Tag Archives: napoleon bonaparte

September 19, 2018 · 22:00

Union and Confederate Infantry Tactics at the Beginning of the Civil War

Friends of Padre Steve’s World,

We are beginning our trip to Germany in the morning and because we are busy I am pre-posting this section of one of my Civil War texts.

Peace,

Padre Steve+

The heart of the Civil War armies was the infantry, of which the key unit was the infantry regiment. The U.S. Army had ten Regular Army infantry regiments that the outbreak of the war, most of which were scattered about the country in small garrisons especially in the west, where they were engaged in providing security in the newly acquired territories and states. The few Regular Army units of the United States Army were expanded during the war, and more importantly were joined by hundreds of volunteer regiments during the war.

The Confederacy, lacking a regular army also raised hundreds of volunteer infantry regiments. The regiment was built around the infantry company that was composed of sixty to one hundred soldiers commanded by a Captain. Most companies, in the case of the volunteer regiments came from the same town, county or neighborhood. The infantry regiment was composed of ten companies. Union infantry regiments “maximum strength was fixed at 39 officers and 986 men. A Confederate regiment was larger: 49 officers and 1,340 men maximum.” [1] However, in practice these guidelines were not rigidly adhered to, depending on recruiting efforts some regiments have fewer men than their authorized strength when organized and others from more populous areas had more.

However, most regiments were rarely at their authorized strength after their muster into service and this got far worse for units after they had been on campaign and in battle. Federal statistics show that, “by April 1862, an average regiment had 560 men; by July 1863, it would number only 375 soldiers.” [2] These were average numbers, at Gettysburg, some regiments like the 8^th Ohio Volunteer Infantry, which on July 3^rd decimated the men of John Brockenbrough and Joseph Davis’s brigades on the left flank during Pickett’s Charge had just 209 men in its the ranks. The 124^th New York Volunteer Infantry had just 18 officers and 220 men in its ranks when Hood’s brigades of Texans, Georgians and Arkansas men hit them at Devil’s Den on July 2^nd 1863 at Gettysburg. [3]

Prior to the war regiments tended to be scarred about the nation in small garrisons or on the frontier, and the brigade was the largest unit within the army, and then only put together for combat or expeditionary operations. A brigade was typically composed of two to five regiments. In theory brigades were commanded by Brigadier Generals but many times commanded by Colonels. In addition to their organic infantry brigades usually had their “own quartermaster, commissary, and ammunition trains. Medical teams and sometimes artillery, were assigned to brigades.” [4] With the attachments the brigade could function as an independent unit.

With the expansion of the armies divisions of infantry were formed. Composed of two or more brigades divisions could operate independently or banded together as part of an army corps. Corps were composed of two or more divisions. Two or more corps would compose an army.

Infantry formations on both sides relied on Napoleonic infantry tactics which when they were formulated worked well due to the types of weapons used by opposing armies. Depending on the tactical situation, infantry regiments, brigades and divisions advanced into battle in either column formation or line shoulder to shoulder.

The column formation, a tactic borrowed from the French, but also used by other armies was used to move quickly into battle. It involved “massing troops on a narrow front, like a swinging a ram, could smash into, and disrupt, an enemy infantry formation and make it run for its life.”[5] During the Napoleonic Era the French often used to charge in the offense as it could provide weight of numbers at the point of attack. The drawback to this formation was that the attacking units were extremely vulnerable to enemy artillery fire, particularly Solid Shot cannonballs “which could do hideous damage to a tightly packed column with just a few well-placed rounds” [6] if the enemy artillery was not sufficiently disrupted or destroyed before they came into range.

Columns could be formed from battalion level up. At Waterloo Napoleon deployed a Corps in column, to gain a better understanding it is best to look at the battalion or regiment in column. Typically a column would be one to two companies wide making a front of 30 to 60 soldiers. Thus a full strength regiment deployed in a two company front column would have about 17 ranks.

The line formation was adopted from the British although the French and Prussians used it as well. The line formation was designed to maximize the fire of regiments by placing the men in a formation of “two or three lines which allowed the full play of musket fire along its front.” [7] Since the rate of fire of muzzle loading muskets, rifled or not was much slower in battle conditions, the tactic enabled infantry regiments to maintain a good volume of fire against enemy units, in the offense or in the defense. However the line was an “extremely fragile formation. Attempting to march a line forward across anything except the smoothest parade ground led to disorder. Men straggled, stumbled, wavered, and the line would soon lose all cohesion.” [8] Confederate General D.H. Hill “later in life once asked, rhetorically but memorably: ‘Whoever saw a Confederate line advancing that was not crooked as a ram’s horn? Each ragged rebel yelling on his own hook and aligning on himself.’” [9]

The great virtue of the line formation was “its ability to deliver musket fire by volley and its relative immunity to artillery fire,” [10] at least fire delivered from the front as it presented a small target. However if enemy artillery was able to get in position to deliver enfilade fire, or fire from the flank as happened to the Confederate troops who made Pickett’s Charge, the effect could be devastating. Unlike the column formation, the line formation took a great deal of time to deploy in line of battle and to maneuver swiftly as a unit once formed and it was vulnerable to cavalry if caught in the open.

The first American infantry drill manual was issued in 1779 when General Von Steuben was given the task of training the Continental Army. The books was based on the tactics of the Prussian Army under Frederick the Great. However, over time, Americans came to favor French drill manuals. In 1835 General Winfield Scott translated the revised French drill manual and issued it as Infantry Tactics and Rules for the Exercise and Manoeuvers of the United States Infantry. The Army that Scott led into Mexico in 1846 used the manual with success and it remained in publican until 1861, and “its general structure remained the heart of all the civil War drill manuals.” [11] As tacticians began to appreciate the impact of the rifled musket infantry tactics saw some adjustments in order to “increase the speed and mobility of tactical movement.” [12]

Scott’s manual was superseded by the volume produced by William J. Hardee who later became a Confederate general. Hardee’s work, Rifle and Light Infantry Tactics for the Exercise of Manoeuvers of Troops when acting as Light Infantry or Riflemen was “based directly on a new generation of French manuals.” [13] Hardee modified the line formation from three lines to two and had an increased role for skirmishers. Likewise Hardee added “extra provisions for rifle fire and manoeuvers at a gymnastic pace (‘double quick’) of 165 to 180 steps a minute.” [14] While an improvement on the older manuals it was still very similar to Scott’s work.

In 1862 the U.S. Army adopted Silas Casey’s manual, Infantry Tactics as its official doctrine. Casey’s work was for the most part a composite of Scott’s and Hardee’s work. That being said, Casey “also contributed tactical doctrine for brigade and larger-unit tactics and made revisions that improved the deployment from column to line.” These contributions were important to both armies as the “Confederates quickly followed the Union army in adapting his revisions.” [15] While Casey’s became the official doctrine it was Hardee’s that “won the widest usage and was issued in the most variants.” [16] These included adaptations for U.S. Colored Troop regiments as well as militia forces.

Casey’s manual was particularly helpful for officers serving as brigade and regimental commanders. Previous manuals had been unclear as to where they should place themselves in the order of march, or when the unit was moving in line or column on the attack. Casey clarified this so that “Budding commanders could easily work out where they should place themselves as their regiments marched to the front in column or line, how brigade artillery should be employed, how the head of a column should be maneuvered to give direction to the main mass, and so on.” [17] Even so new officers who had crammed their heads with Scott, Hardee, or Casey for a few weeks could cause havoc among his own troops. A soldier of the 14^th New Hampshire Infantry noted: “The men were serene in their ignorance of tactics; but ambitious officers of the line, who had been cramming Casey for a fortnight, were in a vertebral, cold-shiver temperature…. That the men got caught in a snarl, a tangle, a double twisted, inextricable tactical knot, is tame delineation. The drill caused a great deal of serious reflection…” [18]

As the war went on more use was made of skirmishers, which traditionally had deployed in front of the line. With the rifled muskets the skirmishers, advancing ahead of the massed formations could use the longer range and greater accuracy of their weapons to inflict significant numbers of casualties on the enemy, and to pick off enemy officers and artillerymen. The artillery despised the skirmishers as they could do little to combat them without having their own close infantry support.

But skirmishers took a long time to train and the massed volunteer armies, mostly officered by volunteers had precious little time or experience to train good skirmishers. The Union attempted to rectify this by organizing Sharpshooter regiments, “two of which were organized for the army of the Potomac by Hiram Berdan in 1862.” [19] Both of these units served well at Malvern Hill in 1862 and Gettysburg on July 2^nd and proved their worth on other battlefields of the war. Highly trained and motivated Berdan’s sharpshooters “lived like a band of brothers, imbued with the one feeling of patriotism in their voluntary enlistment for three years.”[20]

Notes

[1] Robertson, James I. Soldiers Blue and Gray University of South Carolina Press, Columbia 1988 p.21

[2] Ibid. Robertson Soldiers Blue and Gray p.19

[3] For a listing of the numbers of soldiers that each regiment went into battle with at Gettysburg see Petruzzi, J. David and Stanley, Steven The Gettysburg Campaign in Numbers and Losses: Synopses, Orders of Battle, Strengths, Casualties and Maps, June 9 – July 1, 1863 Savas Beatie LLC, El Dorado Hills CA 2012

[4] Ibid. Robertson Soldiers Blue and Gray p.24

[5] Guelzo, Allen C. Gettysburg: The Last Invasion Vintage Books a Division of Random House, New York 2013 p.38

[6] Ibid. Guelzo Gettysburg the Last Invasion p.39

[7] Ibid. Guelzo Gettysburg the Last Invasion p.38

[8] Ibid. Cornwell Waterloo: The History of Four Days, Three Armies, and Three Battles p.69

[9] Ibid. Griffith, Battle Tactics of the Civil War p.111

[10] Ibid. Guelzo Gettysburg the Last Invasion p.38

[11] Ibid. Griffith, Battle Tactics of the Civil War p.100

[12] Ibid. Hagerman The American Civil War and the Origins of Modern Warfare p.20

[13] Ibid. Griffith, Battle Tactics of the Civil War p.100

[14] Ibid. Griffith, Battle Tactics of the Civil War p.100

[15] Ibid. Hagerman The American Civil War and the Origins of Modern Warfare p.20

[16] Ibid. Griffith, Battle Tactics of the Civil War p.101

[17] Ibid. Griffith, Battle Tactics of the Civil War p.103

[18] Ibid. Robertson Soldiers Blue and Gray p.50

[19] Ibid. Guelzo Gettysburg the Last Invasion p.38

[20] Ibid. Guelzo Gettysburg the Last Invasion p.261

U.S. Army Artillery from the Napoleonic Era to the Civil War

Friends of Padre Steve’s World,

Since things are going to stay exciting this week in the realm of American politics and world events I decided to take it easy tonight and post a portion one of my Civil War texts, A Great War in a Revolutionary Age of Change. This section of that chapter deals with the developments of the American artillery branch from the Napoleonic period until the Civil War.

I figured I needed to relax a bit and truthfully artillery gives me a serious woody. I started my military career as a forward observer in the National Guard back in 1981 before all the GPS and computer stuff and I tell you there is nothing like calling in 155mm artillery fire and seeing it obliterate a target. I know that sounds bad, but don’t knock it until you have tried it, and back in those days the life expectancy of a Forward Observer if we went up against the Soviets was measured in minutes so allow me that because I haven’t been allowed to do it since 1983 when I was commissioned as a Medical Service Corps officer and later became a chaplain.

I am sure that there are some artillery geeks out there so if you know one please share this with them.

So anyway, until tomorrow.

Peace

Padre Steve+

The Gribeauval System, Napoleon, and the U.S. Army

Like the infantry and cavalry the technical specifics and tactics of the artillery of the United States Army had their roots in the Napoleonic era. Artillery theory “emphasized both the offensive and defensive role of field artillery, with the emphasis on the offensive role in support of infantry assault tactics.” [1] Much of this was due to how Napoleon, a master of artillery tactics, employed his artillery. Napoleon depended heavily on his artillery, he “liked to assemble them in a Grand Battery and use them as an offensive, as against a defensive weapon. At Wagram, in 1809, Napoleon had torn the heart out of an Austrian army with a Grand Battery of 112 guns.” [2] Napoleon would also use a tactic called the artillery rush in which just prior to launching an attack, “the greater part of his artillery reserve would rush to the front. An intensive bombardment would pulverize the opposing line at the point of assault.” [3] If successful he would unleash his heavy and light cavalry in pursuit of broken enemy formations, if not, the guns would cover the retreat of the assault troops.

Napoleon used the system of General Jean Baptiste Gribeauval (1715-1789) who was the real father of artillery in the French army. Gribeauval adapted the Prussian system of Frederick the Great for France. “He “undertook a complete overhaul of the French artillery system.” [4] He developed an entire artillery system for the French army including field, siege and coastal artillery manned by specially trained soldiers. These soldiers were trained in specialized artillery schools. Napoleon, who was trained in the artillery school of the Regiment La Fere in 1785, “used Gribeauval’s guns, equipment, and organization as steppingstones on the path to becoming First Counsel of France and later of a large part of Europe.” [5]

In order to improve mobility, Gribeauval standardized weapons in each arm of the artillery, and most importantly for field artillery he reduced the number of gun types found in different artillery units. He “selected 4-, 8-, and 12-pr guns, all plain unchambered pieces of 18 caliber length, and 6-in howitzers. All of these fired well-fitting projectiles with powder charges about one-third the weight of the shot.” [6] To increase accuracy he ordered that the bore of artillery pieces be drilled rather than case which “produced more exact tolerances within the bore and reduced the windage between the projectile and the bore’s wall.” [7] To enhance mobility he designed standardized limbers and caissons for his guns and all field artillery pieces were “mounted on the same basic carriage so that many carriage parts were interchangeable.” [8] Likewise, the Frenchman “introduced a series of innovations that aimed at improving the artillery’s accuracy. He introduced an elevating screw to adjust the guns range instead of a wedge, allowing for more precise ranging. Gribeauval also provided the gun crews with graduated rear sights. The elevating screw and the rear sight were seen as the most significant improvements regarding cannon in two hundred years.” [9]

One of the most important aspects of Gribeauval’s system was that it touched “nearly every aspect of cannon design, construction, carriages, and deployment, the so-called Gribeauval System served France into the Napoleonic Era. It was so far reaching that it also profoundly influenced artillery in other nations, including that of the emerging United States” [10] which adopted the Gribeauval System in 1818.

American Army officers had long been in the thrall of Napoleon and had been educated in Napoleon’s theory of war by Napoleon’s Swiss interpreter, Henri Jomini, through Denis Hart Mahan, the first military theoretician of the United States who had studied in France and taught at West Point. As such the army sent officers to France to study, among them was Lieutenant Daniel Tyler who went to France in 1828. He translated all of Gribeauval’s System and noted that the French were in the process of adopting British designs of weapons and accouterments, which they had found to be superior to the older designs. Tyler recommended that the Army continue with the Gribeauval System.

One of these advancements was the stock-rail carriage to mount artillery, which was superior to the Gribeauval designs. Janice McKenny, in her book The Organizational History of Field Artillery 1775-2003 noted that Tyler also translated copies of the French evaluations of British designs, and “obtained complete drawings and specifications of the Système anglais modié, which the Americans later named the “stock-trail system” after the design of the carriage. The new trail consisted of a solid block of wood, simpler and stronger than the old split-trail then in use by the American army, and was significantly superior in maneuverability.” [11] In response to Tyler, some American designers “began fabricating stock trail prototypes” [12] from Tyler’s drawings. However, it took over a decade for the Army to adopt the design, but once adopted the army would use the stock-rail system for its field artillery guns until after the Civil War.

This was in large part due to the work of Captain Alfred Mordecai, who traveled to France in 1833-1834 and collected data on the French development of the stock-rail system. His information, “which included detailed drawings, became the basis for U.S. prototypes of the design.” [13] An Ordnance officer, Mordecai went on to become head of the Frankford Arsenal and later was appointed to the Ordnance Board where he wrote the 1841 Ordnance Manual for the Use of Officers in the United States Army. Mordecai was instrumental in standardizing weapons types and carriages. The guns of his 1841 Pattern, 6- and 12-pound guns, as well as the 12-pound howitzer were all mounted on a standard carriage. Larger weapons, the 24- and 32- pound howitzers of the 1841 pattern were developed but did not see as much service due to their weight. Additionally, limbers and caissons were redesigned to lighten them and improve mobility. Though approaching obsolescence, many these guns saw action in early part of the Civil War and Confederate artilleryman Porter Alexander noted that the 24-pound howitzer was “his favorite gun”[14] for the effectiveness of its heavy shells and canister.

M-1841 6-Pounder Artillery Carriage and Limber

The artillery service in United States Army was organized like the French army into batteries of six guns, which in turn were detailed to brigades, regiments or battalions. The regimental system was adopted in 1821, following discussions by Secretary of War John C. Calhoun and Congress. As a result, the existing artillery of the army, “the Corps of Artillery and the Regiment of Light Artillery were consolidated to form the 1st, 2d, 3d, and 4th Regiments of Artillery. One of the nine companies authorized to each of the four regiments was to be equipped as light artillery…. The number of artillery companies was reduced from forty-two (thirty-two in the Corps of Artillery and ten in the Regiment of Light Artillery) to thirty-six in the four artillery regiments.” [15] The units were dispersed at forts as coastal artillery and depots around the country.

Most of the artillery companies of the period were maintained well below strength and none were organized as horse artillery. In order to give artillerymen practical experience and training working as part of a larger force, Calhoun and the Army established an artillery school at Fortress Monroe. This was an important step. The mission of the school was to provide artillerymen the necessary training in the science of gunnery and artillery tactics, which could not be accomplished in isolated posts. To ensure that the total force was trained the army determined that, “ten artillery companies were to be drawn from the four regiments and assembled as the Artillery Corps for Instruction. The faculty was to be selected from the artillery at large. Through a plan of rotation, all artillery companies were eventually to pass through the school. Cadets assigned to the artillery after graduating from West Point were to receive a year’s instruction at the school before joining their regiments.” [16] The school was closed in 1835 due to the demands for artillerymen in the increased number of coastal fortifications and the need for troops to serve in Florida against the Seminoles.

Though almost all artillery units participated in the war “for the most part, the artillerists were limited in employment to manning the numerous stockades erected to confine the Indians to the Everglades.” [17] Thus they gained no practical experience in their trade. In spite of this by the late 1830s a high percentage of the West Point faculty and staff were men who had served with the artillery in Florida. Major Richard Delafield, an artilleryman became Superintendent in 1838 and gave “artillery instruction wider curricular attention: an artillery “laboratory” would be set up, and practice with lightweight and mobile cannon would receive new impetus.” [18] In another move, Secretary of the Army Joel Poinsett decided to implement the provision of the 1821 regulations to establish four light companies. Using surplus horses from the war he mounted one company as horse artillery in which each crew member had his own horse or rode on the limber, and three as mounted units, “meaning that though the guns were horse-drawn, the cannoneers rode on the carriages or caissons or they walked. In theory the mounted units were to be employed with infantry as regular field artillery and the horse (or light) artillery was to be employed with cavalry.” [19]

The Apex of the Smoothbore

12 Pound M-1857 Napoleons at Gettysburg

Most of the improvements in artillery design between the Napoleonic era and the Civil War were on focused on lightening the weight of the tube, developing better and more mobile limbers, and improvements to fuses and ammunition. During this time the smoothbore cannon reached the apex of its development. In the United States this was realized with the brass M 1857 12-pound Napoleon, which was developed from a French design, however the gun “embodied none of the recent advances in technology” and was “already considered obsolescent by the French Army.” [20] However, much of the choice was dictated by purchasing agents and the budget which required any new ordnance to be cheap. The Napoleon was intended to replace the 1841 patter 6 and 12 pound guns and the 12 pound howitzer. It was nearly 500 pounds lighter than the old guns and “though it was technically a gun, owing to its ability to fire canister and solid shot, the Napoleon was often referred to as a gun-howitzer for its ability to fire explosive shell.” [21] It would see its first action at the Battle of Bull Run and nearly 1,800 of these versatile cannon would be produced in Northern and Confederate foundries during the war. Despite its obsolescence it “proved to be the most popular field piece during the Civil War,” [22] and Union artillery General Henry Hunt later acclaimed the Napoleon as “the best all round field piece of this era.” [23]Robert E. Lee told the Prussian observer to the Army of Northern Virginia, Justus Scheibert: “Nothing surpasses… the impression of a battery of 12-pound smoothbores which approaches to within 400-600 paces of the enemy…. In such moment rifled artillery, the advantages of which in open country I fully appreciate, cannot replace the smoothbore.” [24] Some of these guns remained in service until 1880.

The Development of Rifled Cannon and Breechloaders

While the development of rifled, breech loading, and repeating rifles advanced the capabilities of the infantry in terms of firepower, range, accuracy and battlefield lethality, developments to modernize the artillery around the world lagged behind the rifled musket due to the economic costs involved. Because of the cost “no country would face the cost of re-equipment.” [25] This would begin to change in the mid-1850s as the experience of the Crimean began to give new impetus to weapons development.

However, a number of artillerymen and innovators began to experiment with breech loading and rifled cannon. These were not new ideas, and “when combined, they were first experimented with in England in 1745,”[26] but it would take another hundred years before Italian Major Giovanni Cavalli developed “a cast iron gun, its bore cut with simple two groove rifling to accept an elongated projectile fitted with corresponding lugs that mated with the gun’s grooves.” [27] As Cavalli improved his design others in Europe designed rifled guns. In France Colonel Treuille de Bealieu designed a similar gun to Cavalli; but which fired a cylindrical projectile. Napoleon III who was himself authority on artillery ordered brass smoothbores to be rifled on Bealieu’s design. [28] Swedish Baron Martin Wahrendorf “experimented with smaller, multiple-grooved rifling using lead-sheathed projectiles” [29] Cavalli’s guns were used by the Sardinian army, while the French deployed a number of theirs to Algeria and against the Austrians in Italy.

In the 1850s three English inventors, Charles William Lancaster, Joseph Whitworth, and William George Armstrong began to develop rifled guns. During the Crimean War the British Army modified some old large-caliber guns as breech-loaders. The “first British rifled ordnance consisted of a few old 68-pr and 8-in. cast iron guns, which were made oval and twisted in the bore and so converted to pieces rifled on the Lancaster principle.” [30] Some of these guns saw action during the siege of Sevastopol. Whitworth also produced a breech loading rifled cannon. His gun had a very long range and was exceptionally accurate, however the design was complex and temperamental, and the gun “ultimately proved impractical for general use.” This was in part due to their complexity and the “precise tolerances used in the manufacture… required meticulous maintenance by gun crews to avoid malfunctions, and even moderate bore wear led to jamming in the bores.” [31] A few Whitworth rifles were employed by the Confederate army during the Civil War, two seeing action in Richard Ewell’s Second Corps at Gettysburg.

Armstrong, proposed a lightweight rifled field gun, made of forged rather than cast iron to the Duke of Newcastle, Secretary of State for War in 1854. [32] His design incorporated features that remain today. “His rifled breechloader had multiple groves to distribute the twisting force equally around the projectile. The iron projectile was coated with lead to permit a tight sealing into the grooves. Later projectiles have employed copper rotating bands to produce the tight seal without leaving the deposits of lead which tended to foul the cannon.” [33] The only real issues with Armstrong’s guns was that his “breech-loading system was complex and rather advance of its time, and there were a number of accidents due to various mechanical weaknesses.” [34] Likewise, the early breech-loading systems “were so clumsy and slow to operate that a good crew could fire a muzzle-loader faster than a breach loader.”[35]

The United States Army began to examine the possibilities of rifled guns, but the process took time, and much struggle due to the bureaucracy and political infighting. “In the mid-1850s, experiments with the forerunners of rifled cannon began at Fort Monroe. In 1860, a board of artillery and ordnance officers was established to make further tests on rifling, and the board submitted its report late that year. It recommended that at least 50 percent of the guns at forts and arsenals be converted into rifles.” [36]

15 inch Rodman Gun

During the same time period a number of Americans both military, and civilian, began to develop their own variations of rifled cannon for use in the U.S. Army. The most important of these were Captain Robert Jackson Rodman and Captain Robert Parrott. Rodman was a true scientist who understood both metallurgy and gunpowder. Rodman was instrumental in using his knowledge to design the largest guns of the era. Called Columbiads, these heavy guns came in 8 inch, 10 inch, 15 inch and even a 20 inch model. They were used in coastal fortifications. In the 1870s over 200 of the 10 inch model were converted to 8 inch rifles. The Rodman guns remained in service the rest of the century and are considered to be the best cast-iron cannon ever produced.

Parrott was the Superintendent of the West Point Iron and Cannon Foundry of Cold Spring New York. Parrott “became interested in rifled guns after the successes of Krupp in Germany. In the following years he applied his own skills to designing an American rifled gun.” [37] Parrott focused on improving cast-iron guns. He “developed a method for shrinking wrought-iron bands around the breech of a cast barrel.”[38] The band was designed to strengthen the cast iron barrel and “the final result was a relatively lightweight, economical gun and gave the Parrot rifle its distinctive profile.” [39] For field artillery use Parrot designed a 2.9 inch 10-pounder in 1861 which was modified to a 3 inch bore in 1863 to standardized ammunition with the 3 inch Ordnance Rifle. Parrot also designed a 20-pound 4.7 inch rifle for field service. Both models were manufactured in the North and the South and saw wide use with over 2,000 produced for the Federal government. When he was at VMI in 1860, Thomas “Stonewall” Jackson was “one of the first to test and recommend for adoption the rifled Parrott guns.” [40] At Jackson’s “recommendation, Virginia purchased twelve” of the new rifled guns. [41]

10 Pound Parrot Rifle at Devil’s Den Gettysburg

Parrot also produced heavy guns used by the Navy for use on ships, and the Army for seacoast and siege weapons. The one problem with the Parrot rifles was the fact that the cast-iron barrel was brittle and prone to burst, especially those of large caliber, which made it unpopular among its crews and caused the Navy to withdraw them from service aboard ship. Porter Alexander reported that during the Battle of Fredericksburg that for the first and only time he had 30-pound Parrott rifles in the field and that during the battle “they filled a great want, until they, unfortunately, both exploded towards the middle of the day, one on the 37^th round & one on the 42^nd.” [42]

A civilian, John Griffen of the Phoenix Ironwork of Phoenixville, Pennsylvania,“pioneered the use of wrought iron in the construction of field pieces” [43] and patented his prototype in 1855. The designed was slightly modified by the Ordnance Department and adopted by the army in 1861. The weapon was known as the Ordnance Rifle and is had a bore of 3 inches and threw a 10-pound projectile. Unlike the cast iron Parrot, it was “constructed of tougher wrought iron, consisting of iron bands welded together around a mandrel and then lathed to a sleek, modern profile. It was then bored and rifled.” [44] The Ordnance rifles were light, easy to maneuver and beloved by their crews for their accuracy, and dependability. Phoenix manufactured over 1,000 of these weapons for the Federal government.

To be continued…

Notes

[1] Ibid. Hagerman The American Civil War and the Origins of Modern Warfare p.21

[2] Ibid. Cornwell Waterloo: The History of Four Days, Three Armies, and Three Battles p.165

[3] Nesmith, Vardell E. Stagnation and Change in Military Thought: The Evolution of American Field Artillery Doctrine, 1861-1905 – An Example United States Army Command and Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS 1976 p.5

[4] Kinard, Jeff Artillery: An Illustrated History of Its Impact ABC Clio, Santa Barbara, Denver, and Oxford 2007 p.148

[5] Stevens, Phillip H. Artillery Through the Ages Franklin Watts Inc. New York 1965 p.47

[6] Rogers, H.C.B. A History of Artillery The Citadel Press, Secaucus NJ 1975 p.58

[7] Ibid. Kinard Artillery: An Illustrated History of Its Impact p.148

[8] Ibid. Stevens, Phillip H. Artillery Through the Ages Franklin Watts Inc. New York 1965 p.48

[9] Garcia, Manuel R. The Pursuit of Precision in Field Artillery School of Advanced Military Studies, United States Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth KS 2010 pp.7-8

[10] Ibid. Kinard Artillery: An Illustrated History of Its Impact p.148

[11] McKenny, Janice E. The Organizational History of Field Artillery 1775-2003 Center For Military History, United States Army, Washington D.C. 2007 p.36

[12] Ibid. Kinard Artillery: An Illustrated History of Its Impact p.170

[13] Ibid. Kinard Artillery: An Illustrated History of Its Impact p.169

[14] Ibid. Alexander Fighting for the Confederacy: The Personal Recollections of General Edward Porter Alexander p.182

[15] Ibid. McKenny The Organizational History of Field Artillery 1775-2003 p.32

[16] Ibid. McKenny The Organizational History of Field Artillery 1775-2003 p.34

[17] Ibid. McKenny The Organizational History of Field Artillery 1775-2003 p.34

[18] Longacre, Edward G. The Man Behind the Guns: A Military Biography of General Henry J. Hunt, Chief of Artillery, Army of the Potomac Da Capo Press, a Perseus Group, Cambridge MA 2003 p.28

[19] Ibid. McKenny The Organizational History of Field Artillery 1775-2003 p.38

[20] Ibid. Stevens, Phillip H. Artillery Through the Ages Franklin Watts Inc. New York 1965 pp.62-63

[21] Ibid. Kinard Artillery: An Illustrated History of Its Impact p.188

[22] Ibid. McKenny The Organizational History of Field Artillery 1775-2003 p.49

[23] Ibid. Longacre The Man Behind the Guns: A Military Biography of General Henry J. Hunt, Chief of Artillery, Army of the Potomac p.70

[24] Ibid. Guelzo Fateful Lightening p.257

[25] Ibid. Fuller The Conduct of War 1789-1961 p.89

[26] Ibid. Fuller The Conduct of War 1789-1961 p.89

[27] Ibid. Kinard Artillery: An Illustrated History of Its Impact p.222

[28] Ibid. Rogers A History of Artillery p.94

[29] Ibid. Kinard Artillery: An Illustrated History of Its Impact p.222

[30] Ibid. Rogers A History of Artillery p.94

[31] Ibid. Kinard Artillery: An Illustrated History of Its Impact p.223

[32] Ibid. Rogers A History of Artillery p.94

[33] Ibid. Stevens, Phillip H. Artillery Through the Ages Franklin Watts Inc. New York 1965 p.60

[34] Ibid. Rogers A History of Artillery p.94

[35] Ibid. Stevens, Phillip H. Artillery Through the Ages Franklin Watts Inc. New York 1965 p.60

[36] Ibid. McKenny The Organizational History of Field Artillery 1775-2003 pp.50-51

[37] Ibid. Kinard Artillery: An Illustrated History of Its Impact p.190

[38] Ibid. Stevens, Phillip H. Artillery Through the Ages Franklin Watts Inc. New York 1965 p.61

[39] Ibid. Kinard Artillery: An Illustrated History of Its Impact p.190

[40] Ibid. Gwynne Rebel Yell: The Violence, Passion, and Redemption of Stonewall Jackson p.88

[41] Ibid. Nesmith Stagnation and Change in Military Thought: The Evolution of American Field Artillery Doctrine, 1861-1905 – An Example p.15

[42] Ibid. Alexander Fighting for the Confederacy: The Personal Recollections of General Edward Porter Alexander p.172

[43] Ibid. Nesmith Stagnation and Change in Military Thought: The Evolution of American Field Artillery Doctrine, 1861-1905 – An Example p.14

[44] Ibid. Kinard Artillery: An Illustrated History of Its Impact p.192

A Spirit of Unbelief: Confederates Before Gettysburg

Lieutenant General A. P. Hill

Friends of Padre Steve’s World,

I’m hoping to take a few days off from writing about current events and spend a few days reposting some of my writings about the Battle of Gettysburg.

Peace,

Padre Steve+

When Robert E. Lee learned of the Army of the Potomac’s presence north of the Potomac River he ordered his widely dispersed army concentrate near Cashtown and Gettysburg. It was a complicated movement that involved at least five major operations: the shift of the bulk of Ewell’s Second Corps from its planned attack on Harrisburg, the redirection of Early’s division east from its position on the Susquehanna to the west, the movement of Hill’s Third Corps from the area around Cashtown to a position east of Gettysburg, Longstreet’s First Corps north to Chambersburg and Cashtown and the cavalry brigades of Beverly Robertson, Grumble Jones and John Imboden which were to join the army in Pennsylvania. The movement “would take at least two days – the 29th and the 30th of June – and perhaps more…the complete its concentration, especially since the rains had “made the roads very muddy,” forcing “the infantry” to march off the roads….” [1]

Lieutenant General A.P. Hill’s Third Corps that was nearest of Lee’s major units to Cashtown and Gettysburg. Major General Harry Heth’s division led the corps and arrived at Cashtown on June 29th. His division was followed by that of Major General Dorsey Pender which arrived on the 30th. Hill ordered his last division under the command of Major General Richard Anderson to remain behind at “Fayetteville until July 1, when he would join the rest at Cashtown.” [2]

Cashtown was important as a road junction and because it “was situated at one of the few gaps in the Pennsylvania Mountains” and because one of the roads emanating from it “snaked eight miles to another community called Gettysburg.” [3] However the order to concentrate the army at Cashtown presented its own problems. First was the matter of forage. There was not enough room for all the units ordered to Cashtown to have adequate areas to forage, as:

“each division would (by the standard required of nineteenth-century armies) require a circle twelve and a half miles around its encampments to forage (for water, firewood, and feed for men and horses); one single regiment could denuded an acre of woodland just for firewood every three days.” [4]

Likewise, because of the limited road network, Cashtown was becoming a choke point which as his units closed in slowed their movement and created massive traffic problems and confusion. Hill ordered Heth’s division to take the lead and advance to Cashtown on the 29th. The units of Hill’s corps had to endure heavy rains on the 29th which slowed their march and Heth halted at Cashtown knowing that the army would concentrate there while Pender’s division moved into the area his division had vacated.

Early in the morning of June 30th Harry Heth decided to undertake a foraging expedition to Gettysburg to “search the town for army supplies (shoes especially), and to return the same day.” [5] It was the first in a series of miscalculations that brought Lee’s army into a general engagement that Lee wished to avoid and it is hard to comprehend in light of Lee’s orders not to precipitate a fight.

However, the expedition had taken a toll on the soldiers, especially in terms of shoes, clothes and equipment. The “long march over the hard macadam roads of the North had played havoc with the scraggly foot coverings of Lee’s men.” [6] After muster on the morning of June 30th Heth ordered Johnston Pettigrew’s “brigade to Gettysburg in search of supplies, especially badly needed shoes, which were badly needed by his the men of his division.” Heth, for a reason he never elaborated on decided that there must be shoes in Gettysburg. Perhaps he did not know that the town had been picked clean by John Gordon’s brigade of Jubal Early’s division just a few days before, but for whatever reason he believed this to be the case.

Hill’s Third Corps had been formed as part of the reorganization of the army following Stonewall Jackson’s death after the Battle of Chancellorsville. Hill had a stellar reputation as a division commander; his “Light Division” had distinguished itself on numerous occasions, especially at Antietam where its timely arrival after a hard forced march from Harper’s Ferry helped save Lee’s army late in the battle. At Chancellorsville Hill briefly succeeded Jackson until he too was wounded.

Hill was recommended for promotion to Lieutenant General and command of the new Third Corps by Lee on May 24th 1863. He was promoted over the heads of both Harvey Hill and Lafayette McLaws. The move displeased Longstreet who considered Lafayette McLaws “better qualified for the job.” Likewise there were others who felt that the command should have gone to Harvey Hill, now commanding the Department of North Carolina who’s “record was as good as that of Stonewall Jackson…but, not being a Virginian, he was not so well advertised.” [7]

Ambrose Powell Hill was slightly built and high strung. “Intense about everything” Hill was “one of the army’s intense disbelievers in slavery.” [8] Hill was an 1847 graduate of West Point and briefly served in Mexico but saw no combat. He spent some time in the Seminole wars but due to frequent bouts of ill-health he spent much of his career in garrison duty along the East Coast. Since he was prone to sickness he was assigned to the office of Coastal Survey, a Navy command from 1855 through 1861. Despite pleas from his superiors and his own opposition to secession and slavery, Hill resigned his commission just before Virginia’s secession.

At the outbreak of the war he “received his commission as colonel, and soon trained one of Johnston’s best regiments in the Valley.” [9] He commanded a brigade under Longstreet on the Peninsula and was promoted to Major General and command of the Light Division in May 1862, leading it with distinction, especially at Antietam where his march from Harper’s Ferry and timely arrival on the afternoon of September 17th saved the army of Northern Virginia from utter and complete destruction. He was plagued by health problems which had even delayed his graduation from West Point, health issues that would arise on the first day at Gettysburg.

Hill’s Third Corps was emblematic of the “makeshift nature of the reorganization of the whole army.” [10] It was composed of three divisions. His best and most experienced division was that of the recently promoted and hard fighting Major General Dorsey Pender. Pender’s division was built around four excellent brigades from Hill’s old “Light Division” one of which Pender had commanded before his promotion. Hill had strongly recommended Pender’s promotion during the reorganization, a proposal which was accepted by Lee. Pender, though a fierce fighter and excellent leader, found command of a division to be a heavy burden. He was “an intelligent, reflective man, deeply religious and guided by a strong sense of duty….” [11]

Hill’s second experienced division was that of Major General Richard Anderson. This division had been transferred from Longstreet’s First Corps during the reorganization. Longstreet resented losing the division to Hill, with who he had previously run afoul and this was yet another issue which failed to endear Hill to Longstreet. [12]

The unassuming Anderson had distinguished himself as a brigade and division commander in Longstreet’s corps, but in “an army of prima donnas, he was a self-effacing man, neither seeking praise for himself nor winning support by bestowing it on others.” [13] At Chancellorsville Anderson fought admirably and Lee wrote that Anderson was “distinguished for the promptness, courage and skill with which he and his division executed every order.” [14] With four seasoned brigades under excellent commanders it was a good addition to the corps, although the transition from Longstreet’s stolid and cautious style of command to Hill’s impetuous style introduced “another incalculable of the reshuffled army.” [15]

Major General Harry Heth’s division was the final infantry division assigned to Third Corps. The division was new and had was cobbled together from two brigades of Hill’s old Light Division and “the two new brigades that Jefferson Davis had forced on an already disrupted army organization.” [16] The organization of this division as well as its leadership would be problematic in the days to come, especially on June 30th and July 1st 1863. The hasty and makeshift organization under leaders who had not served together, many of who were new to command, as well as units which had not fought together spelled trouble.

Harry Heth, like Dorsey Pender was also newly promoted to his grade and the action at Gettysburg would be his first test in division command. Heth was a native Virginian. He came from a family that well connected both socially and politically. He had a social charm had “many friends and bound new acquaintances to him” readily. [17] Heth was a cousin of George Pickett. He was a West Point graduate and classmate of Hill. At West Point Heth had an undistinguished academic career and graduated last in the class of 1847. His career in the ante-bellum army was typical of many officers, he served “credibly in an 1855 fight with Sioux Indians” but his real claim to fame was in authoring the army’s marksmanship manual which was published in 1858. [18]

Major General Harry Heth

Heth’s career with the Confederate army serving in western Virginia was undistinguished but he was a protégé of Robert E. Lee who recommended him as a brigade commander to Jackson before Chancellorsville. Tradition states that of all his generals that Heth was the only one “whom Lee called by his first name.” [19] A.P. Hill when writing Lee about the choice of a successor for the Light Division noted that Heth was “a most excellent officer and gallant soldier” but in the coming campaign “my division under him, will not be half as effective as under Pender.” [20] Douglas Southall Freeman noted that Heth was “doomed to be one of those good soldiers…who consistently have bad luck.” [21]

Heth’s division was composed of two depleted brigades from the Light Division which had taken heavy casualties at Chancellorsville. One brigade, commanded by the hard fighting former regular army officer Brigadier General James Archer. Archer was from Maryland and a graduate of Princeton University who had given up a law practice to join the army. Described as a “little gamecock” who “had no sense of fear” [22] Archer had saved the Confederate line at Fredericksburg leading a desperate counterattack at Prospect Hill. The brigade was composed of four veteran regiments, but was now down to barely 1200 soldiers in the ranks by the time it arrived at Cashtown. However, the brigade which was recruited from Alabama and Tennessee was “well led and had a fine combat reputation.”

But the second brigade was more problematic. This was the Virginia brigade under the command of “the plodding, uninspiring Colonel John Brockenbrough.” [23] Brockenbrough was an “1850 of the Virginia Military Institute and a farmer,” who had “entered the Confederate service as Colonel of the 40th (Virginia) in May 1861.” [24] The brigade had once been considered one of the best in the army had deteriorated in quality following the wounding of its first commander Brigadier General Charles Field. Heth took command of it at Chancellorsville where both he and the brigade performed well. The brigade had taken very heavy casualties and now was reduced to under 1000 effectives. When Heth was promoted the lack of qualified officers left it under the command of its senior colonel, John Brockenbrough.[25] Lee did not consider Brockenbrough “suited for promotion” but “could be counted on to keep together a command sadly reduced in numbers.” [26]

Heth’s third brigade came from Mississippi and North Carolina and was commanded by the “stuffy and ambitious” [27] Brigadier General Joe Davis. Davis’s uncle was President Jefferson Davis. Davis served on his uncle’s staff for months during the early part of the war but had no combat experience, never leading as much as a company. [28] One author noted that Davis’s promotion to Brigadier General was “as unadulterated an instance of nepotism as the record of the Confederacy offers.” [29] Davis’s subordinate commanders were no better; one of them, William Magruder was so incompetent that J.E.B. Stuart suggested that “he have his commission revoked.” In Magruder’s outfit only one of the nine field grade officers in his brigade had military training, and that was because he was a graduate of the Naval Academy, hardly fitting for service in the infantry. [30] This brigade was also a makeshift operation with two veteran regiments including the 11th Mississippi which had “gone through blood and fire together on the Peninsula through Antietam.” [31] After Antietam, these units were then paired with two new regiments and a new politically connected commander and sent to the backwater of North Carolina where they saw no action. The veteran regiments “mistrusted not only their commander, but the reliability of its yet untested units.” [32]

Brigadier General Johnston Pettigrew

Heth’s largest brigade was new to the army. Commanded by the North Carolina academic Brigadier General Johnston Pettigrew it had no combat experience. Pettigrew himself was considered a strong leader. He had been badly wounded at Seven Pines and thinking his wound mortal “he refused to permit his men to leave the ranks to carry him to the rear.” [33] He was captured but later paroled and returned to the army to command a brigade later in the year.

Hill was under the impression that Meade’s army was still miles away, having just come from meeting Lee who assured him that “the enemy are still at Middleburg,” (Maryland) “and have not yet struck their tents.” [34] With that assurance Heth decided to use June 30th to send Pettigrew’s brigade on the foraging expedition to Gettysburg. An officer present noted that Heth instructed Pettigrew “to go to Gettysburg with three of his regiments present…and a number of wagons for the purpose of collecting commissary and quartermaster stores for the use of the army.” [35]

However Heth did instruct Pettigrew in no uncertain terms not to “precipitate a fight” should he encounter “organized troops” of the Army of the Potomac. [36] Heth was specific in his report that “It was told to Pettigrew that he might find in the town in possession of a home guard,…but if, contrary to expectations, he should find any organized troops capable of making resistance., or any part of the Army of the Potomac, he should not attack it.” [37]

That in mind anyone with the slightest experience in handling troops has to ask the question as to why Heth would employ “so many men on a long, tiring march, especially as without a cavalry escort he took the risk of sending them into a trap” when his “objects hardly justified” using such a large force. [38] Edwin Coddington is particularly critical of Heth in this regard.

Likewise it has to be asked why the next day in light of Lee’s standing orders not to provoke an engagement that Hill would send two divisions, two thirds of his corps on what was supposedly reconnaissance mission. Some have said that Hill would have had to move to Gettysburg on July 1st anyway due to forage needs of the army, [39] but this is not indicated in any of Hill or Heth’s reports.

As his troops neared Gettysburg Pettigrew observed the Federal cavalry of Buford’s 1st Cavalry Division as they neared the town. He received another report “indicating that drumming could be heard in the distance – which might mean infantry nearby, since generally cavalry generally used only bugles.” [40] He then prudently and in accordance with his orders not to precipitate a fight “elected to withdraw rather than risk battle with a foe of unknown size and composition.” [41] His troops began their retrograde at 11 a.m. leaving Buford’s cavalry to occupy the town at ridges. One Confederate wrote “in coming in contact with the enemy, had quite a little brush, but being under orders not to bring a general engagement fell back, followed by the enemy.” [42]

Upon returning Pettigrew told Hill and Heth that “he was sure that the force occupying Gettysburg was a part of the Army of the Potomac” but Hill and Heth discounted Pettigrew’s report. [43] “Heth did not think highly of such wariness” and “Hill agreed with Heth” [44] Hill believed that nothing was in Gettysburg “except possibly a cavalry vedette.” [45] Hill was not persuaded by Pettigrew or Pettigrew’s aide Lieutenant Louis Young who had previously served under both Hill and Pender. Young reported that the “troops that he saw were veterans rather than Home Guards.” [46] Hill reiterated to both that he did not believe “that any portion of the Army of the Potomac was up” but then according to Young Hill “expressed the hope that it was, as this was the place he wanted it to be.” [47]

Part of the issue was related to the fact that Pettigrew, though highly intelligent, and who had been an observer of wars in Europe was not a professional soldier. Likewise, since had was new to the Army of the Northern Virginia he was an unknown to both Hill and Heth. As such they dismissed his report. In their casual dismissal of Pettigrew’s report, the West Point Graduates Hill and Heth may have manifested an often typical “distain for citizen soldiers…a professional questioning a talented amateur’s observations” [48]

Pettigrew was “aghast at Hill’s nonchalant attitude” [49] while Young was dismayed and later recalled that “a spirit of unbelief” seemed to cloud the thinking of Hill and Heth. [50] In later years Young wrote that the “blindness in part seems to have come over our commanders, who slow to believe in the presence of an organized army of the enemy, thought that there must be a mistake in the report taken back by General Pettigrew.” [51]

Since neither man believed Pettigrew’s report, Heth asked Hill “whether Hill would have any objection to taking his division to Gettysburg again to get those shoes.” Hill replied “none in the world.” [52] It was to be a fateful decision, a decision that brought about a series of events which in turn led to the greatest battle even fought on the American continent.

Lee’s biographer and apologist Douglas Southall Freeman wrote “On those four words fate hung” [53] and in “that incautious spirit, Hill launched Harry Heth’s division down the Chambersburg Pike and into battle at Gettysburg.” [54]

Notes

[1] Guelzo, Allen C. Gettysburg: The Last Invasion Vintage Books a Division of Random House, New York 2013 p.128

[2] Coddington, Edwin B. The Gettysburg Campaign, A Study in Command A Touchstone Book, Simon and Shuster New York 1968 p.194

[3] Robertson, James I. Jr. General A.P. Hill: The Story of a Confederate Warrior Random House, New York 1987

[4] Ibid. Guelzo, Gettysburg: The Last Invasion p.128

[5] Ibid. Coddington, The Gettysburg Campaign, A Study in Command p. 263

[6] Ibid. Robertson A.P. Hill p.205

[7] Foote, Shelby, The Civil War, A Narrative. Volume Two Fredericksburg to Meridian Random House, New York 1963 p.453

[8] Ibid. Dowdy, Lee and His Men at Gettysburg: The Death of a Nation p.79

[9] Ibid. Freeman Lee’s Lieutenant’s a Study in Command p.109

[10] Ibid. Dowdy, Lee and His Men at Gettysburg: The Death of a Nation p.88

[11] Ibid. Dowdy, Lee and His Men at Gettysburg: The Death of a Nation p.85

[12] Ibid. Dowdy, Lee and His Men at Gettysburg: The Death of a Nation p.86

[13] Ibid. Dowdy, Lee and His Men at Gettysburg: The Death of a Nation p.86

[14] Ibid. Freeman Lee’s Lieutenant’s a Study in Command p.512

[15] Ibid. Dowdy, Lee and His Men at Gettysburg: The Death of a Nation p.86

[16] Ibid. Dowdy, Lee and His Men at Gettysburg: The Death of a Nation p.87

[17] Ibid. Freeman Lee’s Lieutenant’s a Study in Command p.527

[18] Krick, Robert K. Three Confederate Disasters on Oak Ridge: Failures of Brigade Leadership on the First Day of Gettysburg in The First Day at Gettysburg edited by Gallagher, Gary W. Kent State University Press, Kent Ohio 1992 p.96

[19] Ibid. Krick. Three Confederate Disasters on Oak Ridge p.96

[20] Ibid. Freeman Lee’s Lieutenant’s a Study in Command p.527

[21] Ibid. Freeman Lee’s Lieutenant’s a Study in Command p.46

[22] Ibid. Guelzo, Gettysburg: The Last Invasion p.134

[23] Sears, Stephen W. Gettysburg. Houghton Mifflin Co. Boston and New York 2003 p.55

[24] Pfanz Harry W. Gettysburg: The First Day University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill and London 2001 p.118

[25] Ibid. Dowdy, Lee and His Men at Gettysburg: The Death of a Nation p.87

[26] Ibid. Freeman Lee’s Lieutenant’s a Study in Command p.529

[27] Ibid. Guelzo, Gettysburg: The Last Invasion p.133

[28] Ibid. Freeman Lee’s Lieutenant’s a Study in Command p.533

[29] Ibid. Krick. Three Confederate Disasters on Oak Ridge p.99

[30] Ibid. Krick. Three Confederate Disasters on Oak Ridge p.101

[31] Ibid. Guelzo, Gettysburg: The Last Invasion p.134

[32] Ibid. Guelzo, Gettysburg: The Last Invasion p.134

[33] Ibid. Freeman Lee’s Lieutenant’s a Study in Command p.136

[34] Ibid. Guelzo, Gettysburg: The Last Invasion p.131

[35] Trudeau, Noah Andre. Gettysburg: A Testing of Courage, Harper Collins Publishers, New York 2002 p.128

[36] Ibid. Sears Gettysburg p.136

[37] Ibid. Trudeau Gettysburg: A Testing of Courage, p.129

[38] Ibid. Coddington, The Gettysburg Campaign, A Study in Command p. 263

[39] Ibid. Guelzo. Gettysburg: The Last Invasion p.131 This argument does have merit based on the considerations Guelzo lists but neither Hill, Heth or Lee make any mention of that need in their post battle reports.

[40] Ibid. Trudeau Gettysburg: A Testing of Courage, p.130

[41] Gallagher, Gary. Confederate Corps Leadership on the First Day at Gettysburg: A.P. Hill and Richard S. Ewell in a Difficult Debut in The First Day at Gettysburg edited by Gallagher, Gary W. Kent State University Press, Kent Ohio 1992 p.42

[42] Ibid. Trudeau Gettysburg: A Testing of Courage, p.135

[43] Ibid. Coddington, The Gettysburg Campaign, A Study in Command pp. 263-264

[44] Foote, Shelby, The Civil War, A Narrative. Volume Two Fredericksburg to Meridian Random House, New York 1963 p.465

[45] Ibid. Pfanz Gettysburg: The First Day p.27

[46] Ibid. Gallagher, Gary. Confederate Corps Leadership on the First Day at Gettysburg p.42

[47] Ibid. Pfanz. Gettysburg: The First Day p.27

[48] Ibid. Gallagher, Gary. Confederate Corps Leadership on the First Day at Gettysburg p.42

[49] Ibid. Guelzo. Gettysburg: The Last Invasion p.131

[50] Ibid. Coddington, The Gettysburg Campaign, A Study in Command p. 264

[51] Ibid Pfanz Gettysburg: The First Day p.27

[52] Ibid. Coddington, The Gettysburg Campaign, A Study in Command p. 264

[53] Ibid. Freeman Lee’s Lieutenant’s a Study in Command p. 563

[54] Ibid. Krick. Three Confederate Disasters on Oak Ridge p.94

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Filed under civil war, Gettysburg, History, leadership, Military, us army

Tagged as a.p. hill, army of northern virginia, army of the potomac, battle of antietam, battle of gettysburg, cashtown, chancellorsville, d h hill, dorsey pender, douglas southall freeman, harry heth, hill's light division, james archer, james longstreet, jefferson davis, john brockenbrough, john buford, johnston pettigrew, joseph davis, louis young, maxims of napoleon, mission command, napoleon bonaparte, reorganization of the army of northern virginia, richard anderson, robert e lee, seven days, third corps, thomas stonewall jackson

February 8, 2018 · 00:40

“We’re Going to Have to Try to Top It” Trump’s Need for a Parade

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Friends of Padre Steve’s World,

It was revealed yesterday that President Trump has ordered the military to conduct a military parade in Washington D.C. It was reported in the Washington Post on Tuesday and a military official noted:

“The marching orders were: I want a parade like the one in France,” said a military official who spoke on the condition of anonymity because the planning discussions are supposed to remain confidential. “This is being worked at the highest levels of the military.”

In the same article White House Press Secretary Sarah Huckabee Sanders noted:

“President Trump is incredibly supportive of America’s great service members who risk their lives every day to keep our country safe,” Sanders said. “He has asked the Department of Defense to explore a celebration at which all Americans can show their appreciation.”

The President who conspicuously avoided military service in Vietnam with five deferments, compared avoiding sexually transmitted diseases in 1980s New York to combat in Vietnam, called men like John McCain and others who were wounded or captured in Vietnam “losers”, combat veterans with PTSD “weak”, and that he knew more about ISIS war and strategy than American military leaders has wanted to display the instruments of American military power since he was elected. He requested such a display for his inauguration but the request was turned down and prior to the inauguration he told a reporter Karen Tumult when she asked how Americans would know that he had made America Great Again:

“We’re going to display our military. We’re going to display it. That military may come marching down Pennsylvania Avenue. That military may be flying over New York City and Washington, D.C., for parades. I mean, we’re going to be showing our military.”

But there is no lack of love, respect or appreciation from the military in the United States. The military is one of the most trusted and respected institutions in the country. In an era where trust most public and private institutions is collapsing the military, trust in the military, despite some erosion since the election of President Trump is still very high, some 72% of Americans have a high amount of trust in the military and its leadership. Trump’s politicization of the military is hurting it, but respect and trust for the military still remains high, and even those who do not trust military leadership still tend to appreciate and honor the troops. So I think that the argument by Ms. Sanders that we need an event were Americans can show their appreciation for the military is misplaced. We already have three days; Armed Forces Day, Memorial Day, and Veteran’s Day; two of them which are national holidays where we honor military personnel, veterans, and those who gave their lives in service of the country.

Presidential historian Douglas Brinkley noted:

“I don’t think there’s a lack of love and respect for our armed forces in the United States,” said Douglas Brinkley, a presidential historian at Rice University. “What are they going to do, stand there while Donald Trump waves at them? It smacks of something you see in a totalitarian country — unless there’s a genuine, earnest reason to be doing it.”

But despite the official pronunciations of Ms. Sanders I think the President’s need for a parade and demonstration of America’s military power is more like Penis Envy based on his visit to Europe last year where he viewed the French Bastille Day Parade. After that event the President remarked:

“It was one of the greatest parades I’ve ever seen… It was two hours on the button, and it was military might, and I think a tremendous thing for France and for the spirit of France… We’re going to have to try to top it.”

The President seems to be jealous that the French President gets to preside over a military parade. But there is a difference between such displays in France and the United States.

The French parade coincides with Bastille Day the French equivalent of our Independence Day marking an event that was the tipping point of the French Revolution. Though it had been held since the revolution the annual parade began in 1880 about a decade after France was defeated by Prussia in the Franco Prussian War. It is closely connected to French independence and has become much less nationalistic over the past few decades. For many years the french have invited contingents from old allies, former colonies, and former enemies like Germany to participate. Likewise, French troops have marched under the banner of the European Union on a number of occasions.

The American experience is not at all similar. Military parades down Pennsylvania avenue are quite rare and with the exception of the inaugural parades of Harry Truman and John F. Kennedy which were held at points of high tension during the Cold War, almost every other parade has commemorated a military victory such as the Civil War, World War Two, and Operation Desert Storm, which should better be called the First Iraq War. There really is no precedent for such a parade when the nation is still engaged in war without end and when the real possibility for at least one major new war, possibly a nuclear war exists.

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But that being said there are real, pragmatic considerations for opposing such a parade and almost all of them deal with national security and the costs. Unlike France in which most of the units involved in the parade are stationed between 50 and 100 miles of Paris, the units needed to fulfill the President’s parade fantasy have to be moved hundreds of miles to get there and doing so would disrupt badly needed training cycles, deployment preparation, and cost tens of millions of dollars, even before the costs to the District of Columbia are added in, and let me remind you all of those costs come from Federal taxes. The last major victory parade, that after Operation Desert Storm cost over 12 million dollars which is close to 22 million now; but the problem is that the actual costs would probably be far more than that in an time when resources are much more constrained in which costs have gone up. In 1991 many of the troops involved were being demobilized and the armed forces being reduced in strength following the end of the Cold War; today’s military is stretched to the breaking point and if war breaks out on the Korean Peninsula anytime soon such a parade will mark a tragedy even if we win.

Since almost all of my life has some association with military service as a Navy dependent, Navy Junior ROTC Cadet, Army National Guard Enlisted Soldier, active duty, Army National Guard, Army Reserve Officer, and for the last 19 years as a Naval Officer I appreciate the support of the American people. But I would rather see that support shown by increased funding of the V.A., increased support to service members and their families, including health care. If the President wanted to honor veterans he could authorize the military to award the Cold War Service Medal or the Iraq Medal of Commitment through an executive order. The costs of doing one or both would be chump change in comparison to the rest of the military budget and as Napoleon Bonaparte noted: “A soldier will fight long and hard for a bit of colored ribbon.”

While he never served himself and has mocked combat veterans the President is a nationalist and authoritarian. Nationalists and authoritarians tend to wrap themselves around the military as a way of showing the strength that inwardly they don’t have.

Timothy Snyder wrote:

“The president is a nationalist, which is not at all the same thing as a patriot. A nationalist encourages us to be our worst, and then tells us that we are the best. A nationalist, “although endlessly brooding on power, victory, defeat, revenge,” wrote Orwell, tends to be “uninterested in what happens in the real world.” Nationalism is relativist, since the only truth is the resentment we feel when we contemplate others. As the novelist Danilo Kiš put it, nationalism “has no universal values, aesthetic or ethical.” A patriot, by contrast, wants the nation to live up to its ideals, which means asking us to be our best selves. A patriot must be concerned with the real world, which is the only place where his country can be loved and sustained. A patriot has universal values, standards by which he judges his nation, always wishing it well—and wishing that it would do better.”

So until tomorrow,

Peace,

Padre Steve+

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Filed under History, iraq,afghanistan, Military, national security, News and current events, Political Commentary

Tagged as bastille day parade, make america great again, militarism, napoleon bonaparte, nationalism, president donald trump, president marcon, Sarah Huckabee Sanders, supporting the troops, timothy snyder, trust in military, victory parades

January 25, 2017 · 06:30

The Development of Artillery from the Napoleon Period to the American Civil War: Part One

Friends of Padre Steve’s World,

I’ve been working on revisions to one of my Civil War texts, A Great War in a Revolutionary Age of Change and decided to post one of those today. Hopefully tomorrow I will follow up with the second part of this section, which deals with the development of artillery from the pre-Napoleonic era to the beginning of the American Civil War. This is kind of a post for geeks who study the period.

I hope that you enjoy.

Peace

Padre Steve+

The Gribeauval System, Napoleon, and the U.S. Army

This was in large part due to the work of Captain Alfred Mordecai, who traveled to France in 1833-1834 and collected data on the French development of the stock-rail system. His information, “which included detailed drawings, became the basis for U.S. prototypes of the design.” [13] An Ordnance officer, Mordecai went on to become head of the Frankford Arsenal and later was appointed to the Ordnance Board where he wrote the 1841 Ordnance Manual for the Use of Officers in the United States Army. Mordecai was instrumental in standardizing weapons types and carriages. The guns of his 1841 Pattern, 6- and 12-pound guns, as well as the 12-pound howitzer were all mounted on a standard carriage. Larger weapons, the 24- and 32- pound howitzers of the 1841 pattern were developed but did not see as much service due to their weight. Additionally, limbers and caissons were redesigned to lighten them and improve mobility. Though approaching obsolescence, many these guns saw action in early part of the Civil War and Confederate artilleryman Porter Alexander noted that the 24-pound howitzer was “his favorite gun” [14] for the effectiveness of its heavy shells and canister.

M-1841 6-Pounder Artillery Carriage and Limber

The Apex of the Smoothbore

12 Pound M-1857 Napoleons at Gettysburg

Most of the improvements in artillery design between the Napoleonic era and the Civil War were on focused on lightening the weight of the tube, developing better and more mobile limbers, and improvements to fuses and ammunition. During this time the smoothbore cannon reached the apex of its development. In the United States this was realized with the brass M 1857 12-pound Napoleon, which was developed from a French design, however the gun “embodied none of the recent advances in technology” and was “already considered obsolescent by the French Army.” [20] However, much of the choice was dictated by purchasing agents and the budget which required any new ordnance to be cheap. The Napoleon was intended to replace the 1841 patter 6 and 12 pound guns and the 12 pound howitzer. It was nearly 500 pounds lighter than the old guns and “though it was technically a gun, owing to its ability to fire canister and solid shot, the Napoleon was often referred to as a gun-howitzer for its ability to fire explosive shell.” [21] It would see its first action at the Battle of Bull Run and nearly 1,800 of these versatile cannon would be produced in Northern and Confederate foundries during the war. Despite its obsolescence it “proved to be the most popular field piece during the Civil War,” [22] and Union artillery General Henry Hunt later acclaimed the Napoleon as “the best all round field piece of this era.” [23] Robert E. Lee told the Prussian observer to the Army of Northern Virginia, Justus Scheibert: “Nothing surpasses… the impression of a battery of 12-pound smoothbores which approaches to within 400-600 paces of the enemy…. In such moment rifled artillery, the advantages of which in open country I fully appreciate, cannot replace the smoothbore.” [24] Some of these guns remained in service until 1880.

The Development of Rifled Cannon and Breechloaders

However, a number of artillerymen and innovators began to experiment with breech loading and rifled cannon. These were not new ideas, and “when combined, they were first experimented with in England in 1745,” [26] but it would take another hundred years before Italian Major Giovanni Cavalli developed “a cast iron gun, its bore cut with simple two groove rifling to accept an elongated projectile fitted with corresponding lugs that mated with the gun’s grooves.” [27] As Cavalli improved his design others in Europe designed rifled guns. In France Colonel Treuille de Bealieu designed a similar gun to Cavalli; but which fired a cylindrical projectile. Napoleon III who was himself authority on artillery ordered brass smoothbores to be rifled on Bealieu’s design. [28] Swedish Baron Martin Wahrendorf “experimented with smaller, multiple-grooved rifling using lead-sheathed projectiles” [29] Cavalli’s guns were used by the Sardinian army, while the French deployed a number of theirs to Algeria and against the Austrians in Italy.

15 inch Rodman Gun

10 Pound Parrot Rifle at Devil’s Den Gettysburg

A civilian, John Griffen of the Phoenix Ironwork of Phoenixville, Pennsylvania, “pioneered the use of wrought iron in the construction of field pieces” [43] and patented his prototype in 1855. The designed was slightly modified by the Ordnance Department and adopted by the army in 1861. The weapon was known as the Ordnance Rifle and is had a bore of 3 inches and threw a 10-pound projectile. Unlike the cast iron Parrot, it was “constructed of tougher wrought iron, consisting of iron bands welded together around a mandrel and then lathed to a sleek, modern profile. It was then bored and rifled.” [44] The Ordnance rifles were light, easy to maneuver and beloved by their crews for their accuracy, and dependability. Phoenix manufactured over 1,000 of these weapons for the Federal government.