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The Responsibility Of Command: Eisenhower’s Letter in Case the D-Day Invasion Failed

Friends of Padre Steve’s World,

The great Prussian military theorist Carl Von Clausewitz noted: “It is now quite clear how greatly the objective of war makes it a matter of assessing probabilities. Only one more element is needed to make war a gamble – chance: the very last thing that war lacks. No other human activity is so continuously or universally bound up with chance. And through through the element of guesswork and luck come to play a great part in war…. If we now consider briefly the subjective nature of war – the means by which war has to be fought – it will look more like a gamble. The highest of all moral qualities in time of danger is certainly courage.”

For a year General Dwight D. Eisenhower had worked to marshal the largest force possible to launch the long awaited invasion of Nazi Occupied France. Eisenhower surrounded himself with an exceptional staff, but had to fight for what he would need for the coming invasion. He had to struggle with Admiral Ernest King for the landing ships and crafts he needed, against the competing needs of Admiral Nimitz and General MacArthur’s Forces in the Pacific Theatre of operations. He had to battle Allied bomber commands, British Bomber Command, and 8th Air Force for bombers to support the invasion, taking them away from the strategic bombing command against the heart of German industry; and finally he had to battle Winston Churchill to be in overall command of the multi-national force being assembled to attack.

The invasion was in fact his baby. He had the ultimate responsibility for its success or failure. He knew the dangers. In 1942 the British launched a raid using Canadian troops on the English Channel port of Dieppe. It was a disaster. With all the work he had done to get his forces ready for the invasion, Eisenhower knew that he owned the result.

Eisenhower understood that everything in war is a gamble and that success is not guaranteed. The weather conditions of the English Channel are unpredictable and only offer a few month window of opportunity to successfully mount a cross channel invasion. The Germans found that out in 1940 when after their failure to clear the skies of the Royal Air Force that the a favorable opportunity for Operation Sea Lion had passed.

The Allied invasion required a full moon for a nighttime paratroop drop, and favorable weather for the landing craft to get ashore. Unfortunately, the weather was not cooperating. High winds, seas, and rain forced a cancellation of the planned June 5th invasion, the open question was whether conditions would be on the 6th would be favorable. If not the next opportunity would not be for at least two more weeks.

The German weather forecasters, having lost the ability to observe weather in the western and mid-Atlantic anticipated that the weather would continue to be unfavorable for an invasion. With this in mind, Field Marshal Erwin Rommel, Commander of Army Group B which had operational control over the potential landing beaches, decided to make a visit to his wife for her birthday and a trip to Berlin to plead for more resources. Other Senior German Commanders departed to inland areas to conduct war games and were not with their units.

Meanwhile, forecasters at Eisenhower’s headquarters who had access to weather data from the mid-Atlantic, predicted a brief lull, not perfect weather, but acceptable. Eisenhower met with his staff and made the decision to go ahead with the invasion in the night of June 5th and June 6th.

But the weather was but one factor, the Allies did not know the latest German deployments, including the movement of the crack 352nd Infantry Division to Omaha Beach. Likewise, a prompt German response with heavy Panzer units could throw the invaders back into the sea if they moved fast enough. However, neither Eisenhower or his staff knew of the conflict in the German High Command and Hitler regarding the deployment of the Panzer Divisions. Rommel argued that the Panzer Divisions should be deployed near the potential invasion beaches, but traditionalists in the German command and Hitler decided that most of the Panzer Divisions should be held back awaiting the point that they could make a decisive counterattack. Rommel, a veteran of Africa and the West knew the power of allied tactical air assets, and the havoc they could inflict on the Panzers. Rommel believed that the invasion had to be defeated on the beachheads and not given the chance to advance inland.

Eisenhower also knew that the success of the invasion depended on the success of the landings. A disaster at any of the landing beaches could doom the invasion. In light of this and so many other ways that could fail, Eisenhower, wrote a letter to his troops and the world when the invasion commenced. It read:

“Soldiers, Sailors, and Airmen of the Allied Expeditionary Force:

You are about to embark upon the Great Crusade, toward which we have striven these many months.

The eyes of the world are upon you. The hopes and prayers of liberty-loving people everywhere march with you.

In company with our brave Allies and brothers-in-arms on other Fronts you will bring about the destruction of the German war machine, the elimination of Nazi tyranny over oppressed peoples of Europe, and security for ourselves in a free world.

Your task will not be an easy one. Your enemy is well trained, well equipped, and battle-hardened. He will fight savagely.

But this is the year 1944. Much has happened since the Nazi triumphs of 1940-41. The United Nations1 have inflicted upon the Germans great defeats, in open battle, man-to-man. Our air offensive has seriously reduced their strength in the air and their capacity to wage war on the ground. Our Home Fronts have given us an overwhelming superiority in weapons and munitions of war, and placed at our disposal great reserves of trained fighting men. The tide has turned. The free men of the world are marching together to victory.

I have full confidence in your courage, devotion to duty, and skill in battle. We will accept nothing less than full victory.

Good Luck! And let us all beseech the blessing of Almighty God upon this great and noble undertaking.

However, prepared for any eventuality he also also wrote a letter in case the invasion failed, as it nearly did on Omaha Beach. That letter noted:

“Our landings in the Cherbourg-Havre area have failed to gain a satisfactory foothold and I have withdrawn the troops. My decision to attack at this time and place was based upon the best information available. The troops, the air and the Navy did all that Bravery and devotion to duty could do. If any blame or fault attaches to the attempt it is mine alone.”

It was dated July 5th, not June 5th, the mistake obviously due to the pressure of what he was feeling for his soldiers, the mission, and if the mission failed, his adversaries in the United States military and in Britain would have seen to his relief. It also could have aided those in the United States and Britain willing to make peace with Germany, which could have destroyed the allied alliance that ended up defeating Germany and rebuilding a democratic Europe, establishing NATO, the United Nations, and many other international organizations that have done much good for America and the world, but which are now under threat from leaders in the United States and Europe who would rather go back to the days of Hitler than advance into a better future.

Eisenhower did not make excuses if the invasion failed. He was ready to take full responsibility if Overlord failed, regardless of how it happened.

Likewise, he knew that the failure of the invasion would have made it possible for the Nazis to divert needed forces to the Eastern Front, where they might have been able to turn back the Soviet Operation Bagration which destroyed the German Army Group Center and opened the way for the Soviets to drive the Nazis from Soviet territory, advance to Warsaw, and knock key German allies out of the war. Before long, Hungary, Romania, and Finland were abandoning the Germans.

The fact that the invasion succeeded was as much as luck as it was the careful planning, and the exceptional courage, and dogged determination of the Allied troops.

Eisenhower’s willingness to take responsibility for defeat as well as give his troops credit for the eventual victory over the Nazis sets him apart from so many others then, and now who would deflect blame for a failed operation to their subordinates and lie about the results achieved.

In the age of Trump it is something to remember.

Peace,

Padre Steve+

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Filed under History, leadership, Military, national security, News and current events, Political Commentary, us army, world war two in europe

Preparing for D-Day

The planning for the Normandy invasion began in earnest after the QUADRANT conference in Quebec in August 1943 and its timetable was established at the Tehran conference where Stalin sided with the Americans on the need for an invasion of France in the spring of 1944.[i] Prior to this there had been some planning by both the British and Americans for the eventual invasion initially named ROUNDUP including a large scale raid at Dieppe in 1942 which ended in disaster but which provided needed experience in what not to do in an amphibious assault on a heavily defended beach.   Dieppe also darkened the mood of the Allies, the British in particular to the success of such operations, bringing to mind the failed Gallipoli campaign of 1915 as well as the opposed landings at Salerno and the USMC experience at Tarawa.[ii] Despite this the Americans led by General Marshall pushed for an early invasion of northwest Europe while the Churchill and the British due to their weakness in land power pushed for land operations in the Mediterranean, and even in Norway as an option to the assault in France. The mindset of the Allies left them in the position of planning almost exclusively for the success of the initial landings and build up to the near exclusion of planning for the subsequent campaign, especially “the maze of troubles awaiting behind the French shore.”[iii]

Operation FORTITUDE: Dummy Sherman Tank

Despite this the Normandy landings planned for in NEPTUNE and OVERLORD moved ahead and with the appointment of Eisenhower as the commander of SHAEF and his major subordinates for Land, Air and Sea which caused consternation on both sides of the Atlantic,[iv] [v]and expanding the operation from the initial 3 division assault on a narrow front to a minimum 5 division assault on a broad front across Normandy[vi] supplemented by a strong airborne force.[vii] Overall the plan as it developed reflected a distinctly “American willingness to confront the enemy head-on in a collision which Britain’s leaders had sought for so long to defer.”[viii] It is ironic in a sense that the British avoidance of the head on attack was based on their known lack of manpower, especially infantry reserves to sustain the war effort and the Americans only late recognized their own deficiency in both quantity and quality of infantry forces on which their strategy depended.  That the western allies, so rich in material and natural resources would be so deficient in infantry manpower was a key constraint on the subsequent campaign in France and Germany.  The Germans too faced manpower shortages resulting in smaller divisions and the creation of many “static” divisions manned by elderly or invalid Germans, as well as “volksdeutsch” and foreign “volunteers.”

Germans building anti-landing craft obstacles. Many would be armed with artillery shells or land mines


Prior to the final decision to mount an invasion the Allied planners had first contended with the location of the assault in northwestern France.  The Pas de Calais while providing a direct route was rejected because it was where the Germans would expect the strike to occur and because it was where the German defenses were strongest, and the fiasco at Dieppe had provided ample proof of making the assault into a heavily fortified port.  Likewise the mouth of the Seine near Le Harve was rejected because of the number and quantity of landing beaches and because the forces would be split on both sides of the river.  Brittany was excluded due to its distance from the campaigns objectives in Germany.[ix] This left Normandy which offered access to a sufficient number of ports and offered some protection from the weather and which offered options to advance the campaign toward the “Breton ports or Le Harve as might be convenient.”[x] Omaha beach, situated on the center right of the strike would be crucial to the success of the assault situated to the left of UTAH and the right of the British beaches.

Rommel on Inspection Tour

Once Normandy was selected as the location for the strike Planning was at times contentious especially over the amount and type of amphibious lift that could be provided in particular the larger types of landing ships and craft to support the Normandy invasion and the planned invasion of southern France, Operation ANVIL.  The increase in OVERLORD requirements for landing craft did have an impact in the Mediterranean and resulted in ANVIL being postponed until later in the summer.

Loading LST’s for D-Day

As part of their preparations the Allies launched a massive deception campaign, Operation FORTITUDE utilizing the fictitious First Army Group under LTG George Patton. Patton still smarting from his relief of command of 7th Army following slapping commanded an “Army Group” incorporating the use of dummy camp sites, dummy tanks, aircraft and vehicles, falsified orders of battle and communications to deceive German intelligence.[xi] The success of this effort which was heightened by the fact that all German Abwehr agents in the U.K. had been neutralized or turned, and the Luftwaffe limited air reconnaissance could only confirmed the pre-invasion build ups throughout England without determining the target of the invasion.[xii] The German intelligence chief in the west, Colonel Baron von Roenne “was deceived by FORTITUDE’s fantasy invasion force for the Pas de Calais.”[xiii] Despite this 7th Army commander recognized by 1943 that Normandy was a likely Allied target and efforts were made to shift 7th Army’s center of gravity from Brittany to Normandy.  The one potential German success in getting wind of when the Allied landings would occur was lost when German intelligence discovered two lines of Verlaine’s “Chason d’ Automme” in January 1944 which were to alert the French Resistance of the invasion.  The security section of 15th Army heard them transmitted on the afternoon of 5 June and notified General Jodl at OKW, but no action was taken to alert forces on the coast.[xiv]Allied intelligence was aided by ULTRA intercepts of coded German wireless transmissions though less so than they were during the African and Italian campaigns as more German communications were sent via secure telephone and telegraph lines vice wireless.[xv] Allied deception efforts were for the most part successful in identifying German forces deployed in Normandy, but were uncertain about the 352nd Infantry Division which had been deployed along OMAHA as it had taken units of the 709th Infantry Division under its command when it moved to the coast.[xvi]

Officers of 2nd Battalion 916th Infatry Regiment 352nd Infantry Division before the invasion

The Allied air campaign leading up to the invasion was based on attempting to isolate the invasion site from German reinforcements. Leigh-Mallory the Air Chief developed the “TRANSPORTATION PLAN” which focused efforts on destroying the French railroad infrastructure.[xvii] A more effective effort was led by General Brereton and his Ninth Air Force which was composed of medium bombers and fighters.  His aircraft attacked bridges and rapidly achieved success in crippling German efforts to reinforce Normandy.[xviii] Hastings gives more credit to the American bombing campaign in Germany led by General Spaatz and the 8th Air Force in destroying both German production capacity in oil and petroleum as well as the degradation of the German fighter force achieved in the American daylight raids, which so seriously degraded the German fighter force that it could not mount effective resistance to the invasion.[xix] Weigley too notes that Albert Speer the Reich Armaments Minister said that “it was the oil raids of 1944 that decided the war.”[xx]

Getting Tanks ashore was vital and the Dual Drive Sherman Tanks were integral to the American Plan at Omaha Beach

Planning and preparations for OMAHA were based around getting the 1st and 29th Infantry Divisions ashore and them securing a beachhead “twenty-five kilometers wide and eight or nine kilometers deep.”[xxi] American preparations were thorough and ambitious, but the American assault would go through the most heavily defended sector of German defenses in Normandy with wide beaches bordered by dunes which were nearly impassable to vehicles and “scrub covered bluffs thirty to fifty meters high…rough and impassable to vehicles even to tracked vehicles except at a few places.  The exits were unimproved roads running through four or five draws that cut the bluffs.”[xxii] Dug in along those bluffs would be the better part of the 352nd Division. Compounding the selection of a difficult and heavily defended landing zone the Americans failed to take advantage of many of the “gadgets” that were offered by the British which in hindsight could have aided the Americans greatly.  The Americans made use of two battalions of DD (Dual Drive) tanks but turned down the offer of flail tanks, flamethrower tanks, and engineer tanks, the “funnies” developed by General Hobart and the British 79th Armored Division.[xxiii] Weigley believes that the American view of “tanks as instruments of mobility rather than of breakthrough power.” And the fact that American victories in the First World War were won by infantry.[xxiv] In this aspect the Americans were less receptive to utilizing all available technology than the British whose use of the Armor on the beaches to provide direct fire into German strong points lessened their infantry casualties on D-Day. Due to this lack of armor support on the beach American forces on OMAHA had little opportunity to exercise true combined arms operations.[xxv]

“Czech Hedgehogs” on the Pas De Calais

German preparations for an Allied landing in Normandy were less advanced than the Pas de Calais, although Field Marshal Rommel had increased defensive preparations along the front, including the Normandy beaches.  One of Rommel’s initiatives was to deploy Panzer Divisions near the coast where they could rapidly respond to an invasion however he did not get everything that he wanted rather than two Panzer Divisions deployed near the Normandy beaches, only one, the 21st Panzer Division was deployed near Caen in the British sector.  One wonders the result had the 12th SS Panzer Division been deployed behind OMAHA. [xxvi]

Rommel with gunners of the 21st Panzer Division’s Self-Propelled Artillery Regiment. The SP Guns were locally built by the Division using captured French Tanks and German artillery

Tomorrow: D-Day


[i] Weigley, Russell F. Eisenhower’s Lieutenants: The Campaign of France and Germany, 1944-1945, Indiana University Press, Bloomington IN, 1981 p.33

[ii] Ibid pp. 34-35

[iii] Ibid p.35

[iv] General Montgomery 21st Army group and Land Forces, Admiral Sir Bertram Ramsey as Allied Naval Expeditionary Force and Air Marshall Sir Trafford Leigh-Mallory as Commander in Chief Allied Expeditionary Air Force. Weigley p.43

[v] Max Hastings in Overlord: D-Day and the Battle for Normandy Vintage Books, New York, 1984, comments that many in Britain wondered if Eisenhower with the lack of actual battle experience could be a effective commander and that Eisenhower was disappointed in the appointment of Leigh-Mallory and Ramsey, and had preferred Alexander over Montgomery, pp. 28-29.

[vi] Ibid. Weigley p.40.  Montgomery was the first to object to the 3 division narrow front invasion rightly recognizing that seizing Caen with its road junctions could provide a springboard for the campaign into open country.

[vii] Ibid. p.37

[viii] Hastings, Max. Overlord: D-Day and the Battle for Normandy Vintage Books, New York, 1984 p.29  Hastings finds the irony in the selection of the British officers to execute the plan that reflected the American way of thinking.

[ix] The Germans agreed with this in their planning leaving Brittany very lightly defended.  See  Isby, David C. Ed. “The German Army at D-Day: Fighting the Invasion.” p.27 The report of General Blumentritt, Chief of Staff OB West noted that only 3 divisions were assigned to Brittany.

[x] Ibid. Weigley, pp. 39-40

[xi] Ibid. p.73

[xii] See Isby p. 69.  General Max Pemsel of 7th Army noted that “During  the spring of 1944, Seventh Army received only tow good photographs of British southern ports, which showed large concentrations of landing craft.”

[xiii] Ibid. Hastings p.63.  Hastings comments also about the success of using the turned Abwehr agents.

[xiv] Warlimont, Walter. “Inside Hitler’s Headquarters: 1939-1945.” Translated from theGerman by R.H. Barry. Presidio Press, Novao CA, English Edition Copyright 1964 Wiedenfeld and Nicholson Ltd. Pp.422-423

[xv] Ibid. Weigley pp. 53-54

[xvi] Ibid. p. 67

[xvii] Ibid. pp.57-64  Weigley spends a great deal of time on the wrangling between Eisenhower, Leigh Mallory and Spaatz on the nature of the plan, the allocation of forces both strategic and tactical assigned to carry it out and its success, or in the light of postwar analysis the lack of effect that it had on German operations.

[xviii] Ibid. p.67-68.

[xix] Ibid. Hastings pp. 43-44 In large part due to the long range P-51 Mustang which accompanied the American bombing raids beginning in 1943.  Another comment is that the campaign drew the German fighters home to defend Germany proper and prevented their use in any appreciable numbers over the invasion beaches.

[xx] Ibid. Weigley p.69

[xxi] Ibid. p.89

[xxii] Ibid. pp. 88-89

[xxiii] Ibid. p.87

[xxiv] Ibid. Weigley also talks about the rejection of General Corlett’s ideas to use Amtracks used by the Marines in the Pacific to land on less desirable, but less defended beaches to lessen casualties on the beaches and the need for additional support equipment even on smooth beaches.  One of Corlett’s criticisms was that too little ammunition was allotted to supporting the landings and not enough supporting equipment was provided. pp. 46-47

[xxv] Hastings notes that with the strength and firepower of the German forces on OMAHA that many of these vehicles had they been employed would like have ended up destroyed further cluttering the beachhead. “Overlord” p.102

[xxvi] The battle over the deployment of the Panzer Divisions is covered by numerous historians.  The source of the conflict was between Rommel who desired to place the Panzer Divisions on the Coast under his command due to the fear that Allied air superiority would prevent the traditional Panzer counterthrust, General Gyer von Schweppenburg commander of Panzer Group West (Later the 5th Panzer Army) and Field Marshal Von Rundstedt who desired to deploy the divisions order the command of Rundstedt for a counter attack once the invasion had been launched, a strategy which was standard on the Eastern Front, and Hitler who held most of the Panzer reserve including the SS Panzer Divisions under his control at OKW.  Hitler would negotiate a compromise that gave Rommel the satisfaction of having three Panzer Divisions deployed behind coast areas in the Army Group B area of responsibility.  21st Panzer had those duties in Normandy.

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The Paradox of Conflicting Doctrine: The US Campaign in France and Germany 1944-1945

The Paradox

The paradox of the American Army’s training in speed and mobility and the strategic tradition of U.S. Grant influenced the final campaign in Germany just as they had the campaign in France.  This is one of the Russell Weigley in Eisenhower’s Lieutenants asserts that the American strategic tradition of U.S. Grant emphasized direct confrontation and defeat of the enemy’s major forces.  He asserts the development of this tradition by officers assigned to the Leavenworth schools was influenced by the Civil War and World War One and the Army’s experience as a frontier constabulary force.  He develops this theory alongside his discussion of the formation of the highly mobile and less powerful forces that the Army would deploy in World War Two and how this paradoxical combination of doctrine and force determined by conflicting legacies “put the army at cross purposes with itself…as it began to prepare for European War.”[i]

Crossing the Siegfried Line

The dogma of the Leavenworth School emphasized that “victory in large-scale war depends on a strategy of direct confrontation with the enemy’s main forces in order to destroy them.”[ii] This was not in itself different than the thought of contemporary European armies influenced by Clausewitz; but the Americans differed from the Europeans “in the extent to which they expected overwhelming power alone, without subtleties of maneuver, to achieve the objective.”[iii] The tradition developed from an emphasis on Ulysses S. Grant’s campaign in Virginia which understood that Grant had “defeated the armies of the Confederacy through head on assault by overwhelming strength to destroy them, so that in any future great war the United States would seek the destruction of the enemy armed forces by similar means.”[iv] It is perplexing that the Army failed to truly appreciate William Tecumseh Sherman’s use of strategic maneuver on the offense with the goal of destroying the enemy’s army. The fact that the Army failed to incorporate those lessons into its strategic thought, even as it built forces that were better suited to Sherman’s campaign is one of the contradictions of American military thought.[v]

Grant’s tradition was put into practice by Pershing in World War One to the extent that he could influence allied strategy, with mixed results.[vi] The reduction of the St Michel Salient and Meuse-Argonne offensive, though aided by German withdraws and achieved with high casualties, helped convince the Germans that the war was lost.[vii] “Only in late 1918 did the veteran American divisions show the same degree of tactical skill as their Allied and German counterparts, and the lessons came by bloody experience.”[viii] Pershing’s campaigns were bloody, but they came at a when maneuver had again become part of the war, and at the point where the Germans were beginning to collapse.  George Marshall warned about “generalizing about modern warfare from their 1918 experiences against a German army already stumbling into exhaustion.”[ix] Yet for “the American military, the First World War confirmed the doctrines of concentration and of fighting for complete victory, and out of the battlefields of Europe came the foundations of strategic faith….”[x] Weigley notes that: “In strategy, most American soldiers believed, the modern mass army left frontal assault as the only recourse.”[xi]

While Grant’s tradition remained a dominant feature of American strategic thought, the Army was becoming a mobile army whose divisions were to be “tough and lean.”[xii] General Leslie McNair reorganized the structure of the infantry division and later that of the armored divisions.  The heavy “square” infantry division of the First World War was reorganized with three infantry regiments and supporting elements and was characterized by its mobility than its sustained combat power.  McNair reorganized the armored divisions into lighter, though extremely flexible organizations built around the “Combat Command” and the tank was viewed as viewed as an instrument of exploitation, not a means to defeat enemy armor.  The result was an army formed “upon the principle of mobility and its lack of sustained combat power…did not serve it so well when it faced resolute and skillful enemies in strong defensive positions….”[xiii]

The new divisional structures were both mobile and flexible but in the context of the European campaign were wanting in sustained combat power.  Peter Mansoor comments that divisions “literally fought themselves out in constant operations.”[xiv] At the same time he takes issue with Weigley on the staying power of U.S. divisions commenting on the efficiency of the American individual replacement system.[xv] A U.S. Army study commented that in direct assaults against a emplaced enemy that “heavy casualties in such operations were more than the triangular division could sustain, with the result that the entire division was often rendered combat ineffective….”[xvi] McNair’s reorganization ignored General Chaffee’s 1941 admonition that armor must be organized into corps and employed in mass using not “hundreds but thousands of tanks…” calling the failure to train and organize “an adequate number of command echelons and corps troops to ensure proper employment and timely supply for these larger armored formations in active operation is indefensible.”[xvii]

To further complicate the American situation, the application of Grant’s tradition failed to take into account the principle of mass or concentration, which was vital to the success of a strategy of direct confrontation.  The theory demanded that the Americans have enough troops divisions to keep up pressure everywhere. Grant had such power at his disposal, Eisenhower did not.  The thought that “if the United States applied its superior power everywhere it must be able to rupture the defenses somewhere,”[xviii] was dominant.  But to be successful it required overwhelming superiority in numbers and firepower.  This strategy was in conflict with the Army that the Americans built to pursue the war, and in conflict with one of the more influential prewar American thesis on the subject, Infantry in Battle. This treatise stated:

“Generalship consists at being stronger at the decisive point-having three men there to attack one.  If we attempt to spread out so as to be strong everywhere, we shall end up being weak everywhere.  To have real main effort-and every attack and attack unit should have one- we must be prepared to risk extreme weakness elsewhere.”[xix]

It was an army designed for Sherman’s campaigns in Georgia and the Carolina’s, not Grant’s Virginia campaign. It was best suited to campaigns of strategic maneuver and concentration rather than frontal assaults along a broad front.  Its organization called for this and this fact was recognized before the war.[xx] Weigley notes that the “paradoxical commitment to a power drive strategy of head-on assault in an army shaped for mobility further contributed to the prolonging of the war by undermining the possible uses of mobility itself.”[xxi]

The theory of Grant, espoused by the Leavenworth school is fine there are sufficient forces to make it work. General McNair and Army planners initially planned for an Army of over 200 divisions.  Such an army would have been able to execute the strategy without the problems experienced by the Allies in 1944 and 1945.  Unfortunately the American Army was afflicted by the War Department’s decision in 1943 to limit the Army to 90 divisions.[xxii] The limitation on the number of divisions ensured that it would be “difficult or impossible once the battle of France was launched to rotate them out of line for rest or refitting.”[xxiii] This became a key consideration of allied planning by late 1944 because once the existing divisions were deployed to Europe or the Pacific there were no more to replace them.  Drastic measures were taken to increase the number of infantry troops by speeding up the movement of the last available divisions to Europe and by combing troops out of the COMMZ and from the Army Air Force.[xxiv] Training programs were put in place to train tank crews and junior officers.  Yet, these programs did not begin to put significant numbers of replacements into the line until March 1945.[xxv] Mansoor, a critic of Weigley, agrees with him on many points and notes that the “90 division gamble was a decision that cost the lives of numerous servicemen-primarily infantry replacements-in Europe in 1944 and 1945.”[xxvi] The decision to limit the number of divisions forced Eisenhower into a position where he frequently faced an equivalent number of German divisions to those that he could employ.  This would be the case in at the beginning of 1945 despite the steady erosion of the German forces arrayed before him.

Leadership, Strategy and Tactics and the Performance of the Army

The Germans Employed the Jagdtiger in Small Numbers Against the American Onslaught

After the Bulge the Allies began their push to the Rhine.  Eisenhower “interpreted the Ardennes as confirming the necessity for his broad front strategy, particularly in closing up to the Rhine all the way to Switzerland.”[xxvii] Hastings notes that the Wehrmacht “retained psychological dominance on the battlefield,”[xxviii] and that “Allied commanders remained fearful about exposing their flanks in attack, even when the Germans no longer possessed the resources or mobility to intervene with conviction.”[xxix] In many places GIs and their British counterparts in Montgomery’s 21st Army Group failed to take the initiative and often the Allied commanders “expressed dismay about the lack of aggression shown by their troops.”[xxx] Gavin noted in his diary that: “With better troops, I see no reason why we could not run all over them…Our American army means well and tries hard, but….it is untrained and inefficient… certainly our infantry lacks courage and élan.”[xxxi] Despite this the Allied armies, in particular the Americans, made headway and in many places when well led performed admirably.

The Eifel

Following the reduction of the Bulge Eisenhower allowed Bradley to begin to break the West Wall in the Eifel. After the attack began Eisenhower stopped Bradley short of a breakthrough in order to shift weight of the offensive to Montgomery in the north ordering 12th Army Group to revert to the defensive.  Yet, Eisenhower allowed Bradley a “measure of freedom for limited attacks,”[xxxii] and Patton termed his “operations in the Eifel an “aggressive defense.””[xxxiii] The campaign was primary conducted against oddments of a number of Volksgrenadier divisions of 7th Army.

First Army was diverted on February 1st after making good progress in the Eifel to safeguard the right flank of 9th Army by capturing the Roer dams.  Hastings notes that a “more flexible and imaginative commander-or one unconstrained by the demands of inter-allied relations-would have allowed Hodges forces to keep going to the river and delayed Montgomery for the necessary few days.”[xxxiv] However Bradley felt that Eisenhower “had little choice but to accede to Montgomery’s demand.”[xxxv] Bradley allowed 3rd Army to continue “probing attacks,” and 3rd Army advanced across the Eifel breaking through the West Wall at Prüm and Bitburg.  For the first time the enemy showed “cracks in the admirable cohesion and discipline of the German army.”[xxxvi] Aggressive units of Patton’s 3rd Army were rewarded with dramatic advances. 4th Armored Division in “one bound covered 25 miles, taking 5,000 prisoners and killing several hundred Germans for the loss of 111 of its own men,”[xxxvii] and 10th Armored took Trier on 14 March.  Patton called the campaign “a long hard fought fight with many river crossings, much bad weather, and a great deal of luck.”[xxxviii] Despite this there were problems in some formations.  Hastings recounts how a platoon leader in a VII Corps unit told his commander during a crossing of the Sauer River that “These men have had it sir! They won’t budge for me or anybody else….”[xxxix]The G-3 of 6th Armored division noted that “some of our divisions are too sensitive to their flanks…the result of this is timidity…”[xl]

The Roer Dams, Grenade and Lumberjack

1st Army supported 9th Army by capturing the Roer river dams in preparation of Grenade.  The inexperienced 78th Division was able to secure the dams with help from the veteran 9th Division, though not before the Germans had destroyed the release valves to “flood the Roer valley for about two weeks.”[xli] This delayed the start of Grenade but the Americans finally captured a prize that had eluded them the previous fall.  The one truly notable aspect of this campaign was the continued erratic leadership of Hodges.  Gavin called it “impatient” and it nearly cost the Commanding General of 78th division his command.  Bradley’s aide, Major Hanson remarked that Hodges “was near exhaustion.”[xlii]

9th Army’s attack was conducted in concert with Operation Veritable of 2nd Canadian Army.  The plan was that the two armies would clear the area west of the Rhine destroying as much of the enemy as possible in preparation for the crossing of the river.  As such 9th Army remained under the operational control of Montgomery’s 21st Army Group.  9th Army crossed the Roer, hampered by the high waters and German resistance but captured Düren and München-Gladbach and closed up to the Rhine.  The “rapid build-up enabled Simpson to maintain intense pressure and on the last Day of February his armor broke away.”[xliii] 9th Army met up with the Canadians eliminated elements of the German Army that remained west of the river.  9th Army took over 30,000 prisoners and killed an estimated 6,000, but substantial numbers were evacuated by skillful German commanders.[xliv] The greatest disappointment was that Grenade failed to capture any bridges over the Rhine.   Montgomery turned down Simpson’s request to make a fast crossing of the Rhine at Urdingen, where there were few German troops.[xlv]

South of 9th Army the 1st and 3rd Armies launched Operation Lumberjack to attempt to envelope the German forces west of the Rhine in its sector in similar fashion to Grenade-Veritable. Facing weak German forces 1st Army made good progress capturing Cologne on March 5th.   3rd Army’s advance was exceptional.  Its plan to cut off the Germans on the west bank worked almost to perfection despite poor roads, snow and the opposition of the 2nd Panzer Division.[xlvi] General Gaffney’s 4th Armored division, drove 40 air miles, captured 5,000 prisoners killed another 700 Germans, capturing much equipment with the loss of only 29 men killed.[xlvii] Bradley called the division’s performance “the most insolent armored blitz of the Western war.”[xlviii] Patton’s armor covered “56 miles in three days to reach the Rhine near its confluence with the Moselle.”[xlix] For the first time “senior officers and headquarters fell into the American bag,”[l] including the command post of LXVI Corps and the commander of LIII Corps. In these operations the bold use of maneuver and concentration by Simpson, Hodges and especially Patton exploited the natural strengths of their formations to achieve their objectives.

Remagen

Remagen Bridge

1st Army’s swift advance and the chaos wreaked by Patton’s army led to the only instance in the campaign where the Allies captured a bridge over the Rhine intact.  The Ludendorff railway bridge at Remagen remained and on 7 March 9th Armored division detached a task force from CCB to take the bridge before it could be blown.   This force surprised the Germans and reached Remagen by 1300. General Hoge, hero of St. Vith, arrived quickly and ordered the capture the bridge as quickly as possible.[li] Hoge ignored orders to divert most of his troops to another crossing of the Ahr River and without orders “threw the rest of his armored infantry across the Rhine….”[lii] “In spite of the threat of the bridge being blown by the fleeing Germans, bold action by American infantry and engineers captured the bridge and established a bridgehead over the Rhine by 1630.  III Corps ordered 9th Armored division to “exploit the opportunity,”[liii] and “within 24 hours they had 8,000 men across.”[liv] Hodges exploited the opportunity and pushed the 9th, 78th and 99th divisions across the river where they continued to enlarge the bridgehead while fighting off fierce German counter-attacks.  By 24 March 1st Army had “three corps, six infantry divisions, and three armored divisions across the Rhine River.”[lv] The best German formations “arrived piecemeal and spent themselves in the same way, mustering only limited, scattered counterattacks instead of any major blow.”[lvi]

The Remagen crossing was not welcomed by all and restrictions were placed on 1st Army as it enlarged the bridgehead.  Carlo D’ Este saw Remagen as “typical of the lack of connection between SHAEF and its subordinate elements.”[lvii] “Pinky” Bull, the SHAEF G-3 was at Bradley’s headquarters when the Bradley was informed of the crossing.  Bull told Bradley that the Remagen crossing “just doesn’t fit in with the plan.”[lviii] Bradley recalled telling Bull: “What the hell do you want us to do,” I asked him, “pull back and blow it up?”[lix] During the next few days however “Bull’s unbending skepticism infected Eisenhower himself.”[lx] And by March 9th Bull informed Bradley that Eisenhower “did not want the Remagen bridgehead expanded beyond the ability of five divisions to defend it.”[lxi] The decision to favor Montgomery’s crossing of the Rhine by detaching divisions from 12th Army Group to support it caused consternation among Bradley and his commanders who feared that Montgomery would “use most of the divisions on the Western Front, British and American, for an attack on the Rhine plains…and the First and Third Armies be left out on a limb.”[lxii] Liddell-Hart noted that the order was “all the more resented because the U.S. Ninth Army…four days earlier, had been stopped by Montgomery from trying to cross the river immediately, as its commander, Simpson, desired and urged.”[lxiii]

Patton’s 3rd Army Crossed the Rhine on the Fly at Oppenheim

Remagen’s aftermath showed Eisenhower’s continued commitment to the broad front, to closing up to the Rhine along its entire length, and his inordinate fear of German counter-stokes.  He remained “fearful that, as long as some German forces survived on the Western side of the Rhine, the potential existed for another potential unpleasant surprise, a counter-attack across an exposed American flank.”[lxiv] The facts belied the situation and Model, commander of Army Group B “had not only given up on trying to eliminate the American bridgehead at Remagen but had covertly begun ordering large elements of Army Group B to evacuate the Rhine and cross the river.”[lxv] This decision resulted “in a lost opportunity to have established a larger bridgehead across the Rhine.”[lxvi] It was another example of Eisenhower’s failure to exploit opportunity when it presented itself and of a desire more to not lose the war than to win it. Despite this “Remagen bridge was one of the great sagas of the war and an example of inspired leadership.”[lxvii] Wilmont called it “a brilliant coup,”[lxviii] a thought echoed by Liddell-Hart.[lxix] The German response to rush numerous units to contain the bridgehead made the Allies task when they crossed the Rhine at other points “much easier than they had anticipated.”[lxx]

Patton’s Saar-Palatinate Campaign

Patton’s 3rd Army attacked the Saar-Palatinate in concert with the 7th Army with the intent of assailing the West Wall from the rear and trapping the remnant of the German Seventh Army and the German First Army.  7th Army assaulted the West Wall while Patton’s army began its assault on 13 March with the XII and XX Corps attacking into scattered German resistance.  With the infantry making the breakthrough both corps unleashed their armored divisions in an exploitation role.  Patton’s attack was so successful that he was allowed to adjust his assault to carry it into 7th Army’s zone to encircle the collapsing German Army.  In an unusual command and control move Devers of the 6th Army Group gave Patch and Patton “the authority to communicate directly with each other, bypassing their different army group headquarters.”[lxxi] Large scale surrenders began to take place for the first time, including that of 3 Volksgrenadier divisions and the remnants of 2nd Panzer division.[lxxii]

US Soldier Standing Watch over Disabled Jagdtiger

Patton was urged on by Bradley, who warned him about “the danger of losing his divisions to Montgomery if he did not secure a Rhine crossing.”[lxxiii] Patton got his engineers and bridging equipment up quickly and Bradley ordered him to “take the Rhine on the run.”[lxxiv] On March 19th alone the Third Army overran more than 950 square miles of territory.”[lxxv] Third Army “cleaned up the west bank of the Rhine all the way south to Worms and Speyer; Third and Seventh Armies claimed well over 100,000 German prisoners in the victory.”[lxxvi] On the 22nd Third Army launched the 5th Infantry division across the Rhine at Nierstein and Oppenheim, surprising the Germans and beating Montgomery across the Rhine. Patton called Bradley: “Brad, for God’s sake tell the world we’re across…I want the world to know that Third Army made it before Monty.”[lxxvii] Weigley notes in this campaign “the American army’s sharpening instinct for the jugular,” and that it was a model “of not only how to gain ground of not only how to gain ground but to destroy enemy forces.”[lxxviii]

Plunder

9th Army and Allied Airborne forces participated in 21st Army Group’s grand set-piece crossing of the Rhine on 23 March.  The attack had been prepared for weeks by Montgomery and more resembled an amphibious operation than a river crossing. The attack employed 25 divisions supported by 3,000 guns with maximum air support and naval amphibious units.   Opposing the Army group were “five weak and exhausted German divisions”[lxxix] of 1st Parachute Army.  The assault cost 9th Army thirty casualties.  Montgomery also employed the American 17th and 6th British Airborne divisions in Operation Varsity which was the largest single day airborne operation of the war. Over 21,000 paratroops were dropped or air-landed in gliders into the face of heavy flak. Numerous troop transport planes and gliders were lost.  The operation was of doubtful utility, ground forces were already well on their way to the objective the paratroops were landed on and the operation had a heavy cost, 17th Airborne took “some 1500 casualties, including 159 killed.” And 6th Airborne lost another 1400.[lxxx]

The Ruhr Pocket and the Decision to Stop on the Elbe


The last major operation in the West following the breakouts from the bridgeheads over the Rhine was the encirclement and reduction of the Ruhr pocket.  This operation involved the 9th Army and 1st Army. The 3rd Army continued its operations east and south toward Nurnberg.   Bradley, his blood stirred by the large numbers of prisoners taken in the Saar, Palatinate and Rhineland now became addicted by the completion of envelopments and he told his staff as “he shifted Hodges’ direction toward a meeting with Simpson encircling the Ruhr: “I’ve got bags on my mind.””[lxxxi] The Army Group completed the encirclement and reduced the pocket by April 18th. Two Army commanders, Von Zangen of 15th Army and Harpe of 5th Panzer Army as well as 25 other Generals and Admirals were caught in the American net.  Vaunted formations such as Panzer Lehr and 116th Panzer were among the 317,000 German prisoners taken by the Army Group. XVII Corps alone captured 160,000 prisoners.[lxxxii] Field Marshal Model, the commander of Army Group B took his own life on the 21st. The one setback during the battle was during the spirited advance of the 3rd Armored division to Paderborn a task force ran into a Kampfgrüppe of King Tigers manned by Waffen SS Panzer training students stopped them with heavy losses.[lxxxiii] To make matters worse the 3rd Armored Division Commanding General, Maurice Rose was killed when his jeep encountered Tigers and a jittery German Panzertroop shot him when he removed his pistol attempting to surrender.[lxxxiv]

Despite the great number of prisoners taken and the elimination of the bulk of the Wehrmacht in the West the battle detracted from what had been hereto the overriding goal of the campaign, the capture of Berlin.[lxxxv] The reasons for this were twofold.  At the Army Group level Bradley was determined to engage as many of his troops as possible so they would not be sucked into any offensive commanded by Montgomery who continued to clamor for control of American troops to make the final drive for Berlin.   Eisenhower supported Bradley’s decision as he believed “that the Western Allies no longer had much chance of capturing “the main prize,” Berlin, anyway.”[lxxxvi] Weigley suggests that a better purpose for the troops that Bradley used to reduce the Ruhr pocket would have been to us them to aid 9th Army’s drive toward Berlin which was already closing on the Elbe.  With the reuniting of the 1st and 9th Armies Bradley was poised to begin his drive to Berlin with the largest field command in American history.[lxxxvii]

US Vehicles Driving Towards Kassel

The second reason was that Eisenhower had made a decision based on political and tactical considerations to shift the focus of the Allied effort from Berlin to Dresden and Leipzig yet not completely ruling out an advance toward Berlin.[lxxxviii] Attempts by 9th Army to drive toward Berlin were frustrated by unexpected German resistance to its bridgeheads over the Elbe. On the 15th of April Simpson flew to Bradley’s headquarters to propose an attack on Berlin.  Bradley called Eisenhower who on hearing Bradley’s estimate of 100,000 casualties to take the city elected not to continue the attack towards Berlin.[lxxxix] Eisenhower had now concluded “that the National Redoubt was now over more importance than Berlin,”[xc] and directed Patton and Devers to secure it.  Patton and Simpson were both incredulous at the decision and felt that it was “a terrible mistake.” Patton felt 9th Army could take Berlin in 48 hours.[xci] In a similar vein Patton’s move into Czechoslovakia was halted before Prague.

Overage German Recruits Captured by US Forces

Eisenhower’s decision was political and tactical and was supported by the U.S. Chiefs of Staff;[xcii] Berlin would be in the Soviet zone even if he took it.  Hastings sates the decision was “surely the correct one” noting that nothing could change the post-war settlement.[xciii] Murray and Millett agree.[xciv]Others such as J.F.C. Fuller felt that the political decisions had turned the fruits of victory “into the apples of Sodom, which turned to ashes as soon as they were plucked,”[xcv] leaving Eastern and Central Europe under the control of the Soviets.  D’ Este notes that no matter what was decided that Eisenhower’s “hands were already tied by the agreement of the Big Three agreement over the division of occupied Germany.”[xcvi] In the end there may have been a political advantage to taking Berlin before the Soviets, but as Hastings notes: “It is hard to see how this could have been prevented, given the Western Allies sluggish conduct of the war.”[xcvii] This was the fault of both the British and Americans and this was in fact as much a part of the final settlement in Europe as any decision made in the final weeks of the war.

In retrospect one can see the historical consequences of Eisenhower’s decision, but how much that decision was influenced by the way the American Army’s organization and conduct for war is seldom mentioned. Perhaps had Eisenhower had the 200 plus divisions envisioned by the Victory plan, or had he been bolder and abandoned the broad front strategy inherited from Grant, history might be different today.  There are always results.  One should not devise strategies for the conduct of war that do not match up with the forces that you plan to employ.  Organization, training and equipment must be designed for the type of war one intends to fight and are just as important as a grand strategy.   This was the lesson of the American involvement in the European campaign.  The American Army succeed in spite of the restraints that its leadership and saddled it with.  The final campaign in Germany showed that at least parts of it had learned the hard lessons of war and could conduct a highly successful campaign.

Handshake on the Elbe: US and  Red Army Troops Meeting


[i] Weigley, Russell  F. Eisenhower’s Lieutenants: The Campaign in France and Germany 1944-1945. Indiana University Press, Bloomington IN 1981. p.2.

[ii] Ibid.  p.728

[iii] Ibid. p.4.

[iv] Ibid.

[v] See Weigley’s article American Strategy, in Peter Paret’s Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age. Paret, Peter, editor.  Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age. Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ 1986 pp.434-436.

[vi] See Keene, Jennifer D. Doughboys, the Great War, and the Remaking of America. The John’s Hopkins University Press. Baltimore,MD. 2001. pp.42-44.  Keene notes the results of the AEF’s training and Pershing’s organization and employment of the Army in WWI.  The similarities to the American experience in WWII are startling.  A comment of George Marshall after the war that: “Officers leading their men into battle, abandoned tactical maneuvering in favor of “steamroller operations” that forced men to keep going until exhaustion stopped them…” reminds one of the Huertgen Forrest.  Likewise a similar situation arose in regard to training.  Other comments are that the infantry was not well trained and that “many troops resisted advancing without artillery support….”

[vii] Herwig, Holger H. The First World War: Germany and Austria-Hungary 1914-1918. Arnold a Member of the Hodder Headline Group, London England 1998. p.424.

[viii] Millett, Allen R. and Maslowski, Peter. For the Common Defense: A Military History of the United States of America. The Free Press, New York 1984. p.349.

[ix] Ibid. Weigley. p.25

[x] Matloff, Maurice Allied Strategy in Europe in Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age. Paret, Peter, editor.  Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age. Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ 1986 p.696.

[xi] Ibid. Weigley. p.5

[xii] Ibid. Weigley. p.23

[xiii] Ibid. p.728

[xiv] Mansoor, Peter R. The GI Offensive in Europe: The Triumph of American Infantry Divsions 1941-1945. University Press of Kansas, Lawrence KS. 1999 p.31.

[xv] Ibid. pp.253-254.  Mansoor is the only historian that I have ever seen defend this system.  Even Stephan Ambrose who generally leads the cheering section for the American Army in WWII condemned the system, which Mansoor admits in his account.

[xvi] Gabel, Christopher R. The Lorraine Campaign: An Overview September-December 1944. U.S. Army Command and Staff College, Ft. Leavenworth KS 1985.  pp.34-35.

[xvii] Chaffee, Adna R. Mechanization in the Army, Statement to Congress, April 1941. p.19.  Combined Arms Research Library, Digital Library http://cgsc.leavenworth.army.mil/carl/contentdm/home.htm

[xviii] Ibid. p.6.

[xix] _________Infantry in Battle 2nd Edition The Infantry Journal Incorporated, Washington DC 1939. p.68

[xx] See Chaffee and Infantry in Battle. Likewise this was echoed in S.L.A. Marshall’s book Armies on Wheels, William and Morrow Company, New York, NY 1941.

[xxi] Ibid. p.729.

[xxii] Ibid. p.14

[xxiii] Ibid.

[xxiv] Ibid. p.662-663. Initially, 21,000 troops were taken from the COMMZ and 10,000 were directed to be transferred from the AAF.  Additionally 2,253 black troops were formed into 37 platoons and distributed among the divisions of 12th and 6th Army Groups.

[xxv] Ibid. p.664.  The efforts were successful and by April there was a surplus of 50,000 infantry soldiers beyond reported shortages, despite the fact that no more American or British divisions were available for deployment to the continent.

[xxvi] Ibid. Mansoor,

[xxvii] Ibid. Weigley. p.578

[xxviii] Hastings, Max. Armageddon:  The Battle for Germany 1944-1945 Alfred A Knopf, New York NY 2004 p.340.

[xxix] Ibid.

[xxx] Ibid. Hastings. p.340

[xxxi] Ibid. p.341

[xxxii] Ibid. Weigley. p.583

[xxxiii] Bradley, Omar  N. A Soldier’s Story Henry Holt and Company, New York NY 1951. p.501

[xxxiv] Ibid. Hastings. p.348

[xxxv] Ibid. Bradley. p.497

[xxxvi] Ibid. p.589.

[xxxvii] Ibid. Hastings. p.348.

[xxxviii] Patton, George S. War as I Knew It Originally published by Houghton Mifflin Company NY 1947, Bantam Paperback Edition,  Bantam Books, New York, NY 1980 p.242

[xxxix] Ibid. Hastings. p.345

[xl] Ibid.

[xli] Ibid. Weigley. p.603

[xlii] Ibid. p.602

[xliii] Wilmont, Chester. The Struggle for Europe Harper and Brothers Publishers, New York, NY 1952 p.673

[xliv] Ibid. p.616

[xlv] Ibid. Hastings. p.365

[xlvi] Ibid. Weigley. p.621

[xlvii] Ibid.

[xlviii] Ibid. Bradley. p.509

[xlix] Ibid. Wilmont. p.674

[l] Ibid. Weigley. p.622.

[li] Ibid. 627

[lii] Ibid. Hastings. p.365

[liii] Ibid.

[liv] Murray, Williamson and Millett, Allan R. A War to Be Won: Fighting the Second World War The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, Cambridge Massachusetts and London England, 2000 p.478

[lv] Ibid. Mansoor. P.244.

[lvi] Ibid. Weigley. p.632

[lvii] D’Este, Carlo. Eisenhower: A Soldier’s Life Owl Books, Henry Holt and Company, New York NY 2002. p.681

[lviii] Ibid. p.682

[lix] Ibid. Bradley. p.511

[lx] Ibid. Weigley. p.629.

[lxi] Ibid.

[lxii] Ibid. Wilmont. p.676

[lxiii] Liddell Hart, B.H. The History of the Second World War G.P. Putnam’s Sons, New York NY 1970. p.678.

[lxiv] Ibid. Hastings. p.366.

[lxv] Newton, Steven H. Hitler’s Commander: Field Marshal Walter Model, Hitler’s Favorite General. DeCapo Press, Cambridge MA 2005. p.351.

[lxvi] Ibid. D’Este. Eisenhower p.682

[lxvii] Ibid.  By this D’Este is obviously not referring to Bull and Eisenhower.

[lxviii] Ibid. Wilmont. p.677.

[lxix] Ibid. Liddell-Hart. p.677

[lxx] Warlimont, Walter. Inside Hitler’s Headquarters 1939-1945 translated by R.H. Barry. Presidio Press, San Francisco, CA 1964. p. 506.

[lxxi] Ibid. Weigly. p.635.

[lxxii] Ibid. p.638

[lxxiii] Ibid. Wilmont. p.678.

[lxxiv] Ibid.

[lxxv] D’Este, Carlo. Patton: A Genius for War. Harper Collins Publishers New York, 1995  p.711

[lxxvi] Ibid.  Murray and Millet. p.479.

[lxxvii] Ibid. D’Este Eisenhower p.683

[lxxviii] Ibid. Weigley. p.639

[lxxix] Ibid. Liddell-Hart. p.678.

[lxxx] Ibid. Hastings. p.369.

[lxxxi] Ibid. Weigley. p.673.

[lxxxii] Ibid. p.680

[lxxxiii] Ibid. Hastings. p.377.

[lxxxiv] Ibid. p.675.

[lxxxv] Ibid. Weigley. p.674.

[lxxxvi] Ibid. p.684.

[lxxxvii] Ibid.

[lxxxviii] Ibid. p.688.

[lxxxix] Ibid. pp.698-699.  Weigley believes that neither Eisenhower nor Bradley wanted to continue to Berlin; Bradley for the reason that Montgomery would steal the credit and Eisenhower because it was a “prestige objective” that would remain in the Soviet zone no matter who captured it.

[xc] Ibid. Wilmont. p.690.

[xci] Ibid. D’Este Patton. P.721

[xcii] Ryan, Cornelius. The Last Battle The Fawcett Popular Library, New York NY.1966.  p.240.

[xciii] Ibid. Hastings. p.425

[xciv] Ibid. Murray and Millett. P.480

[xcv] Fuller, J.F.C. The Conduct of War 1789-1961 DaCapo Press edition, San Francisco, CA 1992. p.296.

[xcvi] Ibid. D’Este. Eisenhower. P.694.

[xcvii] Ibid. Hastings. p.512.

Bibliography

Bradley, Omar  N. A Soldier’s Story Henry Holt and Company, New York NY 1951.

Chaffee, Adna R. Mechanization in the Army, Statement to Congress, April 1941.  Combined Arms Research Library, Digital Library http://cgsc.leavenworth.army.mil/carl/contentdm/home.htm

D’Este, Carlo. Eisenhower: A Soldier’s Life Owl Books, Henry Holt and Company, New York NY 2002.

D’Este,  Carlo. Patton: A Genius for War. Harper Collins Publishers New York, 1995

Fuller, J.F.C. The Conduct of War 1789-1961 DaCapo Press edition, San Francisco, CA 1992.

Gabel, Christopher R. The Lorraine Campaign: An Overview September-December 1944. U.S. Army Command and Staff College, Ft. Leavenworth KS 1985.

Hastings, Max. Armageddon:  The Battle for Germany 1944-1945 Alfred A Knopf, New York NY

Herwig, Holger H. The First World War: Germany and Austria-Hungary 1914-1918. Arnold a Member of the Hodder Headline Group, London England 1998

Keene, Jennifer D. Doughboys, the Great War, and the Remaking of America. The John’s Hopkins University Press. Baltimore, MD. 2001.

Liddell Hart, B.H. The History of the Second World War G.P. Putnam’s Sons, New York NY 1970

Mansoor, Peter R. The GI Offensive in Europe: The Triumph of American Infantry Divsions 1941-1945. University Press of Kansas, Lawrence KS. 1999

Millett, Allen R. and Maslowski, Peter. For the Common Defense: A Military History of the United States of America. The Free Press, New York 1984

Murray, Williamson and Millett, Allan R. A War to Be Won: Fighting the Second World War The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, Cambridge Massachusetts and London England, 2000

Newton, Steven H. Hitler’s Commander: Field Marshal Walter Model, Hitler’s Favorite General. DeCapo Press, Cambridge MA 2005

Paret, Peter, editor.  Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age. Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ 1986

Patton, George S. War as I Knew It Originally published by Houghton Mifflin Company NY 1947, Bantam Paperback Edition,  Bantam Books, New York, NY 1980

Ryan, Cornelius. The Last Battle The Fawcett Popular Library, New York NY.1966

Warlimont, Walter. Inside Hitler’s Headquarters 1939-1945 translated by R.H. Barry. Presidio Press, San Francisco, CA 1964

Weigley, Russell  F. Eisenhower’s Lieutenants: The Campaign in France and Germany 1944-1945. Indiana University Press, Bloomington IN 1981.

Wilmont, Chester. The Struggle for Europe Harper and Brothers Publishers, New York, NY 1952

_________Infantry in Battle 2nd Edition The Infantry Journal Incorporated, Washington DC 1939

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