him as “the most particular, crabbed, exacting man that I ever saw. He is a slim little skeleton of a man and is always nervous and cross.” [33] As a teacher Mahan was exceptional, but he was exceptionally demanding of his students. Those cadets who had survived the first three years at the academy were confronted by this “irritable, erudite, captious soldier-professional who had never seen combat” yet who was “America’s leading military mind.” [34]

Mahan was “aloof and relentlessly demanding, he detested sloppy thinking, sloppy posture, and a sloppy attitude toward duty…Mahan would demand that they not only learn engineering and tactics, but that every manner and habit that characterizes an officer gentlemanly deportment, strict integrity, devotion to duty, chivalric honor, and genuine loyalty be pounded into them. His aim was to “rear soldiers worthy of the Republic.” [35] Continue reading

1 Comment

Filed under civil war, History, leadership, Military, us army

Tragic Heroes: Gouverneur Warren Part Two

Friends of Padre Steve’s World

Yesterday I posted part one of a several part series about the Union Army general, Gouverneur Warren. have been writing about leadership the past couple of days and despite all that is going on in the news I think that I will continue to do so using some parts of my Gettysburg text. I think it is incredibly important to get to know the men and women behind iconic pictures, statues, and biographies that are often not much more than hagiography. In my studies I have encountered people who I find fascinating and not just because of their achievements but also due to their suffering. One of my seminary professors said that you could never come to grips with Jesus until you came to understand suffering.

That is important especially when we deal with men and women who have been traumatized on the battlefield, who when they return from war they come home changed. Many are great leaders and outstanding people whose courage was proven but their lives after the war can only be considered tragic. One of these is Gouverneur Warren, one of the heroes of the Union in the Civil War, and who was instrumental in stopping the Confederate forces at Gettysburg 0n July 2nd 1863. I have written about him before, but I think now is an appropriate time to revisit his life as well as some other men who fought alongside him at Gettysburg. Thia is part two of my series about him.

Have a great day,

Peace

Padre Steve+

200px-GKWarren

 

Gouverneur Warren: A Complex Character

It is in this context that we examine Brigadier General Gouverneur Warren’s actions on Little Round Top on the afternoon and evening of July 2nd 1863, the controversy that embroiled his career and left him embittered and disillusioned at the end of the war; and even the possible explanations for what occurs to Warren during and after the war provided by modern medicine and psychological knowledge. We must do this because Warren is one of the most important people who step into history that day and because he is such a contradictory figure, to try to understand him and in doing so attempt to understand ourselves more fully.

At the time of the Battle of Gettysburg, Brigadier General Gouverneur Warren was serving as the Chief Topographical Engineer of the Army of the Potomac, a position that he had been appointed to by Joseph Hooker prior to Chancellorsville. At Chancellorsville Warren took command of the Pioneer brigade and “was responsible for the spectacular display of improvised field fortification during Hooker’s withdraw from Chancellorsville.” [1]

Unlike some of the other characters on Little Round Top that day, particularly Joshua Chamberlain, Warren does not engender myth; in fact some historians almost go out of their way to besmirch him, Joseph Whelan described Warren as “a fussy man who liked limericks, decidedly lacked gravitas.” [2] The description Warren being a “fussy man” who “lacked gravitas” is decidedly unfair for it immediately paints Warren in the mind of the reader as a man lacking in courage or fortitude and it distorts history. As I mentioned earlier when examining the evidence we have to carefully sift through it and not assume that any one characterization of a person is correct.

Whelan’s description of Warren is decidedly prejudicial. Warren was actually a complex and often contradictory figure as many military leaders throughout history have been. Though heroic, he did not look like a hero, and though an intensely proud man did not seek to bolster his image in the media, during or after the war.  Warren’s most recent biographer, David Jordan wrote that Warren was “prone to long sieges of depression, and he himself agreed that others found him to be morose and unsmiling. A complex and enigmatic man, Gouverneur Kemble Warren is not one to be easily categorized.” [3] His peers seemed to either admire or loathe him for he could be openly critical of others and had arrogance about him, which put some people off. Likewise Warren was often openly disdainful of those that he regarded as his inferiors, which at times included some of his superior officers, a trait that worked against him in the “hierarchical realm of military life.” [4]

Though Warren was considered the “savior of Little Round Top” in the years immediately following the war; his story faded. In part this was due to being relieved of command of Fifth Corps by Philip Sheridan at Five Forks, something that Chamberlain and many other officers and men of V Corps “considered an unjust act made cruel by his [Sheridan’s] refusal to reconsider it.”  [5] His story also faded because he resigned his commission as a Major General of Volunteers soon after the war, and returned to relative obscurity working as an Engineer officer along the Mississippi River.

After Warren’s untimely death at the age of fifty-three in 1882, three months before he exonerated by the Board of Inquiry, he was forgotten by many.  Likewise, the book he had prepared from his carefully arranged letters and reports was not published until 1932, forty years after his death.

Conversely, the story and myth of his friend and defender Joshua Chamberlain story grew throughout the late 1890s and early 1900s.  By then, Chamberlain, a superb writer and orator, alone of the men who made the stand at Little Round Top was still alive to tell his story, and this considerably shaped the history that we know.  The rise of the Chamberlain account is one reason why Warren is so often overlooked by many casual students and observers of the Battle of Gettysburg.

But to look at Warren’s actions is by no means to minimize the actions of others such as Colonel Strong Vincent, Colonel Joshua Lawrence Chamberlain, Brigadier General Stephen Weed, Colonel James Rice, or Colonel Patrick “Paddy” O’Rorke. All of these men played an instrumental part in the battle for Little Round Top, but only Warren, Chamberlain and Rice survived the battle, and Rice was killed in action at the Battle of Spotsylvania on May 10th 1864.

Ante-Bellum Staff Officers, Military Culture and an Expanding Army

For the purposes of this study it is important to note that Warren was not acting as a commander during the Battle of Gettysburg. Warren was, like most senior officers today, serving as a staff officer. Many times students of military history and theory are inclined to dismiss the contributions of staff officers because they do not have the overall responsibility of a battle, or the glamour of the limelight of the commanders that they serve under. However, for military professionals, especially those serving on senior staffs who prepare campaign plans, contingency plans and crisis plans the study of officers like Warren is essential.

The Federal Army at Gettysburg, like its Confederate opponent had a wide variety of officers serving in its ranks. Many of its senior officers were graduates of West Point. Many had served together in Mexico and in the various campaigns against Native American tribes. Those who stayed in the Army during the long “peace” between the Mexican War and the outbreak of the Civil War endured the monotony, boredom and often miserable conditions of isolated army posts, long family separations, as well as low pay, slow promotion and often low social status.[6] In light of such conditions, many resigned their commissions to undertake various professional, business or academic pursuits; in fact Samuel Huntington noted that in the years before the Civil War that “West Point produced more railroad presidents than generals.” [7] However, on the outbreak of the war, many of these graduates returned to service whether in the service of the Union, or the Confederate States.

When the war began the Army underwent a massive expansion, which it met through the call of up militia and by raising new volunteer units from the various states. In the expansion many officers were appointed who had no prior military service, or if they did it was performed years or even decades before the war. Some of these men were simply patriots who rallied to the flag, others due to a sense of righteousness about their cause, while others were political opportunists or appointees. In the north this was a particular problem as “professional officers were pushed aside and passed over in the Union, the higher commissions going, in the first stages of the war at least to officers called back into service or directly appointed from civilian life, many of them “political” appointees.” [8] At times the lack of experience, training and sometimes the poor character of some of the volunteers and political appointees was tragic.  However, many of these men in both Union and Confederate service performed as well or better than some of their regular army counterparts at various levels of command. Gettysburg would provide opportunity for the best and worst of all of these types of officers to succeed or fail. In this chapter we will look at how Warren succeeded remarkably at Little Round Top.

 

Explorer, Engineer and Instructor: The Preparation of a Staff Officer

As the Union mobilized a good number of Regular Army officers were allowed to assist the states in the formation and training of the new volunteer units. One of these officers was First Lieutenant Gouverneur Warren.

Warren was typical of the many professional officers of the old army. An 1850 graduate of West Point Warren was a bright student who had absorbed the teachings of his professor, Dennis Hart Mahan as the core of his own military thought, both in his senior year in college and through reinforcement as a faculty member. [9] Warren was commissioned as a Brevet Second Lieutenant and because of his high standing in his class was assigned to Corps of Topographical Engineers. He spent his first seven years in a number of assignments which took him throughout much of the country. Warren did not look the part of a hero. Short and willowy, he appeared no more substantial in body than a young boy, or as some remarked, a young woman; his uniforms tended to hang off him as if they were several sizes too big. [10]

Warren’s work involved exploring and mapping for various enterprises including the project to help tame the Mississippi River, and the exploration of the Great Plains and Black Hills where he developed a sympathy for the various Sioux tribes he encountered noting on completion of his mission in 1858, writing that He had never heard a Sioux chief express an opinion in regard to what was due them in which I do not concur and that many of them view the extinction of their race as an inevitable result of the operation of present causes, and do so with all the feelings of despair with which we should contemplate the extinction of our nationality. [11] Following his years in the west he returned as faculty to West Point where he as an Assistant Professor, shared mathematics instructional duties with Oliver O. Howard and resumed his relationship with his former professor Mahan. [12]

Commander of the Red Devils: The Peninsula, Gaines Mill and Second Manassas

On the outbreak of war Warren was granted leave from his duties at West Point to serve as Lieutenant Colonel of Volunteers in the 5th New York Infantry Regiment, also known as the Duryee Zouaves. When Abraham Duryee was appointed as a Brigadier General, Warren became the Colonel of the regiment.

He commanded the regiment during the Peninsula campaign where he was eventually given command of a provisional infantry brigade. At Gaines Mill, Warren’s regiment and brigade distinguished itself. Along George Sykes front no troops fought better than the small brigade of two volunteer regiments, the 5th and 10th New York, under Warren’s command. On the afternoon of the battle Warren led the 5th New York in a riveting counter attack.The Red Devils smashed into the 1st South Carolina Rifles and drive them back. The Zouaves were, declared a Regular, the peers of any troops on the hard fought field. Captain John W. Ames of the 11th United States told his parents that the counterattack of the New Yorkers haunted his sleep. Every night, he wrote home a week later, he saw a Zouave, with his arms around a comrade, who was fairly a dead man, walking with his friends support. Ames admitted, the horrors of sudden, accidental, bloody death are here so much augmented and multiplied. [13]

Warren described the action to his wife Nothing you ever saw in the pictures of battles excelled it. The artillery which had been firing stopped on both sides, and the whole armies were now spectators. In less than five minutes 140 of my men were killed or wounded and the other regiment completely destroyed. [14] Warren and his men received many accolades that day. George McClellan credited them with saving the Union left and said that Warren was everywhere conspicuous on the field, and not only directed the movement of his own brigade, which he handled with consummate skill, and placed in the most advantageous of positions, where they could produce the most effect on the enemy, but directed the movement of other regiments. [15] and during the action Warren suffered a slight wound from a spent bullet and had his horse shot out from under him.

Warren’s tiny provisional brigade composed of his 5th New York and the 10th New York was at Second Manassas where they had the bad fortune to be on the exposed Federal flank when Longstreet’s massive attack rolled over them. Warren and his brigade were left to protect the Fifth Corps artillery and trains when that corps was ordered by John Pope to attack Jackson’s corps, and John Reynolds’ division was ordered to withdraw leaving the Fifth Corps’ flank uncovered. On his own initiative Warren moved his brigade to protect the flank when Longstreet’s massive blow hit. Alone the two regiments, numbering about 1100 soldiers were overwhelmed in what one soldier called the very vortex of hell. [16] Robert E. Lee had drawn Pope into a trap and was poised to destroy his army. Longstreet’s corps led by Hood’s Texas brigade struck Warren’s troops and the 10th New York fell back as Warren and the 5th New York hung on long enough for artillery to limber up and withdraw, but they too were forced back with heavy losses. The 10th New York lost 133 killed and wounded, the 5th New York over 300 more. Warren wrote Braver men than those who fought and fell that daycould not be found. It was impossible to do more.  A member of Fifth Corps wrote that Warrens regiment and brigade, commanded by him, sustained heavier losses than any command on that disastrous field. [17] However, Warren’s gallantry was rewarded with promotion to Brigadier General effective September 26th 1862.

Though present at Antietam and Fredericksburg Warren’s brigade was not committed to either fight. However, Warren was in a position to see the disastrous attacks of Union troops against enemy troops in strong defensive positions. As an engineer Warren recognized the advantages that now were afforded to the defense with the advent of the rifled musket, something that would influence many of his decisions as well as his questioning of Meade, Grant and Sheridan for tactical decisions to attack in situations where he viewed such actions to be either unwise or suicidal. Warren was affected by what he had seen, both in the human cost of the war as well as the politics that had engulfed the army. He wrote his wife Emily on Christmas Day:

I today feel very desponding about our government and the management of affairs.I left my home without ambition to save a noble cause. I have seen that cause almost betrayed- I know of bleeding hearts, desolate homes, and unnumbered nameless graves of noble men who have vainly perished. There must be a just God[.] Why does he permit these things…”  [18]

Notes

[1] Hagerman, Edward. The American Civil War and the Origins of Modern Warfare, Midland Book Editions, Indiana University Press, Bloomington IN. 1992 p.96

[2] Whelan, Joseph Bloody Spring: Forty Days that Sealed the Confederacy’s Fate Da Capo Press, Boston 2014 p.65

[3] Jordan, David M. Happiness is Not My Companion: The Life of G.K. Warren Indiana University Press, Bloomington Indiana 2001 p.x

[4] Happiness is Not My Companion The Life of G.K. Warren p. x

[5] Wallace, Willard M. The Soul of the Lion: A Biography of Joshua L. Chamberlain Stan Clark Military Books, Gettysburg PA 1991 p.173

[6] Taylor, John M. Duty Faithfully Performed: Robert E Lee and His Critics Brassey’s, Dulles VA 1999 pp.37-38.

[7] Huntington, Samuel P. The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, Cambridge MA and London 1957 p.199

[8] Ibid. Huntington. The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations p.213

[9] Ibid. Jordan Happiness is Not My Companion The Life of G.K. Warren p.6

[10] LaFantasie, Glenn W. Twilight at Little Round Top: July 2, 1863 The Tide Turns at Gettysburg Vintage Books, a Division of Random House, New York 2005 p.73

[11] Ibid. Jordan Happiness is Not My Companion: The Life of G.K. Warren p.30

[12] Ibid. Jordan Happiness is Not My Companion: The Life of G.K. Warren p.33

[13] Wert, Jeffry D. The Sword of Lincoln: The Army of the Potomac Simon and Schuster New York 2005 p.104-105

[14] Ibid. Jordan Happiness is Not My Companion: The Life of G.K. Warren p.46

[15] Ibid. Jordan Happiness is Not My Companion: The Life of G.K. Warren p.46

[16] Ibid. Jordan Happiness Is Not My Companion: The Life of G.K. Warren p.56

[17] Ibid. Jordan Happiness is Not My Companion: The Life of G.K. Warren p.56

[18] Ibid. Jordan Happiness is Not My Companion: The Life of G.K. Warren p.64

Leave a comment

Filed under civil war, Gettysburg, History, leadership, Military

“A Clear and Present Danger” The Problem of Sexual Assault and Harassment in the Military

111912cover

Over the past number of weeks the incessant number of stories regarding incidents of sexual assault and harassment by military members against other military members has reached levels that I have not seen in years. Since I have served in the military continuously in one capacity or another for almost 32 years I have seen this phenomena develop and reach a point that I did not think was possible, which endangers the morale and mission of the military and the trust of our society in our military institutions.

dod-assaults-timeline

When I first entered the military in 1981, enlisting in the California Army National Guard and in the Army ROTC program at UCLA had no idea what would transpire over my career and how I as a man would see the problem of sexual assault. I entered the military not a few years after the changeover from a military built on conscription to an all volunteer force and the integration of women into units, which while not “combat arms” units would certainly be in the fight should we ever go to war.

I guess that the first places that I saw what would now certainly be prohibited behaviors were in my National Guard unit, a Field Artillery Battalion in Southern California which though not authorized any females, had an administrative support section of females who worked for the personnel officer and Command Sergeant Major. When we went to the field they would accompany us and the stories of what went on with them and members of the leadership were infamous. When I attended my ROTC Advanced Pre-Commissioning Camp at Fort Lewis Washington we had three female cadets in my platoon. They lived in a separate barracks with other women but trained with us. They were subjected to some of the most despicable treatment that I had seen in my life. Their looks, motivations and morals were scrutinized in ways that the editors of the National Enquirer would be proud. They had senior instructors appear to give them unwanted favor and for that they ended up being derided by their fellow male cadets.

603858_10151664883067059_2000407407_n

Me early in my career as a Platoon Leader in Germany

After I was commissioned as a Medical Service Corps Officer in 1983 and assigned to a Medical Ambulance Company in Germany I saw the problem grow as more women were assigned to such field units because of the indiscriminate nature of the Army assignment system. My unit eventually had 63% of its assigned strength as females, about 85% of our medics were female. Our sister company was just that, they peaked at 73% female strength. While I was in the unit I served as a Platoon Leader, Company Executive Officer and eventually the Company Commander when our Company Commander, who actively spoke in racist and sexist terms referring to blacks as “the seed of Cain” and women as “unequal to men” using his religion as justification was relieved of command.

I was privileged to serve with some of the finest women soldiers that I have every served alongside while in that unit. My XO retired as a Lieutenant Colonel and my Platoon Sergeant retired as a First Sergeant. Both were hard chargers and as competent or more than most of the men that I served with but were often, usually behind their backs treated with distain for their competence and ability to serve in what until that point had been pretty much a “men’s club.”

While I was serving as a company commander I worked hard, I had only been an officer a little over two years, a very junior First Lieutenant when I took command following the relief of the previous commander. I found though that some things were not simply a matter of individuals but problems in the very institution that since I was a child had idolized.

One of those situations came out when I attempted to prosecute a Sergeant for forcing a very junior female soldier into a sex act in her barrack room after duty hours. His wife was 8 months pregnant and also a Sergeant but at the base medical clinic. He was caught by her and soon the barracks had every member of the chain of command as well as a copious amount of Military Police and CID agents swarming in it. The poor girl was found half undressed under her bed and had to be taken by my former platoon sergeant out of harm’s way after all was said and done while the Sergeant was being read his rights.  As the Company commander I had the primary responsibility to file charges. Since the man was a Sergeant and under I could not reduce him in rank using the Article 15 Non-Judicial Proceedings process and he was to leave the Army in a couple of months so a court martial would have only kept him in the unit longer. So I referred the case to the Group Commander, a full Colonel and decorated Vietnam veteran and aviator.

050913-military-assault

The Colonel had been our senior instructor when I was at the Academy of Health Sciences and he was a man that I admired. However, when the case got to him he did less that I would have been authorized to do and in addition did not revoke the award of the Army Commendation Medal which the Sergeant was being given for the end of his service as he got ready to leave the Army. When I found out I stormed to the Colonel’s office and told him that he, the Colonel had embarrassed the entire Medical Group and my Company in particular because the case was the talk of the entire base. It could not easily be covered up. I was told by him “I have done what I have done.” He then turned his back on me and from that moment on I was treated with contempt by him and his closest staff members. I learned the hard way that honesty can get you in trouble.

My next assignment was as the Adjutant of the Academy of Health Sciences. I was a newly promoted Captain and worked closely with the Brigade Legal Officer who served as the prosecutor. While I was assigned there three major incidents come to mind all of which involved significant sexual assault, harassment or treatment of students or junior enlisted staff members.

One of those was an aggravated rape of a 18 year old female trainee who was raped by a male trainee over concertina wire in a dark area near her barracks when she was walking back from the trainee PX and Snack Bar on a Saturday Night. It was a brutal case and we sent the young soldier to a General Court Martial when he was convicted of assault, battery, rape and a number of other charges and sentenced to 40 years in Leavenworth prison.

military-sexual-abuse-1

The second was the first trial of a soldier that was having unprotected sex with other soldiers while knowingly being HIV positive. He was a player, a good looking man who easily picked up young women. He worked as a personnel sergeant in one of the training battalions and used his looks, his rank and influence to have unprotected sex with a number of the young female clerks that worked in that personnel center without letting them know of his HIV status. He was found out when the Battalion Commander who was walking through the office overheard one of the females talking with another about her date with him and the sex. Since the commander had personally counseled the sergeant of his legal responsibilities being HIV positive, which included informing sexual partners and ensuring that any sex he had was “safe sex” the commander brought him up on charges. Eventually he was tried and convicted at General Court Martial and since he was beginning to show the outward symptoms of the opportunistic infections of fell blown AIDS was sentenced to 6 months confinement and a Dishonorable Discharge. One of the women that he had sex with, a junior soldier as well eventually tested HIV positive.

The last of the major events at the Academy was a Christmas break, sex for grades scandal that eventually encompassed 17 instructors who had a rather large orgy and party at one of the instructor’s off base home. The San Antonio Express News picked up the story and ran with of course and it made front page news. Unfortunately, most of what they reported, with the exception of the use of “whipped creme” at the orgy was contained in police and CID reports. The whipped creme was certainly an interesting twist and needless to say a good number of instructors were disciplined or their actions.

I left active duty in the fall of 1988 to return to the National Guard while attending seminary. While in the Guard I served in all male units that unlike my unit in California did not have its own assigned female administrative detachment and harem. However that doesn’t mean that I still didn’t see cases of sexual indiscretion, but most of what I saw happened happened outside of my command.

Since I go back a long time I do remember the effects of the Navy’s 1991 Tailhook scandal that eventually ended the careers of some 300 officers, including a number of admirals. I was promoted to the rank of Major in December 1995 and transferred to the Army Reserve and was mobilized in July 1996 to support the Bosnia intervention. About that time a major sexual assault and harassment scandal took place at the Army Training Center at the Aberdeen Proving Grounds. It like Tailhook was all over the news and the Army tried to respond by getting tough on offenders and by sending teams around to emphasize what was right and what was wrong. One of these teams showed up at our base in Germany and about 60 chaplains were gathered together to get the training.

Now I was a mobilized reservist who had not only been a chaplain but had seen and or help prosecute these kinds of issues before as a Company Commander and Brigade Adjutant. I was somewhat jaded by what I had seen and during the lecture I raised my hand into the air and uttered something that many of my colleagues were thinking. One of our instructors, acknowledged my upraised hand so I asked the question. I said “Ms so and so, my name is Chaplain Dundas and unlike most of these gentlemen and women I am a mobilized reservist.” She she asked me what my comment was and I said “Ma’am, it seems to me if people would simply treat people as they would want to be treated or have their wives or daughters treated by others none of this training would be necessary.” You could hear the air being sucked out of the room as my active duty colleagues looked in shock to see who uttered such heresy. Even the instructor seemed stunned. I continued “It seems to me that if we took a hard line and punished the offenders severely and stopped treating this like it was a joke as an institution then we wouldn’t need to have this kind of collective training.” My comment was rapidly passed over and after the training a number of more senior chaplains came to me and thanked me for being honest. Not a few months later the Command Sergeant Major of the Army was relieved of his duties for alleged sexual harassment, yet another scandal.

In 2003 there was a major scandal at the Air Force Academy which very few people were ever punished for, despite a massive number of substantiated complaints of unwanted sexual harassment by female cadets. I have lost count of the number of commanders and other senior officers relieved of duties for inappropriate behaviors with junior subordinates many times of the sexual harassment or assault variety. Any casual reader of the Navy, Army, Air Force or Marine Corps Times can testify to how many of these instances happen and unfortunately they are but the tip of the iceberg I am afraid.

ct-sc-nw-military-rape-krusins-jpg-20130507

Lt. Col Jeffrey Krusinski, the chief of the Air ForceSexual Assault Prevention and Response program

Just in the past month the program director of the Air Force Sexual Assault and Prevention program, a Lieutenant Colonel was arrested for drunkenly accosting a women in a parking lot, the director of the Army program at Fort Campbell Kentucky, also a Lieutenant Colonel was charged with violating a protective order put in place by his estranged wife and a Sergeant First Class, the director of a unit Sexual Assault and Prevention program at Fort Hood Texas was charged with running a prostitution ring using of course, junior female soldiers. Brigadier General Jeffery Sinclair, the former Deputy Division Commander of the 82nd Airborne Division is being prosecuted for is accused of having an illicit affair and engaging in wrongful sexual conduct with several women who were under his command.

petraeus-and-broadwell-e13525065677432

General David Petreus and his “biographer mistress” Paula Broadwell

These instances of course do not take into account of the scandal involving former Iraq and Afghanistan Commander and former CIA Director General David Petreus and his relationship with his biographer an Army Reserve Lieutenant Colonel. To make matters worse some General Officers who are the convening authorities for Courts Martial offenses have given clemency or set aside punishments of senior officers convicted by General Court Martial proceedings of sexual assault or harassment crimes.

I could go on and on and on but will not because frankly it is nauseating and is bringing so much discredit to the services that it cannot be joked about. Almost all of these cases involved some form of undo command influence or other criminal behavior. Although the crimes sometimes are committed by male homosexuals or lesbians, the vast majority are heterosexual and often involve high ranking career service men and women who are married heterosexuals both male and female.

460x

When I look at this situation and ask myself what is going on I have to agree that it is a massive problem. You don’t get so many instances involving so many individuals of high rank without it being something systemic in the military culture. While we can point to the fact that the military is composed of people of the broader society we are a very small segment of that society and percentage wise very few people even qualify to enlist in the military. We are very selective as to who we take in and who we keep. Yet we still have these problems at every level of the chain of command in every branch of the Armed Forces. These are magnified in the eyes of the broader society because of our oath to support and defend the Constitution of the United States and because we are entrusted by the larger society of representing the best of what the country stands for and which we are supposed to defend. Our mission, especially in a military where men and women serve together in combat, often enduring the same hardships and separations that previous generations of military personnel did not have to face becomes compromised when men or women abuse their rank, privilege and office to take advantage of other men or women, heterosexual or homosexual in the conduct of those duties. It compromises the chain of command, it compromises the mission and it destroys the trust needed to be mission ready. We cannot use the excuse that it happens in the civilian world so we shouldn’t be surprised by it in the military.

All the services have implemented training designed to get this problem under control. However, it will not change until people in the military decide that such acts are not just senseless, tasteless or offensive but often an violent assault on another person. I was reading an article in the Military Law Review today written about the Tailhook scandal. The author wrote something very profound with which I completely agree:

“The heart of the problem in redressing sexual harassment in the armed forces has not been Congress’s failure to expand the traditional coverage of the UCMJ so that it directly criminalizes specific forms of hostile environment conduct such as sexist remarks, tasteless jokes, and other offensive gestures. Instead, the problem has been the military leadership’s failure to recognize that in many cases, like those arising in Tailhook, sexual mistreatment actually constitutes a serious assaultive crime that must be prosecuted accordingly. Arresting “Tailhook: The Prosecution ofSexual Harassment in the Military. Lieutenant Commander J. Richard Chema MILITARY LAW REVIEW Volume 140 Spring 1993 p.63

The fact is that the law is established, training is conducted at all levels and this still happens far to often. What it demonstrates to me is that like my first attempt to deal with a sexual assault as a Company Commander in 1986 that the military culture itself is to blame. Despite our best attempts there are many who figure that boys will be boys and girls will be girls and it is not a big deal. Well maybe not, until rape, murder occurs, or a baby is born out of wedlock, or a young man or woman commits suicide because of the trauma and shame that they endure from a senior NCO or officer that has great influence over their career and life.

I know that we can do better because I know a lot of good men and women, officers and senior enlisted that are committed to changing the culture. That being said it takes the commitment of everyone to do this right. Since it doesn’t look like we in the military are capable of handling this ourselves it is that members of Congress will change the UCMJ and maybe take these cases out of the hands of military commanders. That could well be the case. You can only give excuses so many times over so many decades as to why you don’t do better as an institution before those that have the civilian oversight decide that you are incapable of change. We just may have reached that point in our military justice system.

Folks, this might be interesting as a lawyer or ethicist, but it is not going to be something that we in the military will enjoy.

Someone did a You Tube video using footage from the German language film Downfall where Hitler takes his commanders to task in the last days of the war. The subtitles have been changed to deal with the recent sexual assault scandals. It is very pointed satire and maybe, just maybe we in the military should take it seriously.

Peace

Padre Steve+

3 Comments

Filed under Military, national security, News and current events

Twilight of the Generals: The Deeper Implications of the Petraeus Scandal

“War with impersonal leadership la a brutal soul-destroying; business, provocative only of class animosity and bad workmanship. Our senior officers must get back to sharing danger and sacrifice with their men, however exalted their rank, just as sailors have to do. That used to be the British way, but, unfortunately, there was a grievous lapse from it in the last war.” Colonel C.S.O. Head, A Glance at Gallipoli 

It has been a strange week for the military. I will be writing some more on this over the next few days but in the wake of the scandals wracking the military.

Some of these things have been brewing for some time.  But the revelations of an extramarital affair of retired Army General and now former CIA Director David Petreus, the revelation that Petraeus’ successor in Afghanistan Marine General John Allen sending allegedly flirtatious e-mails with the woman whose complaints of e-mail harassment triggered the investigation that exposed the Petraeus and his mistress-biographer Paula Broadwell.

General William “Kip” Ward, the former commander of US AFRICOM was demoted following an investigation that tied him to “unauthorized expenses” and “lavish travel” to the tune of 129,000 on an 11 day “business trip” that only three days were actual business.

Meanwhile in Fort Bragg North Carolina Army Brigadier General Jeffery Sinclair is going through the military version of a grand-jury investigation for sexual harassment and other such crimes against a number of his female staff officers. One alleges that Sinclair forced her to have oral sex and that he threatened to kill her or her family if she told anyone.

As a career officer myself, having spent the last 31 years in the Army, the Reserve Components of the Army and the Active Duty Navy I am disappointed but not surprised. I spent almost over half my career as a company grade officer or enlisted man and a fan of the late Colonel David Hackworth, who called he senior leaders of the military “perfumed princes.”

I think part of the problem is that many of us in the military have become more supporters of the preservation of the institution of the military than we are of the Constitution or the country. This is not surprising and in a sense I can understand this and probably at more than one point in my career been guilty of this. We are afraid of cuts to the military institution because it impacts us.

The roots of the problem go back to Vietnam but can probably be traced further back. The revolt of liberals and young people against the war, the military and the draft forced an end to the draft and the beginning of the All Volunteer force. This was a two edged sword. On the positive side it allowed the military to reform, reorganize and become the premier fighting force in the world. On the minus side of the equation was the fact that the military became a society within the society. We became insular and in many cases, including mine distrusted liberals and Democrats on any national security issue. Those old enough can trace that back to how either we, or our fathers were treated by liberals, Democrats and the media during the Vietnam war and its aftermath. Others, younger than me simply have bought the lie that liberals and Democrats are inherently anti-military. This has been particularly the case since the end of the Reagan administration and the George H.W. Bush led Gulf War victory over Iraq which cemented a narrative that the military was invincible.

Over the course of the next 20 years, the 8 years of Bill Clinton, the 8 years of George W. Bush and the first 4 years of Barak Obama the esteem for the military by the general population has continued to go up, even as that population is increasingly divorced from the need to serve in the military. The military at any given times in the past 20 years numbered less than 1% of the American population. This statistic is unlikely to go up in the near future with the reduction of the military to its pre-Iraq war strength and the increase in the population.

While the military has been engaged in a protracted war since the attacks of 9-11 and heavily involved in other wars or “operations other than war” since the Gulf War it has continued to shrink in relative terms to the US population. At the same time the military has become a lot more top-heavy in  numbers of General and Flag Officers since before the Second World War. The percentage of Generals and Flag officers added to the military since the beginning of the War on Terror has only increased, especially at the 3 and 4 star level.

There were in 2011 a total of 964 Generals and Admirals in the US military down slightly from 1017 at the end of the Cold War when there were more than 600,000 more personnel in the military. In the Second World War there were about 1.7 Generals or admirals per 10,000 personnel, the line today is about 6.8 per 10,000. See ( http://www.pogo.org/pogo-files/testimony/national-security/ns-wds-20110914.html )

Regardless of the administration in power the senior ranks of the military have increased not only in numbers but in influence in the government. Highly respected by the public and with probably more power than at any time in our history the senior leadership of the Armed Forces has become insular and isolated. The senior ranks of the military have become a culture within a culture within the culture. The ongoing revelations of the Petraeus affair and possible involvement of General Allen regarding two women, most notably Jill Kelley a socialite who has cultivated close relationships with military leaders assigned to CENTCOM in Tampa as well as the culture of the Washington Beltway shows the depth of that disconnect.

At any given time there are well under 10% of flag and general officers commanding troops in combat. The rest are assigned to stateside units and staffs of various combatant commands, staffs and the Pentagon. In my service the Navy in World War II there were about 130 ships for every Admiral, today there are almost as many admirals as ships. While the ranks of the military have shrunk the numbers of Generals and Admirals has risen and the culture surrounding them has become more opaque. Generals and Admirals have become celebrities and power players in society in their own right. In fact I would guess that only the Great German Imperial General Staff of the Kaiser Reich had such influence in society at large or political power.

That respect which these men and women have earned in the nation which is often earned due to the incredible sacrifice of ordinary Soldiers, Sailors, Marines and Airmen. Likewise many General and Flag officer have done time in combat zones as lower ranking commanders and staff officers and have spent many years deployed and away from their families in direct combat or in supporting roles.

In spite of this there is obviously something amiss in the senior ranks of the military. The record numbers of the relief for cause of many senior officers and commanders due to various infractions, many of a personal, ethical or sexual nature is cause for concern. The concern that I hear from young men and women serving in the military and read about almost every day is that there is a separate set of standards for senior ranks than junior ranks. I have been fortunate that commands that I have been a part over the past 15 years have sensitive to this and have worked hard to ensure that standards are enforced regardless of rank but that is not always the case. High profile stories of scandal, privilege on the part of some have tarnished the hard work of many stellar officers and NCOs and the great sacrifice of those killed, maimed or wounded in mind, body and spirit in our current war.

The indiscreet and sometimes criminal actions of General Petraeus, General Ward, General Sinclair and fairly substantial number of other commanders who have been relieved for cause is is something to be concerned about.

Major General J.F.C. Fuller who served in the Royal Tank Corps in the First World War wrote a small but timeless book called “Generalship: Its Diseases and Their Cure: A Study of the Personal Factors of Command” in 1932. Fuller was quite critical of a culture in the higher ranks which had led to unnecessary slaughter and suffering during the First World War. It is a book that is well worth the read in such a time as ours. As the scandal continued to develop this week I remembered it and decided to re-read it.

The problems that we face are not unique to us. Scandals that are rocking the US Military are not new, they have been faced by other militaries before. The issue today is that the modern media and communications age has made it nearly impossible for those involved in salacious behavior to have it covered up. The Petraeus scandal has unfolded in large part due to the electronic media which almost all of us are dependent on, even for routine communications that never would have seen the light of day had they not been recorded in the cyber records of Google, Facebook, Twitter, text messages, e-mail providers or other electronic communication systems. There might have been insinuations, innuendo and accusations but many would have never seen the light of day.

The indiscretions of these men actually opened a door for honest questions and examination of the health of the American civil-military institutions. The military institution and those that swear to support and defend the Constitution of the United States cannot become just another special interest group. Yes it is important to maintain national security and to take care of the troops when they return to civilian society. We cannot allow ourselves to become a state within a state or culture within a culture. The exaggerated numbers of General and Flag Officers compared to the overall numbers of personnel in the military can only be justified by the necessary bureaucratic and institutional power provided by the rank, not by mission or responsibility.

The power of the institution is dangerous when its leaders subtly shift the mission from the defense of the Constitution and the people to the defense and maintenance of the institution itself and their own power.

This is not simply about sex, improper relationships, assault or financial indiscretions of leaders, it points to broader and perhaps more dangerous threats to our system of government, but the unbridled temptation of power and influence that believes that comes with the unquestioned adulation of politicians, pundits and preachers, the Unholy Trinity. So even as the scandals rock the military it is not a bad thing. If we do not address them they will become millstones about our necks that will drag us under and expose the people and Constitution that we are sworn to defend to untold disaster.

Dwight D. Eisenhower reminded us so well about this danger in his farewell address in 1961:

“In the councils of government, we must guard against the acquisition of unwarranted influence, whether sought or unsought, by the military-industrial complex. The potential for the disastrous rise of misplaced power exists and will persist. We must never let the weight of this combination endanger our liberties or democratic processes.”

Peace

Padre Steve+

2 Comments

Filed under History, leadership, Military, national security