Tag Archives: battle of gettysburg

June 3, 2014 · 16:26

Gettysburg Day One: Lee’s Vague Discretionary Orders and Lack of Control

Discretionary orders are important to the success of commanders who desire that their subordinates have the necessary freedom to exploit opportunities within the broader operational context. They are a key element of what we now define as Mission Command and thus expressed clearly in the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Desired Leader Attributes the ability to operate on intent through trust, empowerment and understanding. In this chapter we will look at how Lee conducted war and how his decision process and communications, particularly the use of discretionary orders influenced the outcome of the battle and how important the issuance of clear orders is to a successful campaign.

To be effective such orders need to be clear and concise and they must be employed in a manner that are within the capabilities of one’s subordinate commanders to both understand them and carry them out. Thus a commander must always be ready to adjust his method when his command goes through a major turnover of personnel. After the loss of Jackson at Chancellorsville and the subsequent reorganization of the Army of Northern Virginia, Lee continued to operate as if nothing had changed, despite his own recognition that the army suffered from a want of qualified senior officers.

Robert E. Lee habitually issued discretionary orders with varying degrees of effectiveness. With Jackson, a man of ruthless battlefield instincts Lee was able to do this, even when Lee’s intent was less than clear, but even with Jackson such orders occasionally went awry as was the case during the Seven Days. Lee’s aide Walter Taylor noted that Jackson “took the suggestion of General Lee into immediate consideration, and proceeded to carry it into effect.” [1] This was not to be the case with those that followed Jackson, something that Lee failed to adjust to that would doom his army at Gettysburg.

Part of this is attributable to Lee’s distaste for administrative routine. Taylor noted how Lee’s “correspondence…was constantly a source of worry to him. He did not enjoy writing; indeed he wrote with labor, and nothing seemed to tax his amiability as the necessity for writing a lengthy official communication.” [2] But more importantly in the matter of communicating orders and following up, much of the issue came down to Lee’s near fatalistic understanding of faith and life in regard to the providence of God. For Lee victory and defeat came down to God’s will, as he wrote his wife after his ill-fated 1861 campaign in western Virginia “But the Ruler of the Universe willed otherwise and sent a storm to discontent a well laid plan and to destroy my hopes.” [3] But for Lee, the concept of “duty” became a secular manifestation of his religion.” [4]

J. F. C. Fuller attributes much of the manner in how Lee conducted battle to this sense of duty as well as belief in providence. Fuller notes that it “controlled the whole of his generalship.” [5] Lee explained his concept of command to the Prussian observer, Captain Justus Scheibert:

“You must know our circumstances, and see in battle that my leading would do more harm than good. It would be a bad thing if I could not then rely on my brigade and divisional commanders. I plan and work with all my might to bring my troops to the right place at the right time; with that I have done my duty. As soon as I order the troops forward into battle, I lay the fate of my army in the hands of God.” [6]

That firm belief in providence and the hand of God was evident in Lee’s comments to Major General Isaac Trimble as the army advanced into Pennsylvania. “We have again outmaneuvered the enemy, who even now does not know where we are or what our designs are. Our whole army will be in Pennsylvania day after tomorrow, leaving the enemy far behind and obliged to follow by forced marches. I hope with these advantages to accomplish some single result and to end the war, if Providence favors us.” ^{^[7]}

Fuller is one of the harshest critics of Lee bluntly notes that “this lack of appreciation that administration is the foundation for strategy; this lack of interest in routine, and his abhorrence to exert his authority…” [8] were key factors in many of his army’s problems, from command and control, discipline and the material and logistics aspects of war. Likewise his absolute reliance on his subordinates to carry out his orders, and unwillingness to interfere once the battle was joined was a major factor in his failure at Gettysburg, where Russell Weigley noted in a rather kind and subdued way that “Lee…was sometimes served less than well by his corps, division and brigade commanders.” [9]

Throughout the Gettysburg campaign Lee issued vague orders that his subordinates either failed to understand or willingly interpret in a manner that Lee did not intend. Lee’s biographer Michael Korda notes that “the phrase if practicable…led to many unfortunate consequences, since it provided subordinate commanders a kind of escape clause, allowing them to argue after the event that what they had been order to do was not, in their view “practicable.” [10]

From the time that Robert E Lee learned that the Army of the Potomac had crossed the Potomac into Maryland on June 28^th, he attempted to adjust his campaign plan and concentrate his army in preparation for battle. At that point his army was scattered and he did not want to provoke an engagement until he could concentrate his forces. Stuart’s cavalry, the absence of which was a matter of great consternation to Lee was chief among his concerns. Lee had hoped that Hooker would pursue him north, but finding the information out from Longsteet’s spy Harrison disturbed Lee greatly. [11]

Lee expected to know about Hooker’s movements from Stuart. However, Stuart was nowhere to be found; operating nearly fifty miles away separated from Lee’s main body much of the Army of the Potomac. Lee’s aide Walter Taylor wrote: “No tidings had been received from or of our cavalry under General Stuart since crossing the river; and General Lee was consequently without accurate of the movements or position of the main Federal Army.” [12] However, while Stuart certainly can be blamed for taking his best cavalry off on a ride around the Federal army, he acted in accordance with how he interpreted Lee’s orders, as Douglas Southall Freeman wrote: “What was possible was permissible. That, as Stuart saw it, was the substance of his orders.” [13]

This was especially true after Stuart had been surprised at Brandy Station by the Federal cavalry and pilloried in the Confederate press, the Richmond Sentinel saying Stuart had been “outgeneraled” and the Richmond Whig predicting that “We shall not be surprised if the gallant Stuart does not, before many days, make the enemy repent sorely the temerity that led them to undertake this bold and insulting feat….” [14] Lee’s orders provided just enough ambiguity and wiggle room for the wounded Stuart to do precisely what he did.

Lee’s orders gave Stuart the options of moving back to screen the army or passing around the Federal army, leaving the decision to Stuart’s discretion. “You will, however, be able to judge whether you can pass around their army without hindrance, doing them all the damage you can…” [15] Major Henry McClellan, Stuart’s aide recorded that he also received a “lengthy communication from General Lee…” which “discussed at considerable length the plan of passing around the enemy’s rear….” [16] Stuart in his official report wrote: “The commanding General wrote me, authorizing this move if I deemed it practical.” [17]

That being said Lee was clear enough that he expected Stuart to “lose no time in placing his command on the right of our column as soon as he should perceive the enemy moving northward.” [18] Though Stuart had detected Hancock’s II Corps moving north near Manassas he elected to make his movement around the Federal Army. Stuart’s biographer Burke Davis noted that Stuart “sought no advice on the all-important detour of June twenty-sixth, which changed his direct. He did not so much consult his brigadiers as he swung his column southward to pass around the enemy.” [19] Though Lee at a number of points during lead up to Gettysburg signaled his frustration with Stuart’s absence and its effect on his abilities, he failed to draw the appropriate conclusions that a prudent commander, operating deep in enemy territory would assume from the lack of contact. Lee should have assumed that Stuart was because of his move “become temporarily incommunicado” but instead, “inferred from Stuart’s silence that Hooker had not crossed the Potomac.” [20]

Lee’s vague order was the first in a series of command and control issues that plagued him during the campaign and combined with Stuart’s vanity and need to redeem his reputation, Lee’s ill use of the cavalry he did have under his control were all contributing factors leading to the disastrous encounter at Gettysburg, but there was more to come.

Now that Lee knew that the Army of the Potomac had crossed into Maryland and was now under the command of George Meade he began to take action to reassemble his widely scattered army in the vicinity of Chambersburg and Cashtown. A.P. Hill’s Third Corps was already near Cashtown, and Longstreet’s First Corps was on its way up. The most important issue Lee had was to get Ewell’s Second Corps, then near Carlisle preparing to attack Harrisburg, back in contact with the rest of the Army.

Lee sent two sets of orders to Ewell on the night of the 28^th, after getting Harrison’s intelligence, but they did not reach Ewell until the morning of the 29^th. The first orders were for Ewell to move to Chambersburg, and the second, to concentrate at Heidlersburg where he could either continue to Cashtown or turn south to Gettysburg. [21] The intent was good, Lee appears to have desired to minimize congestion on the turnpike in order to more rapidly assemble his army, however the orders caused much discontent at the Second Corps headquarters and “made Old Bald Head most unhappy.” [22] Many of his soldiers with Harrisburg in plain sight were likewise upset the “disappointment and chagrin were extreme” [23] while a soldier in “Maryland Steuart’s brigade recalled the “ill-concealed dissatisfaction” of the men, who “found the movement to be as they supposed “one of retreat.” [24] A staff officer noted that Ewell was “quite testy and hard to please” at the news and “became disappointed, and had everyone flying around.” [25]

Despite his displeasure Ewell did move promptly to comply with Lee’s orders “Lee had not communicated any particular sense of crisis to the case, and the Second Corps’ march proceeded at the usual pace.” [26] Likewise the fact that there were two orders caused several problems that would manifest themselves on July 1^st all of which would affect the outcome of the battle.

The first regarded the movement of Second Corps. On receipt of the first order to proceed to Chambersburg Ewell promptly started Allegany Johnson’s division as well as the Second Corps Wagon Train and two battalions of its Corps Artillery Reserve down the turnpike. [27] When they arrived near Cashtown on the first they would become entangled with Anderson’s division of Hill’s Third Corps, slowing that unit’s attempt to move to battle. This massive traffic jam also delayed two of Longstreet’s divisions which were moving to link up with Hill’s Corps. [28]

Ewell was able to direct Rodes and Early’s divisions toward Heildlersburg, but the vagueness of Lee’s changing the objective of the march “to Cashtown or Gettysburg and leaving it up to the commander to choose between the two” [29]caused Ewell problems. Had Johnson’s division and the rest of the corps been available early on the afternoon of July 1^stat Heildlersburg with Rodes and Early’s divisions it might have completely changed the outcome of the battle. Ewell had been very successful under Jackson, whose orders “were precise and positive” where Lee had not only revered the course of Ewell’s advance on Harrisburg back to Chambersburg, but then modified with the order to proceed to either Cashtown or Gettysburg. [30]

Lee’s order again contained a discretionary clause, to advance to Cashtown or Gettysburg “as circumstances dictate.” [31] Ewell was upset not knowing what “circumstances” Lee had in mind.” [32] On the night of the 30^th he discussed the order with Rodes and Early as well as Major General Isaac Trimble, and complained of the order’s “indefinite phraseology” and made the comment “Why can’t a commanding General have someone on his staff who can write an intelligible order.” [33] Ewell’s acerbic comment could easily be applied to many of Lee’s orders issued during the next few days, but in spite of it Ewell did handle his “first discretionary order very well indeed” [34] as he issued his movement orders for July 1^st in a manner that would allow his divisions to move on either location should the situation dictate.

As Ewell attempted to comply with Lee’s orders on the 29^th and 30^th to rejoin the army his other two corps were resting. Third Corps under A.P. Hill was at and around Cashtown west of Gettysburg. On the 30^th Hill allowed Harry Heth to advance Johnston Pettigrew’s brigade to Gettysburg. When Pettigrew discovered Buford’s cavalry division there he withdrew and reported to incident to Hill and Heth who refused to believe it. Hill did pass on that news to Lee and alerted Lee that “that he intended to march there in the morning” but the “announcement seemed not to have disturbed the commanding general, since he expected to move his headquarters only as far as Cashtown the next day.” [35] This lack of reaction was to have enormous consequences for Lee.

On the morning of July 1^st, Hill ordered Harry Heth to advance his division to Gettysburg without the benefit of cavalry support or reconnaissance and backing them up with Pender’s division. As they advanced the leading brigades under Brigadier General James Archer and Joseph Davis met Federal forces. Heth became embroiled in a fight with Buford’s cavalry, which developed into a fight with Reynolds’s I Corps, a fight that resulted in Heth’s division being mauled and helping to bring a general engagement. That engagement drew in Ewell’s corps as well before Lee knew what was happening.

Lee had a number of chances to prevent the meeting engagement that developed on July 1^st 1863. Lee noted in his after action report that “It had not been intended to deliver a general battle so far from our base unless attacked…” [36] but there are no records of him giving such instructions prior to the battle. There are no reports indicating that he urged caution on his commanders not to bring on a general engagement before July 1^st, when the battle was already underway, nor are there records of any warning orders to his corps commanders upon learning of the presence of the Federal army north of the Potomac.

In the end of the day it was Lee’s “laxness with respect to reconnaissance and his lack of control of Hill’s movements caused him to stumble into battle.” ^{^[37]} The battle began without him knowing it; his subordinate commanders committed nearly half of his army into battle before he issued an order, Lee wrote “A battle had, therefore, become in a measure unavoidable….” [38] But such is not the case.

Lee arrived early enough in the battle to make his influence known. He was told of Ewell’s movements by Major G. Campbell Brown of Ewell’s staff and instructed Brown in very strong terms to tell Ewell “that a general engagement was to be avoided until the arrival of the rest of the army.” [39] Ewell, did not get that message until after his forces were heavily committed noting in his report “that By the time this message reached me….It was too late to avoid an engagement without abandoning the position already taken up.” [40]

Lee was not happy that battle had been joined by Heth and Taylor observed that “on arriving at the scene of the battle, General Lee ascertained that the enemy’s infantry and artillery were present in considerable force” [41] and when Lee arrived on Herr Ridge, Heth asked permission to renew his attack when Rodes entered the fight. Lee’s initial response was negative “No, I am not prepared to bring on a general engagement today. Longstreet is not up.” [42]

After observing the battle for a time it became evident that Ewell’s corps was also heavily engaged and Lee began to change his mind. Heth reported that the Federal troops in front of him were withdrawing and Lee sensed an opportunity to strike a blow that might bring the climactic victory that he sought. Lee analyzed the situation and with Heth back at his division Heth wrote that “very soon an aide came to me with the orders to attack.” [43]

The order was given in the heat of the moment, and Lee always aggressive responded, but it was a bad decision. “It committed him to a major confrontation on this ground…without sufficient troops on hand and without knowledge of the whereabouts of the rest of the Federal army,” [44] and Lee knew this. He told Anderson at Cashtown not long before- meeting Heth: “I am in ignorance of what we have in front of us here. It may be the whole Federal army, or it may be only a detachment. If it is the whole Federal force we must fight a battle here.” But he was worried, telling Anderson “If we do not gain a victory, those defiles and gorges which we passed through this morning will shelter us from disaster.” [45]

Despite the success that his soldiers we now enjoying as they drove the I Corps and XI Corps back through the town Lee gave yet another vague order. This one to Ewell, who having already committed his corps to battle in the full knowledge that Lee did not desire a general engagement was confronted with another discretionary order, Lee said “General Ewell was…instructed to carry the hill occupied by the enemy, if he found it practicable, but to avoid a general engagement until the arrival of the other divisions of the army.” [46]

The Army of Northern Virginia came very close to sweeping Federal forces from the field on July 1st in spite of Lee’s lack of planning and clear commanders’ intent. But close was not enough. His forces which were committed in a piecemeal manner were unable to follow up their initial success. The situation faced by Ewell in Gettysburg was chaotic; his units were badly disorganized, and burdened by thousands of prisoners on the confided streets of the town. Rodes’ division had sustained frightful losses and he had no assurance of support from Hill. [47] Rodes’ after battle report supported Ewell’s decision. He wrote that before “the completion of his defeat before the town the enemy had begun to establish a line of battle on the heights back of the town, and by the time my line was in condition to renew the attack, he displayed quite a formidable line of infantry and artillery immediately in my front, extending smartly to my right, and as far as I could see to my left in front of Early.”^{^[48]}

Lee’s orders to Ewell, to take the high ground “if practicable” were correctly interpreted by Ewell despite his critics; he nature of the terrain, the number and condition of the troops that he had available for an attack, and the nature of the orders given by Lee late in the day was strong factors for Ewell to not attack. [49] Coddington noted that these problems “upset Ewell, for he was faced with the prospect of organizing a new attack with tired men even while he felt constrained by Lee’s injunction not to open a full-fledged battle. No wonder he was uncertain!” [50]The fact that Lee was not far away and did not issue a “peremptory order to Ewell” to attack also has to be noted. [51] If Lee had sensed that Ewell was not going to attack and really wanted him to he could have issued a direct order which Ewell, would have surely obeyed. “Lee realized that Ewell was not Jackson…and should have modified his method of command accordingly.” [52]

That evening Lee rode to Ewell’s headquarters and met with Ewell, Early and Rodes. “No reference was made to the possibility of an attack that evening on Cemetery Hill.” The question was put to them about what to do the next day. Lee asked “Can’t you with your corps attack on this flank tomorrow?” Jubal Early answered for Ewell saying “flatly that he did not believe an attack should be made from Gettysburg against Cemetery Hill the next day.” [53] Early added, “even if such an action were to succeed… it would be at a very great cost.” [54] Lee suggested to Ewell and his commanders that Second Corps around to the right along Seminary Ridge “where it might be better put to use, and twice he gave in to Ewell’s pleadings to remain where he was.” [55] This was yet another mistake that would haunt Lee during the rest of the battle, but the “notion of imposing his will on a subordinate was simply too alien to Lee’s nature for him to even to admit as a possibility.” [56] Fuller wrote “it was Lee’s inexhaustible tact that ruined his army.” [57]

Whether Lee intended to engage the Army of the Potomac at Gettysburg so early in the campaign is debated. His multiple and contradictory strategic aims left his commanders acting much on their own. Lee’s lack of clear commander’s intent to his subordinate commanders created confusion on the battlefield. They also paved the way to many controversies in the years following the war as Southerners sought to explain the failure of the Lost Cause, for which Lee could not be blamed.

Much of the controversy comes from Lee’s own correspondence which indicates that he might have not fully understood his own intentions. Some correspondence indicates that Lee desired to avoid a general engagement as long as possible while other accounts indicate that he wanted an early and decisive engagement. The controversy was stoked after the war by Lee’s supporters, particular his aides Taylor and Marshall and generals Early, Gordon and Trimble. Men like Longstreet and were castigated by Lee’s defenders for suggesting that Lee made mistakes on the battlefield.

The vagueness of Lee’s instructions to his commanders led to many mistakes and much confusion during the battle. Many of these men were occupying command positions under him for the first time and were unfamiliar with his command style. Where Stonewall Jackson might have understood Lee’s intent, even where Lee issued vague or contradictory orders, many others including Hill and Ewell did not. Lee did not change his command style to accommodate his new commanders.

That lack of flexibility and inability to clearly communicate Lee’s intent to his commanders and failure to exercise control over them proved fatal to his aims in the campaign. Stephen Sears’ scathing analysis of Lee’s command at Gettysburg perhaps says it the best. “In the final analysis, it was Robert E. Lee’s inability to manage his generals that went to the heart of the failed campaign.” ^{^[58]}

The vagueness of Lee’s intent was demonstrated throughout the campaign and was made worse by the fog of war. Day one ended with a significant tactical victory for Lee’s army but without a decisive result which would be compounded into a strategic defeat by Lee’s subsequent decisions on the 2nd and 3rd of July.

Notes:

[1] Taylor, Walter. General Lee: His campaigns in Virginia 1861-1865 With Personal Reminiscences University of Nebraska Press, Lincoln Nebraska and London, 1994 previously published 1906 p.45

[2] Ibid. Taylor General Lee: His campaigns in Virginia 1861-1865 With Personal Reminiscences p.25

[3] Lee, Robert Edward. Recollections and Letters of General Robert E Lee A Public Domain book, Amazon Kindle edition location 548

[4] Taylor, John M. Duty Faithfully Performed: Robert E Lee and His CriticsBrassey’s, Dulles VA 1999 p.35

[5] Fuller, J.F.C. Grant and Lee: A Study in Personality and Generalship, Indiana University Press, Bloomington IN 1957 p.112

[6] Korda, Michael. Clouds of Glory: The Life and Legend of Robert E. Lee Harper Collins Publishers, New York 2014 p.348

^{^[7]}Tucker, Glenn. High Tide at Gettysburg, The Bobbs Merrill Co. Indianapolis Indiana 1958 p.24

[8] Ibid. Fuller Grant and Lee: A Study in Personality and Generalship p.125

[9] Weigley, Russell F. The American Way of War: A History of United States Military History and Policy University of Indiana Press, Bloomington IN, 1973 p.116

[10] Ibid. Korda, Michael. Clouds of Glory: The Life and Legend of Robert E. Lee p.446

[11] Sears, Stephen W. Gettysburg. Houghton Mifflin Co. Boston and New York 2003 p. 139

[12] Taylor, Walter Four Years with General Lee Original published 1877. Heraklion Press Kindle Edition 2013 location 1199

[13] Freeman, Douglas Southall, Lee’s Lieutenant’s a Study in Command, One volume abridgement by Stephen W Sears, Scribner, New York 1998 pp.554-555

[14] Ibid. Freeman Lee’s Lieutenant’s a Study in Command, p.552

[15] Nolan, Alan T. R. E. Lee and July 1 at Gettysburg in the First Day at Gettysburg edited by Gallagher, Gary W. Kent State University Press, Kent Ohio 1992 p.16

[16] McClellan, Henry Brainerd The Life and Campaigns of Major General J.E.B. Stuart Commander of the Cavalry of the Army of Northern Virginia 1885. Digital edition copyright 2011 Strait Gate Publications, Charlotte NC location 6123 unfortunately this letter cannot be verified as no copy exists, McClellan presuming that it was destroyed sometime during the march.

[17] Dowdy, Clifford. Lee and His Men at Gettysburg: The Death of a Nation Skyhorse Publishing, New York 1986, originally published as Death of a Nation Knopf, New York 1958 p.60

[18] Lee, Robert E. Reports of Robert E Lee, C.S. Army, Commanding Army of Northern Virginia Campaign Report Dated January 20^th 1864. Amazon Kindle Edition location 503

[19] Davis, Burke JEB Stuart: The Last Cavalier Random House, New York 1957 p. 325

[20] Coddington, Edwin B. The Gettysburg Campaign: A Study in Command, A Touchstone Book, Simon and Schuster New York, 1968 p.183

[21] Ibid. Coddington The Gettysburg Campaign: A Study in Command p.189

[22] Ibid. Sears Gettysburg p. 134

[23] Tredeau, Noah Andre. Gettysburg: A Testing of Courage, Harper Collins Publishers, New York 2002 p.124

[24] Ibid. Sears Gettysburg p. 134

[25] Ibid. Tredeau, Gettysburg: A Testing of Courage, p.124

[26] Ibid. Sears Gettysburg p. 134

[27] Ibid. Coddington The Gettysburg Campaign: A Study in Command pp.189-190

[28] Ibid. Dowdy Lee and His Men at Gettysburg: The Death of a Nation p.99

[29] Foote, Shelby, The Civil War, A Narrative. Volume Two Fredericksburg to Meridian Random House, New York 1963 p. 464

[30] Ibid. Foote The Civil War, A Narrative. Volume Two Fredericksburg to Meridian p.464

[31] Pfanz Harry W. Gettysburg: The First Day University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill and London 2001 p.148

[32] Ibid. Coddington The Gettysburg Campaign: A Study in Command p.192

[33] Ibid. Pfanz Gettysburg: The First Day p.149

[34] Ibid. Sears Gettysburg p. 160

[35] Ibid. Coddington The Gettysburg Campaign: A Study in Command p.264

[36] Ibid. Lee Reports of Robert E Lee, C.S. Army, Commanding Army of Northern Virginia Campaign Report Dated January 20th 1864 location 552

^{^[37]}Ibid. Nolan R. E. Lee and July 1 at Gettysburg p.24

[38] Ibid. Lee Reports of Robert E Lee, C.S. Army, Commanding Army of Northern Virginia Campaign Report Dated January 20th 1864 location 552

[39] Ibid. Pfanz Gettysburg: The First Day p.150

[40] Ibid. NolanR. E. Lee and July 1 at Gettysburg p.22

[41] Ibid. Taylor General Lee: His campaigns in Virginia 1861-1865 With Personal Reminiscences p.188

[42] Ibid. Foote The Civil War, A Narrative. Volume Two Fredericksburg to Meridian p.475

[43] Ibid. Sears Gettysburg p. 203

[44] Ibid. NolanR. E. Lee and July 1 at Gettysburg p.24

[45] Ibid. Foote The Civil War, A Narrative. Volume Two Fredericksburg to Meridian p.474

[46] Freeman, Douglas Southall, Lee’s Lieutenant’s a Study in Command, One volume abridgement by Stephen W Sears, Scribner, New York 1998 p.571

[47] Gallagher, Gary. Confederate Corps Leadership on the First Day at Gettysburg: A.P. Hill and Richard S. Ewell in a Difficult Debut in The First Day at Gettysburg edited by Gallagher, Gary W. Kent State University Press, Kent Ohio 1992 pp.54-55

^{^[48]} Ibid. Nolan p.26

[49] Ibid. NolanR. E. Lee and July 1 at Gettysburg in the First Day at Gettysburg p.28

[50] Ibid. Coddington The Gettysburg Campaign: A Study in Command p.319

[51] Ibid. NolanR. E. Lee and July 1 at Gettysburg in the First Day at Gettysburg p.28

[52] Ibid Gallagher Confederate Corps Leadership on the First Day at Gettysburg p.56

[53] Ibid. Freeman Lee’s Lieutenant’s a Study in Command p.572

[54] Ibid. Tredeau, Gettysburg: A Testing of Courage, p.261

[55] Sears, Stephen W. Gettysburg. Houghton Mifflin Co. Boston and New York p.504

[56] Ibid. Tredeau, Gettysburg: A Testing of Courage, p.262

[57] Ibid. Fuller Grant and Lee: A Study in Personality and Generalship p.119

^{^[58]}Sears, Stephen W. Gettysburg. Houghton Mifflin Co. Boston and New York p.504

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Filed under civil war, History, leadership, Military

Tagged as a.p. hill, army of northern virginia, battle of gettysburg, Cemetery Hill, chairman's desired leader attributes, discretionary orders, gettysburg campaign, harry heth, herr ridge, isaac trimble, j.e.b. stuart, johnston pettigrew, jubal early, McPherson’s and Herr’s Ridge, mission command, richard ewell, robert e lee, robert rodes, walter taylor

May 28, 2014 · 15:06

Gettysburg Day One: John Reynolds’ Finest Hour

While A.P. Hill and Harry Heth ignored warnings and launched their troops towards Gettysburg, Buford believing an engagement was in the offing sought out good ground to give battle and hold back the enemy until the army could arrive. This he found on the ridges west of Gettysburg. The choice of ground is always important and in this battle was paramount to the success of the Army of the Potomac. Buford alerted Major General John Reynolds and the cavalry corps commander Alfred Pleasanton to the location of the approaching Confederates on the night of June 30^th. However, Buford’s warning, and that of the intelligence bureau came too late for Reynolds or Meade to take action on them that evening, nor give Meade “to dictate the choice of giving or accepting battle.” ^{^[1]}

The Army of the Potomac had the good fortune of having Reynolds in this key position on the morning of July 1^st 1863. John Reynolds was one of the finest commanders on either side during the Civil War. He graduated from West Point in 1841 and served in the artillery. He fought during the war with Mexico serving in Braxton Bragg’s battery winning fame and two brevet promotions for bravery, ^{^[2]} to Captain at Monterrey and Major at Buena Vista. Following the war he remained in the army. He served in field and coastal batteries and like John Buford had “participated in the Utah Expedition.” ^{^[3]} In 1860 he was appointed as Commandant of the Corps of Cadets at West Point and served there until June of 1861 when he was appointed as Lieutenant Colonel of the 14th U.S. Infantry regiment. ^{^[4]}

However, he was soon promoted to Brigadier General and he commanded a brigade of Pennsylvania volunteers during the Peninsula Campaign. He was captured on June 28^th as McClellan began his withdraw from the gates of Richmond but was released in a prisoner exchange on August 15^th 1862. [5] He returned to command a division at Second Bull Run where his division held firm as much of the army retreated, but missed the battle of Antietam as he was called to “the fruitless and frustrating task of trying to organize Pennsylvania’s militia” [6] by Governor Curtain. He commanded I Corps at Fredericksburg and again at Chancellorsville and was reportedly offered command of the Army of the Potomac by Lincoln, something that he recounted to his artillery chief Colonel Wainwright that he “refused it because he would have been under the same constraints as Burnside and Hooker.” [7]

The Army of the Potomac’s senior leadership had been the source of much political consternation during 1862 and 1863 for Abraham Lincoln. It was split among Lincoln’s supporters and detractors, Radical Republican abolitionists and moderate Democrats some of its leaders including McClellan, Hooker and Sickles had their own aspirations for the presidency. However, Reynolds was of a different character than some of his fellow commanders. He was a moderate Pennsylvania Democrat and no supporter of Lincoln, once comparing him to a “baboon.” But he “was also a serious unbending professional, who unlike McClellan, actually lived by the principle of “obedience to the powers that be.” [8] “Universally respected” in the army “for his high character and sterling generalship” [9] it was noted that unlike others Reynolds had a policy of holding back “stoutly aloof from all personal or partisan quarrels, and keeping guardedly free from any of the heart-burnings and jealousies that did so much to cripple the usefulness and endanger the reputation of many gallant officers.” [10]

On the night of June 30^th Reynolds was awash in reports, some of them conflicting and without Meade’s course of action for the next day “concluded that Lee’s army was close by and in force.” [11] He spent the night at his headquarters “studying the military situation with Howard and keeping in touch with army headquarters.” [12] Howard noted Reynolds anxiety and “Howard received the impression that Reynolds was depressed.” [13] After Howard’s departure Reynolds took the opportunity to get a few hours of fitful sleet before arising again at 4 a.m. on July 1^st.

When morning came, Reynolds was awakened by his aide Major William Riddle with Meade’s order to “advance the First and Eleventh Corps to Gettysburg.” [14] Reynolds studied the order and though he expected no battle that morning, expecting “only moving up to be in supporting distance to Buford” [15] took the reasonable precautions that Confederate commanders had not done.

Though Reynolds was not expecting a fight he organized his march in a manner that ensured if one did happen that he was fully prepared. They were precautionary measures that any prudent commander knowing that strong enemy forces were nearby would take. Reynolds certainly took to heart the words of Napoleon who said “A General should say to himself many times a day: If the hostile army were to make its appearance in front, on my right, or on my left, what should I do?” [16] It was a question that A.P. Hill and Harry Heth seemed not to consider on that warm and muggy July morning, where Heth was committing Lee’s army to battle on his own authority, Reynolds was about to do the same, but unlike Heth, he “had at least been delegated the authority for making such a decision.” [17]

Reynolds “wanted all the fighting troops to be up front, so he instructed Howard not to intermingle his supply wagons with his infantry. Similar instructions had been given to Abner Doubleday; to ensure that the First Corps wagons would wait until the Eleventh Corps foot soldiers had passed.” [18] Likewise, instead operating in the normal fashion of rotating units on the march, Reynolds opted to save time. Since the First Division under the command of James Wadsworth was further advanced than other I Corps divisions, Reynolds instructed it to move first. In doing so he countermanded the order of the acting corps commander Doubleday telling Wadsworth that Doubleday’s order “was a mistake and that I should move on directly.” [19] He went forward with Wadsworth’s division and ordered Doubleday to “assemble the artillery and the remainder of the corps, and join him as soon as possible.” [20] He ordered Howard’s XI Corps to follow and Sickles’ III Corps to come up through Emmitsburg. [21] Reynolds’ intention according to Doubleday was “to fight the enemy as soon as I could meet him.” [22]

Reynolds rode forward with some of his staff into the town as the infantry of I Corps and XI Corps moved advanced. In the town they were met by “a fleeing, badly frightened civilian, who gasped out the news that the cavalry was in a fight.” [23] When he came to the Lutheran Seminary he came across Buford. It was a defining moment of the Civil War, a moment that shaped the battle to come. It has been recounted many times and immortalized on screen in the movie Gettysburg, a time “when the entire battle would come down to a matter of minutes getting one place to another.” [24]

When Buford saw Reynolds infantry advancing he remarked “now we can hold this place.” [25] Reynolds greeted Buford, who was in the cupola of the seminary calling out “What’s the matter John?” to which Buford replied “The devil’s to pay” before coming down to discuss the matter with Reynolds. [26] Buford explained the situation noting that “I have come upon some regiments of infantry…they are in the woods…and I am unable to dislodge them.” [27]

Reynolds needed no other convincing. He asked Buford if he could hold and quickly sent off a number of messages. One officer wrote: “The Genl ordered Genl Buford to hold the enemy in check as long as possible, to keep them from getting into town and at the same time sent orders to Genl Sickles…& Genl Howard to come as fast as possible.” [28] He also sent a message to Meade stating: “The enemy are advancing in strong force. I [Reynolds] fear they will get to the heights beyond the own before I can. I will fight them inch by inch, and if driven into the town, I will barricade the streets and hold them back as long as possible.” [29] He directed Major Weld to take it to Meade with all haste “with the greatest speed I could, no matter if I killed my horse.” [30]

After dictating his instructions Reynolds then did what no senior Confederate commander did, he rode back and took personal charge of the movements of his troops to hurry them forward. Unlike Heth, he had taken note of the ground and recognized from Buford’s reports that “the Confederates were marching only on that single road and thus would not be able to push their forces to the front any faster than Reynolds could reach the battlefield with his First Corps divisions.” [31]

Reynolds, recognizing that time was of the essence if his forces were to hold the ground west of the town selected a shortcut around the town for I Corps. Those forces were directed across the fields near the Condori farm toward the back side of Seminary Ridge, with Reynolds’ staff helping to remove fences to speed the advance. [32] It was not an easy advance as the troops had to move across the farm fields at an oblique and have to “double-quick for a mile and a quarter in the thick humidity just to reach the seminary.” [33]

As troops arrived Reynolds directed them into position. He directed the artillery of Captain James Hall’s 2^nd Maine Battery to McPherson’s Ridge instructing Hall “I desire you to damage their artillery to the greatest possible extent, and to keep their fire from our infantry until they are deployed….” [34] The leading infantry of I Corps was James Wadsworth’s understrength division containing just two brigades, its losses from Chancellorsville not being made good and as the result of the loss of regiments discharged because their enlistments had expired.

However these units were “good ones,” composed of hardened combat veterans. Brigadier General Zylander Cutler led his brigade of New Yorkers and Pennsylvanians up first followed by the six foot seven inch tall Quaker, Brigadier General Solomon Meredith’s “Iron Brigade” of westerners following in their distinctive black hats. Reynolds directed Cutler’s brigade north of the Cashtown Pike and “called the Iron Brigade into action on the south side” [35] Reynolds directed Wadsworth to take change on the north side of the road while he looked after the left. [36] It is also believed by some writers that he directed Oliver Howard to prepare Cemetery Hill as a fallback position [37] however; there is more evidence that points to Howard selecting the site himself. [38]

Cutler’s brigade moved north and engaged Davis’ men near the railroad cut, with Davis’ troops initially having the upper hand, inflicting massive casualties Cutler’s regiments. But in a fierce engagement Cutler’s men pushed the unsupported Confederates back into the Railroad Cut where they slaughtered many of those unfortunate soldiers, taking over 200 prisoners and a battle flag. [39]

The Iron Brigade, brought forward by Doubleday hit Archer’s brigade in the front at Herbst Woods on McPherson’s Ridge. As the unit went into action Doubleday “urged the men…to hold it all hazards.” He recalled that the troops, “full of enthusiasm and the memory of their past achievements they said to me proudly, “If we can’t hold it, where will you find men who can?” The effect was dramatic as the Iron Brigade overwhelmed that unit, whose soldiers now realized they were facing “the first team.” Members of the Iron Brigade recalling the voices of Confederate soldiers exclaiming “Here are those damned black-hat fellers again…’Taint no militia-that’s the Army of the Potomac.” [40] As they attempted to withdraw they piled up at a fence near Willoughby Run and were hit in the flank by “a Michigan regiment that had worked its way around through the woods to the south.” [41]

Coddington writes “It was a bad moment for the Army of Northern Virginia, and Archer gained the unenviable distinction of being the first of its general officers to be captured after Lee took command.” [42] As the 2^nd Wisconsin advanced into the woods Reynolds urged them forward: “Forward men, for God’s sake and drive those fellows out of those woods….” [43] As he looked around toward the seminary to see the progress of reinforcements Reynolds was struck in the back of the neck by a bullet and fell dead with Doubleday taking command of the First Corps to the west of the town.

Reynolds was dead, but the series of command decisions reached by Reynolds under the pressure of a meeting engagement “where neither side held an immediate advantage” [44] were critical to the army. Though shaken by his loss the Union troops fought on at McPherson and Seminary Ridge until the assault of Ewell on their left and the arrival of Pender’s fresh division forced them from their positions.

The contrast between Reynolds and his opponents was marked. Hill was ten miles away from the action, Heth too far to the rear of his troops to direct their advance when they ran into trouble. However, Reynolds “hurried to the front, where he was able to inspirit the defense and throw troops into the decisive zone.” [45] At every point John Reynolds showed himself superior to his opponents as he directed the battle and reacted to circumstances. He paid with his life but his sacrifice was not in vain. Harry Hunt noted: “…by his promptitude and gallantry he had determined the decisive field of the war, and he opened brilliantly a battle which required three days of hard fighting to close with a victory.” ^{^[46]}

Notes

[1] Sears, Stephen W. Gettysburg. Houghton Mifflin Co. Boston and New York 2003 p. 159

[2] Pfanz Harry W. Gettysburg: The First Day University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill and London 2001pp.47-48

[3] Ibid. Pfanz Gettysburg: The First Day p.48

[4] Ibid. Pfanz Gettysburg: The First Day p.48

[5] Foote, Shelby, The Civil War, A Narrative. Volume One Fort Sumter to Perryville Random House, New York 1958 p.493

[6] Ibid. Pfanz Gettysburg: The First Day p.48

[7] Ibid. Sears, Gettysburg. p. 40-42

[8] Guelzo, Allen C. Gettysburg: The Last Invasion Vintage Books a Division of Random House, New York 2013 pp.29-30

[9] Ibid. Sears, Gettysburg. p. 34

[10] Ibid. Guelzo, Gettysburg: The Last Invasion p.30

[11] Ibid. Pfanz Gettysburg: The First Day p.48

[12] Coddington, Edwin B. The Gettysburg Campaign: A Study in Command, A Touchstone Book, Simon and Schuster New York, 1968 p.261

[13] Ibid. Pfanz Gettysburg: The First Day p.48

[14] Ibid. Coddington The Gettysburg Campaign: A Study in Command, p.261

[15] Ibid. Sears, Gettysburg. p. 158

[16] Napoleon Bonaparte, Military Maxims of Napoleon in Roots of Strategy: The Five Greatest Military Classics of All Time edited by Phillips, Thomas R Stackpole Books Mechanicsburg PA 1985 p.410

[17] Ibid. Sears, Gettysburg. p. 165

[18] Tredeau, Noah Andre. Gettysburg: A Testing of Courage, Harper Collins Publishers, New York 2002 p.159

[19] Ibid. Tredeau, Gettysburg: A Testing of Courage p.156

[20] Ibid. Guelzo, Gettysburg: The Last Invasion p.142

[21] Ibid. Sears, Gettysburg. p. 158

[22] Ibid. Tredeau, Gettysburg: A Testing of Courage p.156

[23] Ibid. Sears, Gettysburg. p. 165

[24] Ibid. Guelzo, Gettysburg: The Last Invasion p.142

[25] Ibid. Guelzo, Gettysburg: The Last Invasion p.142

[26] Ibid. Sears, Gettysburg. p. 172

[27] Ibid. Guelzo, Gettysburg: The Last Invasion p.143

[28] Ibid. Tredeau, Gettysburg: A Testing of Courage p.172-173

[29] Schultz, Duane The Most Glorious Fourth: Vicksburg and Gettysburg July 4^th 1863. W.W. Norton and Company New York and London, 2002 p.202

[30] Ibid. Tredeau, Gettysburg: A Testing of Courage p.173

[31] Ibid. Sears, Gettysburg. p. 166

[32] Ibid. Pfanz Gettysburg: The First Day p.75

[33] Ibid. Guelzo, Gettysburg: The Last Invasion p.145

[34] Gottfried, Bradley The Artillery of Gettysburg Cumberland House Publishing, Nashville TN 2008 pp.28-29

[35] Catton, Bruce The Army of the Potomac: Glory Road Doubleday and Company, Garden City New York, 1952 p.271

[36] Ibid. Pfanz Gettysburg: The First Day pp.75-76

[37] Ibid. Pfanz Gettysburg: The First Day p.76

[38] Green, A. Wilson. From Chancellorsville to Gettysburg: O. O. Howard and Eleventh Corps Leadership in The First Day at Gettysburg edited by Gallagher, Gary W. Kent State University Press, Kent Ohio 1992 p. 70

[39] Ibid. Guelzo, Gettysburg: The Last Invasion p.153

[40] Ibid. Catton The Army of the Potomac: Glory Road p.273

[41] Foote, Shelby, The Civil War, A Narrative. Volume Two Fredericksburg to Meridian Random House, New York 1963 pp.470-471

[42] Ibid. Coddington The Gettysburg Campaign: A Study in Command, p.271

[43] Ibid. Coddington The Gettysburg Campaign: A Study in Command, p.271

[44] Ibid. Sears, Gettysburg. p. 168

[45] Krick, Robert K. Three Confederate Disasters on Oak Ridge: Failures of Brigade Leadership on the First Day of Gettysburg in The First Day at Gettysburg edited by Gallagher, Gary W. Kent State University Press, Kent Ohio 1992 p.113

[46] Hunt, Henry. The First Day at Gettysburg in Battles and Leaders of the Civil War Volume III, The Tide Shifts. Edited by Robert Underwood Johnson and Clarence Clough Buel Castle, Secaucus NJ

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Tagged as 2nd maine battery, a.p. hill, abner doubleday, abraham lincoln, battle of gettysburg, captain john hall, general george gordon meade, harry heth, herr's ridge, i corps, iron brigade, james archer, james wadsworth, john buford, john reynolds, joseph davis, major general dan sickles, mcpherson's ridge, oliver howard, robert e lee, solomon meredith, the Railroad Cut, willoughby run, xi corps, zylander cutler

May 25, 2014 · 17:29

Memorial Day 2014: Remembering the Memorial Day Order of 1868

Oliver Wendell Holmes ended his Decoration Day 1884 speech:

But grief is not the end of all…Our dead brothers still live for us, and bid us think of life, not death, — of life to which in their youth they lent the passion and glory of the spring. As I listen, the great chorus of life and joy begins again, and amid the awful orchestra of seen and unseen powers and destinies of good and evil our trumpets sound once more a note of daring, hope, and will.

Frederick Douglass noted the same year in his Decoration Day Speech:

“Dark and sad will be the hour to this nation when it forgets to pay grateful homage to its greatest benefactors. The offering we bring to-day is due alike to the patriot soldiers dead and their noble comrades who still live; for, whether living or dead, whether in time or eternity, the loyal soldiers who imperiled all for country and freedom are one and inseparable.” From Frederick Douglass’ Memorial Day Speech 1884

The words of both men are something that we should not forget as we remember and honor all who have given the “last full measure of devotion to duty.”

It was after the great bloodletting known as the American Civil War that Memorial Day, originally known as Decoration Day was established. The first observance was made by the recently freed slaves of Charleston South Carolina who honored the memory of the Union Soldiers who had died at the Washington Racecourse Prison Camp on May 1st 1865. Other celebrations began around the country in May and June of 1866. By 1868 the Commander of the Grand Army of the Republic Union Veterans association General John Logan issued an order directing that the 30th of May 1868 be designated to the memory of the Union Soldiers, Sailors and Marines who had given their lives in the defense of the Union.

Since its establishment the holiday has grown to encompass the honored dead of all American wars. However its roots were in the Civil War, a war that claimed the lives of between 600,000 and 700,000 American military personnel on both sides of the conflict. It is hard to imagine that on one, September 17th 1862 that over 23,000 Union and Confederate Soldiers were killed, wounded or missing. At Gettysburg more men were killed and wounded than in the entirety of the Iraq and Afghanistan wars. Two percent of the population was killed in the war. To put that in perspective that casualty rate would involve the deaths of more than 6 million soldiers, well over twice as many men and women as currently serve on active duty and in the reserve components. Abraham Lincoln noted in his Gettysburg Address the importance of not forgetting those men:

“It is rather for us to be here dedicated to the great task remaining before us — that from these honored dead we take increased devotion to that cause for which they gave the last full measure of devotion — that we here highly resolve that these dead shall not have died in vain — that this nation, under God, shall have a new birth of freedom — and that government of the people, by the people, for the people, shall not perish from the earth.”

General Logan’s order is remarkable in its frankness and the understanding of the war in the immediate context of its conclusion. In 1868 the day would be observed at 183 cemeteries in 27 States and the following year over 300 cemeteries. Michigan was the first state to make the day a holiday and by 1890 all states in the North had made it so. In the South there were similar observances but the meaning attributed to the events and the sacrifices of the Soldiers of both sides was interpreted differently. In the North it was about preserving the Union and in the South the interpretation of the Lost Cause. Yet in both regions and all states, the surviving Soldiers, family members and communities honored their dead.

This Memorial Day we will honor all that have fallen but in our mind are the few that fight our current wars, wars that unlike that terrible Civil War, the majority of the population does not experience.

The order of the Grand Army of the Republic establishing Memorial Day is posted below.

Peace

Padre Steve+

HEADQUARTERS GRAND ARMY OF THE REPUBLIC, General Orders No.11, WASHINGTON, D.C., May 5, 1868

I. The 30th day of May, 1868, is designated for the purpose of strewing with flowers or otherwise decorating the graves of comrades who died in defense of their country during the late rebellion, and whose bodies now lie in almost every city, village, and hamlet church-yard in the land. In this observance no form of ceremony is prescribed, but posts and comrades will in their own way arrange such fitting services and testimonials of respect as circumstances may permit.

We are organized, comrades, as our regulations tell us, for the purpose among other things, “of preserving and strengthening those kind and fraternal feelings which have bound together the soldiers, sailors, and marines who united to suppress the late rebellion.” What can aid more to assure this result than cherishing tenderly the memory of our heroic dead, who made their breasts a barricade between our country and its foes? Their soldier lives were the reveille of freedom to a race in chains, and their deaths the tattoo of rebellious tyranny in arms. We should guard their graves with sacred vigilance. All that the consecrated wealth and taste of the nation can add to their adornment and security is but a fitting tribute to the memory of her slain defenders. Let no wanton foot tread rudely on such hallowed grounds. Let pleasant paths invite the coming and going of reverent visitors and fond mourners. Let no vandalism of avarice or neglect, no ravages of time testify to the present or to the coming generations that we have forgotten as a people the cost of a free and undivided republic.

If our eyes grow dull, other hands slack, and other hearts cold in the solemn trust, ours shall keep it well as long as the light and warmth of life remain to us.

Let us, then, at the time appointed gather around their sacred remains and garland the passionless mounds above them with the choicest flowers of spring-time; let us raise above them the dear old flag they saved from dishonor; let us in this solemn presence renew our pledges to aid and assist those whom they have left among us a sacred charge upon a nation’s gratitude, the soldier’s and sailor’s widow and orphan.

II. It is the purpose of the Commander-in-Chief to inaugurate this observance with the hope that it will be kept up from year to year, while a survivor of the war remains to honor the memory of his departed comrades. He earnestly desires the public press to lend its friendly aid in bringing to the notice of comrades in all parts of the country in time for simultaneous compliance therewith.

III. Department commanders will use efforts to make this order effective.

By order of

JOHN A. LOGAN,
Commander-in-Chief

N.P. CHIPMAN,
Adjutant General

Official:
WM. T. COLLINS, A.A.G.

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Tagged as abraham lincoln, battle of gettysburg, civil war casualties, decoration day, frederick douglass, general john logan, grand army of the republic, memorial day, oliver wendell holmes, order establishing memorial day, the gettysburg address

May 21, 2014 · 16:47

“A Spirit of Unbelief”: A.P. Hill, Harry Heth and the Prelude to the Battle of Gettysburg

Lieutenant General A.P. Hill

Note: One of the most important things to understand about the Battle of Gettysburg or for that matter any battle or campaign is leadership as well as organizational structure and climate of command. The study of A.P. Hill’s Third Corps is important to understanding how the battle unfolds and what happens at Gettysburg particularly on July 1^st. In our understanding “Successful mission command demands that subordinate leaders at all echelons exercise disciplined initiative, acting aggressively and independently to accomplish the mission. Essential to mission command is the thorough knowledge and understanding of the commander’s intent at every level of command.”

While the leaders at Gettysburg on both sides would be unaware of our present definition they certainly would have been acquainted with the maxims of Napoleon, who many studied under Dennis Hart Mahan at the West Point. Napoleon noted: “What are the conditions that make for the superiority of an army? Its internal organization, military habits in officers and men, the confidence of each in themselves; that is to say, bravery, patience, and all that is contained in the idea of moral means.”

Likewise in a maxim that has direct application to the Confederate campaign in Pennsylvania Napoleon noted “To operate upon lines remote from each other and without communications between them, is a fault which ordinarily occasions a second. The detached column has orders only for the first day. Its operations for the second day depend on what has happened to the main body. Thus according to circumstances, the column wastes its time in waiting for orders or it acts at random….” [1]

I have spent more time in this chapter developing the issues of organization, leadership, climate of command and relationships between leaders because of their importance to the campaign. From these students should be able to draw lessons that would be applicable to leadership, organization and campaigning at the operational level of war.

As the Army of Northern Virginia began to concentrate near Cashtown after the reports that the Army of the Potomac was in Maryland it was Lieutenant General A.P. Hill’s Third Corps that was nearest to Gettysburg. Major General Harry Heth’s division led the corps and arrived on June 29^th followed by Major General Dorsey Pender’s division on the 30^th. Hill ordered his last division under the command of Major General Richard Anderson to remain behind and join the corps on July 1^st. [2]

On the 30^th Harry Heth sent Johnston Pettigrew’s Brigade to Gettysburg to “search the town for army supplies (shoes especially), and to return the same day.” [3] It was the first in a series of miscalculations that brought Lee’s army into a general engagement that he wished to avoid.

The Confederate Third Corps commanded by Lieutenant General Ambrose Powell (A.P.) Hill had been formed as part of the reorganization of the army following Stonewall Jackson’s death after the Battle of Chancellorsville. Hill had a stellar reputation as a division commander; his “Light Division” had distinguished itself on numerous occasions, especially at Antietam where its timely arrival after a hard forced march from Harper’s Ferry helped save Lee’s army late in the battle. At Chancellorsville Hill briefly succeeded Jackson until he too was wounded.

But that being said Hill was no stranger to controversy, beginning with a clash with James Longstreet during the Seven Days battles in which time Longstreet placed Hill under arrest and Hill challenged Longstreet to a duel. Lee quickly reassigned Hill to Jackson’s command as Jackson was operating in a semi-independent assignment. [4] Hill was in an intractable controversy with Stonewall Jackson for nearly a year until Jackson succumbed to his wounds. Jackson at one point during the invasion of Maryland prior to Antietam had Hill placed under arrest for the number of stragglers that he observed in Hill’s hard marching division as well as other errors that Jackson believed Hill had made. The dispute continued and the animosity deepened between the two men and in January 1863 Hill asked Lee for a trial by courts-martial on charges preferred against him by Jackson. Lee refused this and wrote to Hill: “Upon examining the charges in question, I am of the opinion that the interests of the service do not require that they be tried, and therefore, returned them to General Jackson with an indorsement to that effect….” [5] Just before Chancellorsville Jackson wrote to Lee “I respectfully request that Genl. Hill be relieved of duty in my Corps.” This time Lee simply ignored the request and though the two generals remained at loggerheads they also remained at their commands at Chancellorsville. [6]

Hill was recommended for promotion to Lieutenant General and command of the new Third Corps by Lee on May 24^th and was promoted over the heads of Harvey Hill and Lafayette McLaws. The move displeased Longstreet who considered McLaws “better qualified for the job” and but who felt that the command should have gone to Harvey Hill whose “record was as good as that of Stonewall Jackson…but, not being a Virginian, he was not so well advertised.” [7]

Hill was slightly built and high strung. “Intense about everything” Hill was “one of the army’s intense disbelievers in slavery.” [8] Hill was an 1847 graduate of West Point and briefly served in Mexico but saw no combat. He spent some time in the Seminole wars and in garrison duty along the East Coast, spending 1855-1860 in the Coastal Survey and resigned his commission before Virginia’s secession. At the outbreak of the war he “received his commission as colonel, and soon trained one of Johnston’s best regiments in the Valley.” [9] He commanded a brigade under Longstreet on the Peninsula and was promoted to Major General and command of a division in May 1862. He was plagued by health problems which had even delayed his graduation from West Point, health issues that would arise on the first day at Gettysburg.

Hill’s Third Corps was emblematic of the “makeshift nature of the reorganization of the whole army.” [10] It was composed of three divisions; the most experienced being that of the recently promoted and hard fighting Major General Dorsey Pender. Pender’s division, was built around four excellent brigades from Hill’s old “Light Division” one of which Pender had commanded before his promotion. Hill strongly recommended Pender’s promotion which was accepted by Lee. Pender found the command to be a heavy burden. He was “an intelligent, reflective man, deeply religious and guided by a strong sense of duty….” [11]

Hill’s second experienced division was that of Major General Richard Anderson, transferred from Longstreet’s First Corps, something else which failed to endear Hill to Longstreet. [12] The unassuming Anderson had distinguished himself as a brigade and division commander in Longstreet’s corps, but in “an army of prima donnas, he was a self-effacing man, neither seeking praise for himself nor winning support by bestowing it on others.” [13] At Chancellorsville he fought admirably and Lee wrote that Anderson was “distinguished for the promptness, courage and skill with which he and his division executed every order.” [14] With four seasoned brigades under excellent commanders it was a good addition to the corps, although the transition from Longstreet’s stolid and cautious style of command to Hill’s impetuous style introduced “another incalculable of the reshuffled army.” [15]

Major General Harry Heth

Major General Harry Heth’s division was the final infantry division assigned to the corps. This division was recently formed from two brigades of Hill’s old Light Division and “the two new brigades that Jefferson Davis had forced on an already disrupted army organization.” [16] The organization of this division as well as its leadership would be problematic in the days to come, especially on June 30^th and July 1^st 1863.

Heth like Pender was also newly promoted to his grade and the action at Gettysburg would be his first test in division command. Heth was a native Virginian, well connected politically who through his social charm had “many friends and bound new acquaintances to him” readily. [17] Heth was a West Point graduate who had an undistinguished academic career graduating last in the class of 1847. His career in the ante-bellum army was typical of many officers, he served “credibly in an 1855 fight with Sioux Indians” but his real claim to fame was in authoring the army’s marksmanship manual which was published in 1858. [18]

Heth’s career with the Confederate army serving in western Virginia was undistinguished but he was a protégé of Robert E. Lee who recommended him as a brigade commander to Jackson before Chancellorsville. Tradition states that of all his generals that Heth was the only one “whom Lee called by his first name.” [19] A.P. Hill when writing Lee about the choice of a successor for the Light Division noted that Heth was “a most excellent officer and gallant soldier” but in the coming campaign “my division under him, will not be half as effective as under Pender.” [20] Douglas Southall Freeman noted that Heth was “doomed to be one of those good soldiers…who consistently have bad luck.” [21]

Heth’s division was composed of two depleted brigades from the Light Division which had taken heavy casualties at Chancellorsville. The brigade commanded by James Archer from Alabama and Mississippi was “well led and had a fine combat reputation.” But the second brigade was more problematic. A Virginia brigade it had once been considered one of the best in the army had deteriorated in quality following the wounding of its first commander Brigadier General Charles Field. Heth took command of it at Chancellorsville and both he and the brigade performed well, but when Heth was promoted the lack of qualified officers left it under the command of its senior colonel, John Brockenbrough. [22] His third brigade came from Mississippi and North Carolina and was commanded by Brigadier General Joe Davis whose uncle was President Jefferson Davis. Davis had served on his uncle’s staff for months and had no combat experience. [23] One author noted that Davis’s promotion to Brigadier General “as unadulterated an instance of nepotism as the record of the Confederacy offers.” [24] His subordinate commanders were no better, one William Magruder was so bad that J.E.B. Stuart suggested that “he have his commission revoked” and only one of the nine field grade officers in his brigade had military training, and that from the Naval Academy. [25]

Brigadier General Johnston Pettigrew

Heth’s largest brigade was new to the army. Commanded by the North Carolina academic Johnston Pettigrew it had no combat experience though Pettigrew was considered a strong leader, badly wounded at Seven Pines and thinking his wound mortal “he refused to permit his men to leave the ranks to carry him to the rear” [26] and was captured but later paroled and returned to the army later in the year.

Hill was under the impression that Meade’s army was still miles away, having just come from meeting Lee who assured him that “the enemy are still at Middleburg,” (Maryland) “and have not yet struck their tents.” [27] With that assurance Heth decided to use June 30^th to send Pettigrew’s brigade on the foraging expedition to Gettysburg. An officer present noted that Heth instructed Pettigrew “to go to Gettysburg with three of his regiments present…and a number of wagons for the purpose of collecting commissary and quartermaster stores for the use of the army.” [28]

However Heth did instruct Pettigrew in no uncertain terms not to “precipitate a fight” should he encounter “organized troops” of the Army of the Potomac. [29] Heth was specific in his report that “It was told to Pettigrew that he might find in the town in possession of a home guard,…but if, contrary to expectations, he should find any organized troops capable of making resistance., or any part of the Army of the Potomac, he should not attack it.” [30]

That in mind one has to ask the question as to why Heth would employ “so many men on a long, tiring march, especially as without a cavalry escort he took the risk of sending them into a trap” when his “objects hardly justified” using such a large force. [31] Likewise it has to be asked why the next day in light of Lee’s standing orders not to provoke an engagement that Hill would send two divisions, two thirds of his corps on a reconnaissance mission. Some have said that Hill would have had to move to Gettysburg on July 1^st anyway due to forage needs of the army, [32] but this is not indicated in any of Hill or Heth’s reports.

As his troops neared Gettysburg Pettigrew observed the Federal cavalry of Buford’s 1st Cavalry Division as they neared the town. He received another report “indicating that drumming could be heard in the distance – which might mean infantry nearby, since generally cavalry generally used only bugles.” [33] He then prudently and in accordance with his orders not to precipitate a fight “elected to withdraw rather than risk battle with a foe of unknown size and composition.” [34] His troops began their retrograde at 11 a.m. leaving Buford’s cavalry to occupy the town at ridges. On Confederate wrote “in coming in contact with the enemy, had quite a little brush, but being under orders not to bring a general engagement fell back, followed by the enemy.” [35]

Upon returning Pettigrew told Hill and Heth that “he was sure that the force occupying Gettysburg was a part of the Army of the Potomac” but Hill and Heth discounted Pettigrew’s report. [36] “Heth did not think highly of such wariness” and “Hill agreed with Heth” [37] Hill believed that nothing was in Gettysburg “except possibly a cavalry vidette.” [38] Hill was not persuaded by Pettigrew or Pettigrew’s aide Lieutenant Louis Young who had previously served under Hill and Pender who reported that the “troops that he saw were veterans rather than Home Guards.” [39] Hill reiterated that he did not believe “that any portion of the Army of the Potomac was up” but then according to Young Hill “expressed the hope that it was, as this was the place he wanted it to be.” [40] The West Point Graduates Hill and Heth may have manifested an often typical “distain for citizen soldiers…a professional questioning a talented amateur’s observations” [41] If so it was a distain that would cost the Confederacy dearly in the days to come.

Pettigrew was “aghast at Hill’s nonchalant attitude” ^{^[42]} and Young was dismayed and later recalled that “a spirit of unbelief” seemed to cloud their thinking. ^{^[43]} In later years he wrote “blindness in part seems to have come over our commanders, who slow to believe in the presence of an organized army of the enemy, thought that there must be a mistake in the report taken back by General Pettigrew.” ^{^[44]}

Heth then asked Hill since neither believed Pettigrew’s report “whether Hill would have any objection to taking his division to Gettysburg again to get those shoes. Hill replied “none in the world.” [45] Douglas Southall Freeman wrote “On those four words fate hung” [46] and then, in “that incautious spirit, Hill launched Harry Heth’s division down the Chambersburg Pike and into battle at Gettysburg.” [47]

Notes

[1] Napoleon Bonaparte, Military Maxims of Napoleon in Roots of Strategy: The Five Greatest Military Classics of All Time edited by Phillips, Thomas R Stackpole Books Mechanicsburg PA 1985 p.410

[2] Coddinton, Edwin B. The Gettysburg Campaign, A Study in Command A Touchstone Book, Simon and Shuster New York 1968 p.194

[3] Ibid. Coddinton, The Gettysburg Campaign, A Study in Command p. 263

[4] Dowdy, Clifford. Lee and His Men at Gettysburg: The Death of a Nation Skyhorse Publishing, New York 1986, originally published as Death of a NationKnopf, New York 1958 p.81

[5] Freeman, Douglas Southall, Lee’s Lieutenant’s a Study in Command, One volume abridgement by Stephen W Sears, Scribner, New York 1998 p.460

[6] Sears, Stephen W. Chancellorsville A Mariner Book, Houghton and Mifflin Company, Boston and New York 1996 p.51

[7] Foote, Shelby, The Civil War, A Narrative. Volume Two Fredericksburg to Meridian Random House, New York 1963 p.453

[8] Ibid. Dowdy, Lee and His Men at Gettysburg: The Death of a Nation p.79

[9] Ibid. Freeman Lee’s Lieutenant’s a Study in Command p.109

[10] Ibid. Dowdy, Lee and His Men at Gettysburg: The Death of a Nation p.88

[11] Ibid. Dowdy, Lee and His Men at Gettysburg: The Death of a Nation p.85

[12] Ibid. Dowdy, Lee and His Men at Gettysburg: The Death of a Nation p.86

[13] Ibid. Dowdy, Lee and His Men at Gettysburg: The Death of a Nation p.86

[14] Ibid. Freeman Lee’s Lieutenant’s a Study in Command p.512

[15] Ibid. Dowdy, Lee and His Men at Gettysburg: The Death of a Nation p.86

[16] Ibid. Dowdy, Lee and His Men at Gettysburg: The Death of a Nation p.87

[17] Ibid. Freeman Lee’s Lieutenant’s a Study in Command p.527

[18] Krick, Robert K. Three Confederate Disasters on Oak Ridge: Failures of Brigade Leadership on the First Day of Gettysburg in The First Day at Gettysburg edited by Gallagher, Gary W. Kent State University Press, Kent Ohio 1992 p.96

[19] Ibid. Krick. Three Confederate Disasters on Oak Ridge p.96

[20] Ibid. Freeman Lee’s Lieutenant’s a Study in Command p.527

[21] Ibid. Freeman Lee’s Lieutenant’s a Study in Command p.46

[22] Ibid. Dowdy, Lee and His Men at Gettysburg: The Death of a Nation p.87

[23] Ibid. Freeman Lee’s Lieutenant’s a Study in Command p.533

[24] Ibid. Krick. Three Confederate Disasters on Oak Ridge p.99

[25] Ibid. Krick. Three Confederate Disasters on Oak Ridge p.101

[26] Ibid. Freeman Lee’s Lieutenant’s a Study in Command p.136

[27] Guelzo, Allen C. Gettysburg: The Last Invasion Vintage Books a Division of Random House, New York 2013 p.131

[28] Tredeau, Noah Andre. Gettysburg: A Testing of Courage, Harper Collins Publishers, New York 2002 p.128

[29] Sears, Stephen W. Gettysburg. Houghton Mifflin Co. Boston and New York 2003 p.136

[30] Ibid. Tredeau Gettysburg: A Testing of Courage, p.129

[31] Ibid. Coddinton,. The Gettysburg Campaign, A Study in Command p. 263

[32] Ibid. Guelzo. Gettysburg: The Last Invasion p.131 This argument does have merit based on the considerations Guelzo lists but neither Hill, Heth or Lee make any mention of that need in their post battle reports.

[33] Ibid. Tredeau Gettysburg: A Testing of Courage, p.130

[34] Gallagher, Gary. Confederate Corps Leadership on the First Day at Gettysburg: A.P. Hill and Richard S. Ewell in a Difficult Debut in The First Day at Gettysburg edited by Gallagher, Gary W. Kent State University Press, Kent Ohio 1992 p.42

[35] Ibid. Tredeau Gettysburg: A Testing of Courage, p.135

[36] Ibid. Coddinton, The Gettysburg Campaign, A Study in Command pp. 263-264

[37] Foote, Shelby, The Civil War, A Narrative. Volume Two Fredericksburg to Meridian Random House, New York 1963 p.465

[38] Pfanz Harry W. Gettysburg: The First Day University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill and London 2001 p.27

[39] Ibid. Gallagher, Gary. Confederate Corps Leadership on the First Day at Gettysburg p.42

[40] Ibid. Pfanz. Gettysburg: The First Day p.27

[41] Ibid. Gallagher, Gary. Confederate Corps Leadership on the First Day at Gettysburg p.42

[42] Ibid. Guelzo. Gettysburg: The Last Invasion p.131

[43] Ibid. Coddinton, The Gettysburg Campaign, A Study in Command p. 264

[44] Ibid Pfanz Gettysburg: The First Day p.27

[45] Ibid. Coddinton, The Gettysburg Campaign, A Study in Command p. 264

[46] Ibid. Freeman Lee’s Lieutenant’s a Study in Command p. 563

[47] Ibid. Krick. Three Confederate Disasters on Oak Ridge p.94

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Tagged as a.p. hill, army of northern virginia, army of the potomac, battle of antietam, battle of gettysburg, cashtown, chancellorsville, d h hill, dorsey pender, douglas southall freeman, harry heth, hill's light division, james archer, james longstreet, jefferson davis, john brockenbrough, john buford, johnston pettigrew, joseph davis, louis young, maxims of napoleon, mission command, napoleon bonaparte, reorganization of the army of northern virginia, richard anderson, robert e lee, seven days, third corps, thomas stonewall jackson

May 19, 2014 · 17:11

Gettysburg Day One: A Breakdown in Leadership, Disaster at Oak Ridge

Major General Robert Rodes

Major General Robert Rodes was new to commanding a division. The big, blond and charismatic Rodes was one of the most popular leaders in the Army of Northern Virginia. Rodes had a great ability to inspire his subordinates, in part due to his physical appearance which was “as if he had stepped from the pages of Beowulf” [1] but also due to his “bluff personality featuring “blunt speech” and a tincture of “blarney.” [2]

Rodes graduated at the age of 19 from the Virginia Military Institute and remained at the school as an assistant professor for three years. He left VMI when Thomas “Stonewall” Jackson received the full professorship he desired and became a successful civil engineer working with railroads in Alabama. He had just been appointed a full professor at VMI as the war was declared. [3]

With the coming of war Rodes abandoned his academic endeavors and was appointed Colonel of the 5^th Alabama regiment of infantry. Early in the war Rodes distinguished himself as the commander of that regiment and later as a brigade commander. He took acting command of Major General D. H. Hill’s former division at Chancellorsville and handled that unit well. Following Chancellorsville Rodes was recommend for promotion to Major General and permanent command the division by Stonewall Jackson, in one of his last acts before his untimely death from pneumonia as that remarkable commander recovered from wounds sustained at Chancellorsville. With his appointment Rodes was the first non-West Point graduate to command a division in the Army of Northern Virginia.

Rodes’ division was the largest in the Army of Northern Virginia. Composed of five brigades and numbering around 8000 men it was a powerful force. All of its brigades save one had seen action before, but that large brigade of 2200 men was well trained and commanded by West Point graduate Junius Daniel [4] and was expected to perform well despite its inexperience.

The despite Gettysburg campaign was to be Rodes first command as a Major General and his brigade commanders were an uneven lot. Following the heavy losses in senior officers at Chancellorsville experienced and competent officers were becoming harder to come by. As a result some brigades were commanded by officers either not experienced or competent in their new commands.

Rodes was fortunate to have Brigadier Generals Stephen Ramsuer and George Doles in command of two of his brigades. Both had led their units well at Chancellorsville under Rodes direction, and would fight well in Gettysburg and subsequent actions. [5] Brigadier General Junius Daniel, though experienced was new to the Army of Northern Virginia and his brigade untested.

Brigadier General Alfred Iverson

This left two brigades under questionable leadership. One brigade from North Carolina was commanded by Brigadier General Alfred Iverson. Iverson who was considered a “reliable secession enthusiast” was appointed to command the North Carolina troops whose political steadiness and loyalty was questioned by Richmond. [6] Because of this Iverson became “embroiled in bitter turmoil with his North Carolinians.” [7] Iverson both in the Mexican War, the 1850s and in his service to the Confederacy owed his position to political appointments and patronage. Though he was from Georgia he helped raise the 20^th North Carolina regiment of infantry and became its first Colonel. However he was constantly at war with his officers and his regiment never bonded with him. As a regimental commander he did see a fair amount of action but his leadership was always a question mark. After he took command of the brigade Iverson “sent an aide to the camp of his former regiment to arrest all twenty-six of its officers.” [8] Those officers responded in kind and “retained a powerful bevy of counsel including…Colonel William Bynum who would later become a member of the Supreme Court.” [9] Iverson then refused promotions to any officer who had opposed him. One of the aggrieved officers of the 20^th North Carolina “wrote an outraged letter home insisting that resistance to Iverson was every reasonable man’s duty and asserting that he would oppose him again “with great pleasure” if the occasion offered.” [10] In his previous action at Chancellorsville Iverson “had not distinguished himself.” [11] After Chancellorsville he had “been stigmatized for his conspicuous absence at the height of the fighting.” [12]

Colonel Edward A. O’Neal

The last brigade to mention is the brigade which Rodes had commanded prior to taking command of the division at Chancellorsville. Due to the lack of qualified officers it was commanded by its senior regimental commander Colonel Edward A. O’Neal. O’Neal was another political animal, who unlike Iverson had no prior military training and nothing he had done before the war “had prepared him for command at any level.” [13] As an Alabama lawyer O’Neal was however well connected politically which gained him rapid rank and seniority over other officers, this eventually led to his command of the 26^th Alabama which was a part of Rodes brigade. Rodes had reservations about O’Neal’s ability to command the brigade and recommended two other officers, John Gordon and John T. Morgan who instead were assigned to other brigades and both of whom became General Officers, [14] Gordon finish the war as a Lieutenant General and commander of Second Corps. Richmond forwarded a commission to Lee for O’Neal to be promoted to Brigadier General but Lee, obviously with reservations about O’Neal’s capabilities blocked the promotion. [15]

On June 30^th Rodes’ division marched about twenty miles and bivouacked at Heidlersburg where he met with his corps commander Ewell, fellow division commander Jubal Early and Isaac Trimble who was accompanying Second Corps where they puzzled over Lee’s orders as to the movement of Second Corps the following day, which indicated that Ewell should march to Gettysburg or Cashtown “as circumstances may dictate.” [16] Neither Rodes nor Early gave favorable opinions of the order and Ewell asked the rhetorical question “Why can’t a commanding General have someone on his staff who can write an intelligible order?” [17]

Ewell who assumed that Cashtown was the desired junction of the army ordered his to march from on the morning of July 1^st 1863 toward Cashtown to join with Hill’s corps. His choice of routes was good as it gave him the opportunity to turn south towards Gettysburg “as circumstances” dictated.[18] Rodes division was at Middletown (modern Bilgerville) when Ewell was informed that Hill’s troops were in action against Federal cavalry outside of Gettysburg. Ewell then ordered his divisions south to support Hill’s corps in its attack even though he was not clear on what the strength or composition of the Federal forces. [19]

Like Heth to his west Rodes was also operating somewhat independently and like Heth when confronted with the opportunity for battle ignored the instruction “to avoid a general engagement, if practicable.” [20] The operation was Rodes’ first as a Major General and he like the other commanders in Second Corps was operating independently “as Ewell preferred.” [21] About four miles north of the town Rodes wrote that “to my surprise, the presence of the enemy there in force was announced by the sound of a sharp cannonade, and instant preparations for battle were made.” [22]

The arrival of Rodes’ division as well as Early’s division was decisive in turning the tide of the battle toward the Confederates that afternoon. The Union I Corps and Buford’s cavalry division had fought Heth’s poorly coordinated and led attacks to a standstill, but when Rodes arrived he found “a golden opportunity spread before him.” [23] From his position at Oak Ridge he saw the opportunity to take the Federal troops opposing Hill in the flank though his position did not “provide him as comprehensive view as he thought. [24] He also saw the divisions of Howard’s XI Corps advancing out of Gettysburg and moving north.

Rodes brought up Carter’s artillery battalion and ordered it to fire on the Union positions. This and the reports from Devin’s brigade of Buford’s cavalry division deployed north of the town alerted the commanders of I Corps who turned to meet the new threat from their north.

Captain Hubert Dilger

Carter’s artillery, deployed in the open immediately drew the fire of Captain Hubert Dilger’s Battery I First Ohio Artillery from Howard’s XI Corps. Dilger commanded one of the best artillery units in the army, a German immigrant and artilleryman serving in the Grand Duke of Baden’s Horse Artillery at the beginning of the war arrived in the United States at the invitation of a distant uncle, to “practice the war-making he had only previously rehearsed.” [25] Dilger was “blunt and a bit arrogant…loved by his men but not by his superiors.” At Chancellorsville he and his battery had helped save the Federal right “when it used a leapfrogging technique to keep the victorious Confederate infantry at bay.” [26] The effect of Dilger’s fire was blasted carter’s artillery blowing up several caissons and guns causing casualties among the men. [27]

Dilger’s Battery goes into action

Thinking he had an adequate grasp of the situation Rodes did not order a reconnaissance before launching his attack, nor did the brigades assigned to it put out skirmishers, a normal precaution when advancing to the attack. [28] Rodes deployed his troops over the rough ground of the ridge as quickly as he could and dashed off a note to Jubal Early stating “I con burst through the enemy in an hour.” [29] He was to be badly mistaken.

Rodes deployed Doles’ excellent brigade to guard his left against the advancing XI Corps units a task which it conducted admirably until the arrival of Jubal Early’s division and after which it too joined the attack on XI Corps. Initially this opened a gap between Doles and the rest of the division but this could not be exploited by the Federals.

His division initially deployed on a one brigade front. As they neared the Federal positions Rodes developed a relatively simple plan to “attack on a two brigade front, sending in O’Neal’s and Iverson’s men simultaneously, then following up with Daniel’s brigade in echelon on the right.” [30] It was a sound plan, but in execution it was “bungled right at the start.” [31] Direction was faulty, units were mingled and a gap developed between O’Neal and Iverson. [32]

O’Neal’s brigade had stalled almost immediately when fired upon by Union troops who had been hidden by a wall which had obscured them from Rodes’ view. Striking the O’Neal’s advancing troops at the oblique the Union troops wreaked havoc on the unsuspecting Confederates. These men were solid veterans from Baxter’s brigade of Robinson’s division as well as Dilger’s artillery which delivered effective canister fire at O’Neal’s brigade” [33] which “killed or wounded about half of the advancing men with a series of point blank volleys pumped directly into their flank.” [34] To further complicate matters O’Neal had chosen to remain back with his reserve regiment rather than “going forward to direct the advancing regiments.” [35] Rodes noted in his after action report that O’Neal’s three attacking regiments “moved with alacrity (but not in accordance with my orders as to direction)” and when he ordered the 5^th Alabama up to support “I found Colonel O’Neal, instead of personally superintending the movements of his brigade, had chosen to remain with his reserve regiment. The result was that the whole brigade was repulsed quickly and with loss….” [36]

As Rodes bad luck would have it Iverson on O’Neal’s right did not advance simultaneously or on the same axis, but in waited to see O’Neal’s advance. Like O’Neal, Iverson did not advance with or direct his advancing troops. [37] As a result the brigade drifted right and its exposed left was subject to attack from Baxter’s, Paul’s and Hook’s brigades of Robinson’s division. Like O’Neal’s brigade it too blundered into the path of well concealed veterans who like they did with O’Neal’s Alabamians and slaughtered them. The Federals advanced into the broken ranks of the North Carolina regiments they captured many. Official Confederate reports list only 308 missing but that number differs from the Union reports, Robinson reporting 1000 prisoners and three flags and Baxter’s nearly 400 alone. [38]

The 88th Pennsylvania Charges Iverson’s Brigade

Iverson was badly shaken by the slaughter and “went to pieces and became unfit for further command,” [39] being just close enough to observe it. He panicked and notified Rodes that one of his regiments had surrendered in masse though he later retracted that in his official report where he noted “when I found afterward that 500 of my men were left lying dead and wounded on a line as straight as a dress parade, I exonerated …the survivors.” [40] His brigade had lost over two-thirds of its strength in those few minutes, one regiment the 23^rd North Carolina lost 89 percent of those it took into battle, and at the end of the day would “count but 34 men in its ranks.” [41] Iverson’s conduct during the battle was highly criticized by fellow officers after it. Accused of cowardice, drunkenness and hiding during the action he was relieved of his command upon the army’s return to Virginia “for misconduct at Gettysburg” [42] and sent back to Georgia. Some complained after the war that Iverson was helped by politicians once he returned to Richmond and instead of facing trial “got off scot free & and had brigade of reserves given to him in Georgia.” [43]

With the center of his attacking forces crushed the brigades of Junius Daniels and Stephen Ramseur entered the fray to the right of Iverson’s smashed brigade. These capable officers achieved a link up with the battered brigades of Harry Heth at the Railroad cut after Daniel’s brigade had fought a fierce battle with Culter’s and Stone’s brigades in the area [44] and allowed the Confederates a unified front with which they pressed east. To the east Doles’ brigade advanced with Jubal Early’s division smashed the outnumbered and badly spread out divisions of Oliver Howard’s XI Corps. The timely arrival of that division coupled with the skillful work of Daniel and Ramseur saved Rodes from even more misfortune on that first day of battle, but Rodes’ plan “to burst through the enemy” with his division had evaporated. [45] Rodes’ division lost 3000 of its 8000 men present killed, wounded or captured in those few short hours on July 1st 1863.

The battle at Oak Ridge was a series of tactical debacles within a day of what appeared to be a “Confederate strategic bonanza.” [46] Despite the mistakes Rodes never lost his own self-control. He recovered from each mistake and continued to lead his division. He “kept his men on the ridge driving forward until with Hill, and on the flats left joined Early’s right to form a continuous line into Gettysburg.” [47] It was a hard lesson for the young Major General, but one that he learned from. He would be killed at killed at the Third Battle of Winchester on September 19^th 1864.
Notes:

[1] Freeman, Douglas Southall, Lee’s Lieutenant’s a Study in Command, One volume abridgement by Stephen W Sears, Scribner, New York 1998 p.39

[2] Krick, Robert K. Three Confederate Disasters on Oak Ridge: Failures of Brigade Leadership on the First Day of Gettysburg in The First Day at Gettysburg edited by Gallagher, Gary W. Kent State University Press, Kent Ohio 1992 p.115

[3] Dowdy, Clifford. Lee and His Men at Gettysburg: The Death of a Nation Skyhorse Publishing, New York 1986, originally published as Death of a Nation Knopf, New York 1958 p.123

[4] Sears, Stephen W. Gettysburg. Houghton Mifflin Co. Boston and New York 2003 p.53

[5] Ibid. Krick Three Confederate Disasters on Oak Ridge p.117

[6] Guelzo, Allen C. Gettysburg: The Last Invasion Vintage Books, a Division of Random House, New York 2013 p.25

[7] Ibid. Sears Gettysburg p.53

[8] Ibid. Krick Three Confederate Disasters on Oak Ridge p.129

[9] Ibid. Krick Three Confederate Disasters on Oak Ridge p.131

[10] Ibid. Krick Three Confederate Disasters on Oak Ridge p.130-131

[11] Ibid Freeman, Lee’s Lieutenant’s a Study in Command p.564

[12] Tredeau, Noah Andre. Gettysburg: A Testing of Courage, Harper Collins Publishers, New York 2002 p.145

[13] Ibid. Krick Three Confederate Disasters on Oak Ridge p.120

[14] Ibid. Krick Three Confederate Disasters on Oak Ridge p.123

[15] Pfanz Harry W. Gettysburg: The First Day University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill and London 2001 p.162Also see Krick pp.123-124 Following Gettysburg Lee continued to block O’Neal’s promotion and that officer went to extraordinary lengths to obtain a General’s commission using every political ally he had in Alabama and in Richmond. Finally Lee settled the matter before the Wilderness campaign writing that he made “more particular inquiries into his capacity to command the brigade and I cannot recommend him to the command.” Krick pp.123-124

[16] Ibid Pfanz Gettysburg: The First Day p.148

[17] Ibid Pfanz Gettysburg: The First Day p.149

[18] Ibid. Sears Gettysburg p.160

[19] Ibid Tredeau, Gettysburg: A Testing of Courage p.169-170

[20] Ibid Freeman, Lee’s Lieutenant’s a Study in Command p.564

[21] Foote, Shelby, The Civil War, A Narrative. Volume Two Fredericksburg to Meridian Random House, New York 1963 p.472

[22] Luvaas, Jay and Nelson Harold W editors. The U.S. Army War College Guide to the Battle of Gettysburg South Mountain Press, Carlisle PA 1986 p.35

[23] Ibid. Foote, Shelby, The Civil War, A Narrative. Volume Two p.472

[24] Ibid. Guelzo Gettysburg: The Last Invasion p.170

[25] Ibid Tredeau, Gettysburg: A Testing of Courage p.208

[26] Gottfried, Bradley The Artillery of Gettysburg Cumberland House Publishing, Nashville TN 2008 pp.59-60 Dilger was awarded the Medal of Honor for his actions at Chancellorsville in 1893, part of the citation stating that Dilger: “fought his guns until the enemy were upon him, then with one gun hauled in the road by hand he formed the rear guard and kept the enemy at bay by the rapidity of his fire and was the last man in the retreat.”

[27] Ibid Tredeau, Gettysburg: A Testing of Courage p.210

[28] Ibid. Guelzo Gettysburg: The Last Invasion p.170

[29] Ibid. Guelzo Gettysburg: The Last Invasion p.170

[30] Ibid. Sears Gettysburg p.197

[31] Ibid. Sears Gettysburg p.197

[32] Ibid Freeman, Lee’s Lieutenant’s a Study in Command p.565

[33] Ibid. Sears Gettysburg p.198

[34] Ibid. Foote, Shelby, The Civil War, A Narrative. Volume Two p.473

[35] Ibid Freeman, Lee’s Lieutenant’s a Study in Command p.565

[36] Ibid Luvaas The U.S. Army War College Guide to the Battle of Gettysburg p.36

[37] Ibid. Krick Three Confederate Disasters on Oak Ridge p.132

[38] Ibid Pfanz Gettysburg: The First Day p.175

[39] Coddington, Edwin B. The Gettysburg Campaign: A Study in Command, A Touchstone Book, Simon and Schuster New York, 1968 p.290

[40] Ibid Luvaas The U.S. Army War College Guide to the Battle of Gettysburg p.37

[41] Ibid. Sears Gettysburg p.201

[42] Ibid. Guelzo Gettysburg: The Last Invasion p.173

[43] Ibid. Krick Three Confederate Disasters on Oak Ridge p.136

[44] Ibid. Coddington, The Gettysburg Campaign: A Study in Command, p.292

[45] Ibid. Guelzo Gettysburg: The Last Invasion p.173

[46] Ibid. Krick Three Confederate Disasters on Oak Ridge p.138

[47] Ibid. Dowdy Lee and His Men at Gettysburg: The Death of a Nation p.138

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Filed under civil war, History, Military

Tagged as a.p. hill, alfred iverson, battle of gettysburg, chancellorsville, edward o'neal, harry heth, hubert dilger, i corps, john c robinson, jubal early, oak ridge, richard ewell, robert e lee, robert rodes, rodes division, Second Corps, stephen ramsuer, thomas stonewall jackson, xi corps

May 13, 2014 · 16:01

Gettysburg Day One: “A Portrait of Hell” The Collapse of Barlow and Schimmelpfennig’s Divisions at Blocher’s Knoll

Note to readers: This is another of my articles on the battle of Gettysburg.

Oliver Howard’s XI Corps had a bad reputation in the Army of the Potomac through no fault of its commander. Composed mainly of German immigrants the corps was on the extreme right of the Union line at Chancellorsville with its flank exposed. It was hit unexpectedly by Jackson’s Corps and routed, its soldiers fleeing as Howard and other commanders tried to rally them. The action earned the corps the derisive nickname “the flying Dutchmen.”

As the battle along McPherson’s and Seminary Ridge continued between Hill’s Third Corps and the Union I Corps and Buford’s Cavalry Howard’s Corps deployed to cover I Corps flank. Howard sent two divisions forward under the command of Major General Carl Schurz. The divisions Schurz’s Second division temporarily under the command of Brigadier General Alexander Schimmelpfennig, one of the brigade commanders and the First Division under the command of Brigadier General Francis Barlow were small divisions of just two brigades apiece. Schurz estimated that the two divisions numbered “hardly over 6,000 effective men when going into battle….” [1]

Carl Schurz

Schurz intended to bring these two divisions into line each with one brigade forward and one in reserve. Schimmelpfennig’s brigade was placed at a right angle to the flank of Robinson’s division and it was his intention that Barlow’s division “extend Schimmelpfennig’s front facing north” keeping Ames’ brigade as a reserve in the right rear “in order to use it against a possible flanking movement by the enemy.” [2]

However Barlow did not comply. Barlow was a 29 year old Harvard law graduate and Boston Brahmin was well connected politically with the more radical abolitionists of the Republican Party and had an intense dislike of Democrats. He came from a family well entrenched in Boston society and though he became a competent soldier and was promoted to Brigadier General after Antietam and was convinced to command a division in XI Corps by Howard after Chancellorsville. He soon regretted his decision. Barlow was to use modern terminology somewhat of an elitist and snob. He “disliked the beery and impenetrable Germans in his division as much as he disliked Democrats.” He admitted that he had “always been down on the ‘Dutch’ & I do not abate my contempt now.” [3]

Francis Barlow

Barlow was the only non-German division commander in XI Corps and he had little regard for Schurz. Instead of following Schurz’s direction he advanced Colonel Leopold Von Gilsa’s small brigade with two sections of artillery to a small knob of high ground known as Blocher’s Knoll. Instead of maintaining Ames’ brigade in reserve and to the right to guard against a flanking attack he deployed it facing slightly northeast on the right of Von Gilsa’s brigade. It was to be a costly error. Schurz noted:

“But I now noticed that Barlow, be it that he had misunderstood my order, or that he was carried away by the ardor of the conflict, had advanced his whole line and lost connection with my third division on the left, and…he had instead of refusing, had pushed forward his right brigade, so that it formed a projecting angle with the rest of the line.” [4]

There are still debates as to why Barlow advanced but one of the most likely explanations is that he saw the unprotected left of Brigadier General George Doles’s brigade of Georgians from Rodes divsion and wanted to strike them in the flank. [5] However this left his own flank exposed to the attack of Brigadier General John Gordon’s brigade of Early’s division.

John Gordon

Gordon’s troops hit the exposed right flank of Von Gilsa’s brigade and that force rapidly cracked under the fierceness of the Confederate assault. Jones’ artillery battalion “enfiladed its whole line and took it in reverse” [6] supporting Gordon as well as Hays and Avery’s brigades as they advanced. One Confederate recalled “it was a fearful slaughter, the golden wheat fields, a few minutes before in beauty, now gone, and the ground covered with the dead and wounded in blue.” [7]

As Von Gilsa’s brigade collapsed Gordon “focused on the exposed right flank of Ames’s brigade” and Doles fell upon its left and “Ames’s outnumbered troops also collapsed” [8] even as he advanced his brigade to support Von Gilsa’s now fleeing troops. Ames took command of the shattered remnants of the two brigades when Barlow, attempting to rally his troops fell badly wounded. Barlow would be assisted by Gordon who had one of Early’s staff “carried to the shade” of a nearby farmhouse. [9] Barlow recovered and “he and Gordon established a friendship that lasted for the remainder of their lives.” [10]

Schurz attempted to recover the situation by extending Schimmelpfennig’s division to the right, and advanced his reserve brigade under Polish born Colonel Wladimir Krzyzanowski to support Barlow counterattacking against Doles’s brigade. However they too were rolled up in the Confederate assault, both of Krzyzanowski’s flanks received enfilading fire and the brigade fell back across the Carlisle Road toward an orchard on the north side of Gettysburg.” [11] During the retreat the 157^th New York sacrificed itself leaving over 75 percent of its men on the battlefield. Krzyzanowski described the scene as “a portrait of hell.” [12]

Harry Hays brigade of Louisianans joined the assault on the collapsing Federal right while on the left Schimmelpfennig’s line collapsed and the Prussian joined his troops in retreat. Inside the town he was unhorsed and in order to avoid capture “took refuge in a woodshed, where he remained in hiding the next three days.” [13]

Howard, looking for relief from Major General Slocum’s XII Corps sent the First Brigade of Brigadier General Adolph Von Steinwehr’s division from Cemetery Hill to support the fleeing men of Barlow and Schimmelpfennig’s divsions. The small brigade of about 800 soldiers under the command of Colonel Charles Coster advanced through the town to a brickyard on the outskirts of the town. They were hit hard by Hays and Avery’s brigades of Early’s division; Avery’s which took them in the right flank. Both flanks turned by the advancing Confederates [14] Coster’s brigade too broke under the pressure leaving many prisoners to the Confederates. The commander of the 134^th New York exclaimed “I never imagined such a rain of bullets.” [15] Coster survived but resigned from the army a few months later never having filed and official report. [16]

Barlow was acrimonious toward his troops who he had so carelessly exposed to the Confederate onslaught. He wrote “We ought to have held the place easily, for I had my entire force at the very point where the attack was made….But the enemies [sic] skirmishers had hardly attacked us before my men began to run. No fight at all was made.” [17] However this statement is not backed by others on the Union of Confederate side. Henry Hunt wrote that it was “an obstinate and bloody contest” [18] while Gordon wrote:

“The enemy made a most obstinate resistance until the colors of the two lines were separated by a space of less than 50 paces, when his line was broken and driven back, leaving the flank which this line had protected exposed to the fire from my brigade. An effort was made by the enemy to change his front and check our advance, but the effort failed and this line too, was driven back in the greatest confusion with immense loss in killed, wounded and prisoners.” [19]

A private of the 61^st Georgia Infantry of Gordon’s brigade wrote the XI Corps troops “stood firm until we got near them. Then they began to retreat in good order. They were harder to drive than we had known them before….Their officers were cheering their men and behaving like heroes and commanders of ‘the first water’” [20]

Their right now uncovered by the retreat of the XI Corps the battered I Corps survivors fell back through the town onto Cemetery Ridge. There they and the remnants Barlow and Schimmelpfennig’s divisions were rallied by Howard and the recently arrived Major General Winfield Scott Hancock around Colonel Orland Smith’s fresh and dug in brigade and a substantial amount of artillery.

[1] Coddington, Edwin B. The Gettysburg Campaign: A Study in Command, A Touchstone Book, Simon and Schuster New York, 1968 p.288

[2] Guelzo, Allen C. Gettysburg: The Last Invasion Vintage Books a Division of Random House, New York 2013 p.181

[3] Ibid. Guelzo. P.181

[4] Green, A. Wilson. From Chancellorsville to Gettysburg: O. O. Howard and Eleventh Corps Leadership in The First Day at Gettysburg edited by Gallagher, Gary W. Kent State University Press, Kent Ohio 1992 p.77

[5] Ibid. Greene p.78

[6] Hunt, Henry The First Day at Gettysburg in Battles and Leaders of the Civil War edited by Bradford, Neil Meridian Press, New York 1989 p.363

[7] Ibid. Greene p.79

[8] Ibid. Greene p.79

[9] Ibid. Guelzo p.188

[10] Dowdy, Clifford. Lee and His Men at Gettysburg: The Death of a Nation Skyhorse Publishing, New York 1986, originally published as Death of a Nation Knopf, New York 1958 p.141

[11] Ibid. Greene p.80

[12] Ibid. Guelzo p.186

[13] Foote, Shelby, The Civil War, A Narrative. Volume Two Fredericksburg to Meridian Random House, New York 1963 p.477

[14] Tredeau, Noah Andre. Gettysburg: A Testing of Courage, Harper Collins Publishers, New York 2002 p.241

[15] Ibid. Trudeau p.241

[16] Ibid. Guelzo p.190

[17] Ibid Greene p.79

[18] Ibid. Hunt The First Day at Gettysburg p.365

[19] Report of Brigadier General J. B. Gordon, CSA, commanding brigade, Early’s Divsision, in Luvaas, Jay and Nelson Harold W editors. The U.S. Army War College Guide to the Battle of Gettysburg South Mountain Press, Carlisle PA 1986 p.45

[20] Ibid. Greene p.79

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May 12, 2014 · 14:50

“Integrity, Purity Unselfish Devotion to Duty” Reflections on Winfield Scott Hancock after another Gettysburg Staff Ride

“I shall not fight upon the principle of state-rights, but for the Union, whole and undivided.” Winfield Scott Hancock

I am back home after leading another trip to Gettysburg with a new group of students.

I always come away from Gettysburg with a new appreciation of the sacrifice that was made there by so many Americans. I am always humbled and learn something new. I only wish that most Americans and our leaders of both political parties as well as most media types and pundits could grasp what I experience on each visit to this “hallowed ground.”

Quite honestly I do not think that the vast majority Americans understand, appreciate or value in the slightest the sacrifices of the men who fought and in many cases died to preserve the Union at Gettysburg. Even among those who do I think that the object of their appreciation are the military aspects of the battle often taken in isolation, not the profound strategic dimensions of what this battle as well as the fall of Vicksburg in the west at the same time had on the war.

Nor do they appreciate the massive political, ideological and social effects bought about by those Union victories in ending the war and how those effects redound to us today. This is especially true of the pundits, politicians and preachers, the “Trinity of Evil” as I call them whose shrill voices urge on divisions between our people; including some that call out for violence to maintain their groups social, economic or religious advantages over others. Quite a few even lament the fall of the South and the institution including the washed up rock and roll musician of the political right Ted Nugent who wrote in the Washington Times in July 2012: “I’m beginning to wonder if it would have been best had the South won the Civil War.”

All of that concerns me as an American and a historian; because I realize how dangerous such historical ignorance and visceral propaganda is in the life of any nation. Thus when I go to Gettysburg, or for that matter any other battlefield of our American Civil War the sacrifices of those men and what they fought to maintain is again imprinted on my heart.

Abraham Lincoln eloquently noted about those soldiers who fought to turn back the Confederate tide at Gettysburg in his Gettysburg Address:

“But, in a larger sense, we can not dedicate — we can not consecrate — we can not hallow — this ground. The brave men, living and dead, who struggled here, have consecrated it, far above our poor power to add or detract. The world will little note, nor long remember what we say here, but it can never forget what they did here. It is for us the living, rather, to be dedicated here to the unfinished work which they who fought here have thus far so nobly advanced. It is rather for us to be here dedicated to the great task remaining before us — that from these honored dead we take increased devotion to that cause for which they gave the last full measure of devotion — that we here highly resolve that these dead shall not have died in vain — that this nation, under God, shall have a new birth of freedom — and that government of the people, by the people, for the people, shall not perish from the earth.”

While I am an idealist I am also a pragmatist. I respect the right of others, even those that disagree with things that I very much believe in and support. Like it or not the keystone of our governmental system is one of compromise. That being said having relatives that fought on both sides of the American Civil War that I am not a sectionalist. Nor am I a person that attempts to use the political system to ensure that others have to follow my religious beliefs or to enrich certain groups. The democracy that is part of our republic’s system of government is not a perfect system by any means. In fact as the great English Prime Minister Winston Churchill noted “democracy was the worst form of government except for all the others.”

Thus I appreciate military men who maintain their oath to the nation in times of great conflict not abandoning it to support causes that they know are wrong because the people of their state, or interest group seek to divide that Union. Winfield Scott Hancock was one of those kind of men, as was George Meade, and John Buford, all of whom played key roles in defeating the Confederates at Gettysburg.

Hancock, who earned the title “Hancock the Superb” was the commander of the Union II Corps at Gettysburg. Upon the death of John Reynolds early on the first day of battle Hancock was appointed by Meade as commander of the Federal Left Wing, in effect becoming Meade’s deputy commander for the rest of the battle. He was seriously wounded as Pickett’s Charge came to its bloody end at “the Angle” and his dear friend Confederate General Lewis Armistead lay mortally wounded a few hundred yards away.

Hancock is an interesting character. He was from Pennsylvania but was a Democrat. He was not a Republican like Lincoln. Hancock was not a political ideologue but was since he was a Democrat he was suspect by some in the party establishments of both parties and never was given independent command.

Hancock gave his advice to Armistead and others who were preparing to leave the Union in early 1861 including Armistead and his commanding officer Brigadier General Albert Sidney Johnston. He made himself clear:

“I shall not fight upon the principle of state-rights, but for the Union, whole and undivided.”

During the war he served with distinction and Ulysses Grant wrote of him:

“Hancock stands the most conspicuous figure of all the general officers who did not exercise a separate command. He commanded a corps longer than any other one, and his name was never mentioned as having committed in battle a blunder for which he was responsible. He was a man of very conspicuous personal appearance…. His genial disposition made him friends, and his personal courage and his presence with his command in the thickest of the fight won for him the confidence of troops serving under him. No matter how hard the fight, the 2d corps always felt that their commander was looking after them.”

After the war he supervised the execution of those convicted of the assassination of Abraham Lincoln and in various postings in the occupied South attempted to mitigate some of the actions of those bent on vengeance and others who tried to exploit the defeated people of the south for political or economic gain.

Hancock ran for President and lost a narrow election in 1880 to James A. Garfield. After that he returned to the Army and died at the age of 61at his headquarters of complications from diabetes.

He was praised by political opponents. Former President Rutherford B. Hayes wrote:

“if when we make up our estimate of a public man, conspicuous both as a soldier and in civil life, we are to think first and chiefly of his manhood, his integrity, his purity, his singleness of purpose, and his unselfish devotion to duty, we can truthfully say of Hancock that he was through and through pure gold.”

Another political opponent Republican General Francis A. Walker lamented not supporting Hancock in 1880 after the great corruption that engulfed the country during “Gilded Age” of the “Robber Barons” the 1880s. Walker wrote:

“Although I did not vote for General Hancock, I am strongly disposed to believe that one of the best things the nation has lost in recent years has been the example and the influence of that chivalric, stately, and splendid gentleman in the White House. Perhaps much which both parties now recognize as having been unfortunate and mischievous during the past thirteen years would have been avoided had General Hancock been elected.”

As I stood at the statue that marks Hancock on Cemetery Hill this weekend I again was struck by the bravery, courage and integrity of that remarkable man.

Peace

Padre Steve+

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May 10, 2014 · 23:59

The Power of Noble Deeds and the Fallibilty of those that Do Them

“The power of noble deeds is to be preserved and passed on to the future.” Joshua Chamberlain

Today I was at the Gettysburg battlefield leading a Staff Ride for students from our Staff College. Today’s portion of the Staff Ride encompassed the first two days of the battle. We will continue it tomorrow with the actions of the night of July second 1863 at Culp’s Hill and the climatic event we know as Pickett’s Charge.

The Staff Ride is a optional trip for our students and the get no academic credit for it. However since I have taken it over I have been working to connect it to aspects of what they are learning in our courses, issues of campaigning, mission command and the diplomatic, information, military and economic aspects of war. I am working with our academic course developers and directors to turn this into an actual elective that students can receive academic credit for in addition to the chance to go the the battlefield.

I have a passion for this. The American Civil War and the Battle of Gettysburg are intrinsic parts of who we are as Americans today. The events of that war and this battle continue to reverberate in many aspects of our political, social and national life. Thus for me teaching about this event and what happened on this “hallowed ground” matters for more than the fact that it is interesting history and a fascinating battle.

As someone who has served in the military for most of my life, coming up on 33 years I feel like Joshua Chamberlain, the hero of Little Round Top that “The power of noble deeds is to be preserved and passed on to the future.” I do this in what I teach and what I write, both in the academic setting as well as on this website.

We live in a time of great cynicism, some of which I can understand. We also live in a time where many people and our institutions operate in a “zero defect” culture, those who fail in any way are shunted aside, punished or even chastised or ostracized. However, when I look at the men who fought at Gettysburg, or for that matter almost any individual who has accomplished great things, very few are perfect people.

Many great leaders, or other men and women that we consider today to be great, influential or important were quite fallible. They made many mistakes and even had great flaws in their character, some even did things in their lives that were not good and in some cases scandalous. Such deeds may tarnish them or take some of the luster away from their accomplishments. But I think that from a historical as well as pastoral point of view that these flaws are often as important as their successes. They demonstrate the amazing capacity of imperfect humanity to accomplish great things, as well as the incredible complexity of who we are as people. No one is perfect. There are degrees of goodness and even evil in all of us. It is part of the human condition. Thus the personal failures of those men and women should not detract from their great accomplishments.

When I look at the perfection that imperfect people expect of others I am reminded of something that William Tecumseh Sherman said about his relationship with Ulysses Grant. The fact is that neither man who were in large part responsible for the Union victory in the Civil War would never reach the level of command that they rose to in our current military culture, nor would they rise to the top in corporate America. Sherman said: “Grant stood by me when I was crazy, and I stood by him when he was drunk, and now we stand by each other.”

That s one of the enduring facts of being human and being in relationship with others. Neither Grant or Sherman were at Gettysburg, they were at Vicksburg preparing to receive the surrender of that city as the Battle of Gettysburg ended. However, what Sherman said is true and needs to be more a part of our lives today.

That being said, even less tan perfect people can rise to do great deeds, deeds that need to be remembered, passed down and told to succeeding generations. That is a part of my passion about Gettysburg and my appreciation and admiration of the brave men who fought in that battle.

Have a great night.

Peace

Padre Steve+

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May 9, 2014 · 23:48

“The Unfinished Work” Another Teaching Weekend at Gettysburg

“In great deeds, something abides. On great fields, something stays. Forms change and pass; bodies disappear; but spirits linger, to consecrate ground for the vision-place of souls… generations that know us not and that we know not of, heart-drawn to see where and by whom great things were suffered and done for them, shall come to this deathless field, to ponder and dream; and lo! the shadow of a mighty presence shall wrap them in its bosom, and the power of the vision pass into their souls.” Joshua Chamberlain

Tonight I am getting ready for bed but still preparing for tomorrow and Sunday as I lead about 30 of our officer students and their family members on what is called a “Staff Ride” of the Gettysburg Battlefield.

This is the second time that I have led this trip since I have been assigned to this teaching position. Since I learned that I was going to take over the responsibility for the trip I have written produced a text of around 180 pages for my own work, a text that grows with each month. Many of the chapters of that text have been posted to the Gettysburg page on this site.

We drove up today and in the van I was in we were able to talk about aspects of the campaign as well as the Civil War connected to this battle. We also discussed the timeless aspects of leadership and dealing with the complexities of people and organizations. Unlike the last trip we had good weather for the trip up, although we may be dodging rain showers and thunderstorms tomorrow.

To me Gettysburg is indeed “hallowed ground.” That is why I led the article with the comments of Joshua Lawrence Chamberlain, the hero of Little Round Top. I feel that “mighty presence” that Chamberlain described every time I come here. I am drawn here by the actions of men who I never knew but through books and movies, but men who I feel a deep kinship, something spiritual, something deep, something that abides.

I know that as I lead the staff ride the next two days that I will see things that I never noticed before, and those things will inspire me to study more and write more. On my last trip I was drawn to the actions of Brigadier General George Sears “Pop” Greene at Culp’s Hill and Lieutenant Colonel Freeman McGilvery directing his artillery to stop the crushing Confederate assault at the Peach Orchard, the Wheat Field and Cemetery Ridge on day two of the battle and the sound preparations and expert leadership of Brigadier General Henry Hunt of the Federal artillery on day two and three.

I don’t know what will grab me tomorrow and Sunday, but I know that something will and of course you will hear about it here.

I am honored to teach, and in a sense to pass along a bit of what the men who fought here did to consecrate this ground and to give our nation a “new birth of freedom.” It is my part to continue to bring to fruition what Abraham Lincoln said in the Gettysburg Address:

“It is for us the living, rather, to be dedicated here to the unfinished work which they who fought here have thus far so nobly advanced. It is rather for us to be here dedicated to the great task remaining before us — that from these honored dead we take increased devotion to that cause for which they gave the last full measure of devotion — that we here highly resolve that these dead shall not have died in vain — that this nation, under God, shall have a new birth of freedom — and that government of the people, by the people, for the people, shall not perish from the earth.”

Peace

Padre Steve+

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April 29, 2014 · 12:19

“The Artillery…Must Concur as a Unit” -Henry Hunt and the Union Artillery at Pickett’s Charge

Major General Henry Hunt

“Fires are defined as the use of weapon systems to create specific lethal or nonlethal effects on a target. All fires are normally synchronized and integrated to achieve synergistic results.”Joint Publication 3-09 “Joint Fire Support”30 June 2010 p.I-1

Major General Henry Hunt the Chief of Union artillery was the admitted expert of all the artillerymen present at Gettysburg. Prior to the war he had taught artillery theory and tactics at West Point and written the Army’s artillery doctrine. However, he was no mere theoretician. He was an excellent battlefield leader who had a keen eye to assess the tactical situation and effectively employ his batteries. Hunt also understood the change in warfare brought about by small arms, particularly the rifled musket and that artillery had become a support weapon instead of an assault weapon, something that Lee had not yet fully appreciated as we have seen from his use of artillery.

The employment of fires is an important part of military art and to be effective it must be understood and used in concert with maneuver. As George Patton wrote in War as I Knew It “Battles are won by fire and by movement. The purpose of the movement is to get the fire in a more advantageous place to play on the enemy.” In contrast to Lee and his employment of artillery at Gettysburg which was ineffective in large part because he declined to use maneuver to his advantage, Meade, Hancock, Hunt and the various Union Corps commanders used their artillery to maximum effect taking advantage of their interior lines.

After Hooker’s disastrous experiment at Chancellorsville to decentralize the command and organization of the artillery Hunt was give a free hand to reorganize the artillery of the Army of the Potomac. The changes were sweeping. Batteries were removed from divisions and consolidated into brigades for each corps. Additionally Hunt created an Artillery Reserve of five Brigades totaling 21 batteries which could be employed to support the army at any given point and provided both him and the army commander a flexible and powerful source of firepower. “Hunt put his best veteran artillerymen in charge of these brigades, and their deployment was in the hands of Hunt and the corps commanders.”^{^[1]} At Gettysburg the changes would be of decisive importance.

Hunt had been very active on July 2^nd in working with Meade, Hancock and vital in ensuring that Sickles beleaguered command received batteries from the artillery reserve. He was not present at the council of war held that night but was informed of the decision to remain upon his return from his last inspection of his lines and supervision of artillery at Culp’s Hill. In his inspection of the Federal artillery positions he took charge and moved units as needed and coordinated his work with the brigade commanders of each corps ensuring that they understood their part in the next day’s action.

Unlike his Confederate counterpart William Pendleton, Hunt went into battle on July 3^rd with very definite ideas of how he was going to employ his artillery and developed a detailed plan of fire support. Hunt’s artillery regulations dictated that “in the attack…the artillery is employed to silence the batteries that protect the [enemy] position. In the defense it is better to direct its fire on the advancing troops.”^{^[2]}

One of his most critical decisions was in relation to the Artillery Reserve to address Meade’s concerns about an attack on the Union center. About 11 A.M. Hunt went to Cemetery Hill where he was able to gain a good view of Confederate preparations. He wrote that “Here a magnificent display greeted my eyes. Our whole front for two miles was covered by batteries in line or going into position…. Never before had such a sight been witnessed on this continent, and rarely if ever abroad…”^{^[3]}Hunt placed twenty batteries of his artillery reserve along Cemetery Ridge and “laid out a deadly latticework of crossfire lanes designed to scourge the fields in front of every living thing.”^{^[4]} Hunt was aided in his efforts by the commander of the Artillery Reserve Brigadier General Robert O. Tyler who was able to increase the number of guns available “through repairs and reconditioning.”^{^[5]}

As Hunt examined the situation before him he had to discern what the Confederate intentions were. He thought there was the possibility that Lee might use them to cover a move of infantry to support Ewell but he dismissed that as he did the possibility of Lee withdrawing his army. Despite the fact that he could not see the deployment of the Confederate infantry massing for the assault Hunt was convinced that the attack would hit the center. In light of his understanding of the how artillery should be employed in the defense he “grasped the essence of the situation-that the duty of the artillery was not to combat the opposing ones, but to reserve themselves to smash the infantry assault.”^{^[6]}

As such his guns, both of the artillery reserve as well as II Corps deployed on Cemetery Ridge was confronted with an artilleryman’s dream. “He was posted on the high ground…with clear fields of fire. He had 119 guns of high quality massed in battery, with plentiful reserves and sufficient ammunition. He was positioned to catch an infantry attack in a deadly crossfire. His brigade commanders were chosen by him and trained by him….”^{^[1]} This total included the guns on Cemetery Hill as well as Cemetery Ridge.

Hunt knew that any Confederate infantry assault on Cemetery Ridge would be preceded by an artillery bombardment and once he was sure that this was the Confederate intent Hunt “immediately set out to ride his lines once again”^{^[2]}and went to each of his artillery commanders and instructed them. Another insightful Union officer, Gouverneur Warren felt counter battery fire was “doing little good” and “from his observation post on Little Round Top, sent a message to Meade, suggesting that the Union batteries cease firing.” [3] The message was unnecessary as Hunt was working to ensure this but it showed that insightful officers on the Union side were not adverse to recommending changes in deployments or tactics to meet the conditions of the battlefield.

“I gave instructions to the batteries and to the chiefs of artillery not to fire at small bodies! nor to allow their fire to be drawn without promise of adequate results; to watch the enemy closely, and when he opened to concentrate the fire of their guns on one battery at a time until it was silenced; under all circumstances to fire deliberately, and to husband their ammunition as much as possible.” ^{^[4]}

Until the Confederate bombardment began at 1:07 P.M. Hunt continued to “check on the condition of his batteries” ^{^[5]} and was with Hazlett’s former battery of 10 pounder Parrotts on Little Round Top, now commanded by Rittenhouse. When the cannonade began reiterated his orders to Rittenhouse to ensure that he “would not tolerate any yielding to the usual artilleryman’s temptation to fire back and turn things into a useless artillery duel.” ^{^[6]}and then rode down to Freeman McGilvery’s guns on the south end of Cemetery Ridge.

In the process he observed the performance of his former students commanding the Confederate artillery. He was not impressed by their performance. At Appomattox Hunt, the consummate instructor recounted to Colonel Armistead Lindsey Long of Lee’s staff been his student:

“I was not satisfied with the conduct of this cannonade which I heard was under his direction, inasmuch as he had not done justice to his instruction; that his fire, instead of being concentrated on the point of attack, as it ought to have been, or as I expected it would be, was scattered, over the whole field.” ^{^[7]}

Though Long was not in charge of the Confederate barrage Hunt remembered that his former student’s was amused and replied “I remembered my lessons at the time, and when the fire became so scattered I wondered what you would think about it!” ^{^[8]}

As a Hunt moved back up the Union gun line he was pleased that his artillerymen were doing as he had told, except for guns of Hancock’s II Corps Artillery commanded by Captain John Hazard. Hancock, confused as to why his guns were not replying to the Confederate barrage berated his artillery Chief and ordered him to open fire. He believed that “the moral of an infantryman under an artillery barrage is best maintained by a heavy and vigorous counterbarrage by one’s own artillery.” [9] It was a classic clash between the points of view of an infantryman and an artillery expert.

Hancock seeing McGilvery’s guns silent rode to that officer to demand that he open fire. McGilvery refused as he was not under Hancock’s command which “brought a red-hot stream of language…profane and blasphemous such as a drunken Ruffian would use.” McGilvery was the wrong officer to attempt such a tactic. The former sea captain told Hancock straight up that “he was not under General Hancock’s orders, and….his orders would result in a most dangerous and irreplaceable waste of ammunition.” ^{^[10]}

During the barrage Hunt supervised the rotation of batteries off of Cemetery Ridge from the reserve and from the VI Corps artillery brigade. Hunt’s persistence paid off with fresh batteries ready for the Confederate infantry assault.

Many Confederates later assumed that their massive barrage had severely damaged the union batteries and caused significant casualties. There were some areas around Cemetery Hill that the early part of the cannonade had an effect, causing heavy damage to a few batteries. However the damage caused much less than the effort and ammunition expended. The Prussian observer to the Army of Northern Virginia referred to the barrage as a “Pulververschwendung” which can be translated as “a waste of powder.” ^{^[11]}

As Pickett’s men prepared to advance the essential batteries capable of the crossfire that would slaughter them were unaffected, and the morale of the Union infantry awaiting the assault still high. The infantry brigade at the center of the Confederate maelstrom commanded by brigadier General A. S. Webb only suffered about 50 casualties. The Union counter battery fire caused about 350 casualties among the waiting Confederate infantry, especially among Kemper’s brigade of Pickett’s division. ^{^[12]}

As Pickett’s, Pettigrew’s and Trimble’s divisions advanced across the mile separating Cemetery and Seminary Ridge the came under fire from the concentrated enfilade and cross fire from batteries of Osborne’s on Cemetery Hill, Rittenhouse on Little Round Top and McGilvery’s powerful brigade of 8 batteries poured a merciless fire into them. “The gun crews manned their pieces and directed them on the advancing gray line in-that most cold blooded of military phrases- “anti-personnel fire.” They were firing bursting shells, some solid shots, and much canister.” ^{^[13]}

The barrage from the well protected Union artillery was devastating. “The storm of hot metal shredded the attacking column, which suffered 50 percent casualties.” [14] Fifty percent is a good round number but the Confederate casualties were likely higher. Stewart whose micro-history of focuses solely on Pickett’s Charge in relation to the rest of the battle notes and who examined numerous sources, discounting many “official” reports as inaccurate believes that Pickett’s division suffered 67 percent casualties, Pettigrew 60 percent and Trimble 52 percent. [15]

McGilvery and Hunt had skillfully deployed his brigade behind a rise of high ground that shielded them from view of the Confederates. Pickett’s division was advancing oblique angle past McGivery’s brigade. McGilvery explained “the Rebel battle lines “presented an oblique front to the guns under my command, and by training the whole line of guns obliquely to the right, we had a raking fire through all three of these lines.” ^{^[16]}As a Florida regiment of Wilcox’s brigade which had come up in support of Pickett passed in front of McGilvery’s brigade an officer found “himself in a bewildering storm of “men falling all around me with brains blown out, arms off, and wounded in every direction.” ^{^[17]}One of McGilvery’s captains later testified “We had a splendid chance at them…and we made the most of it.” ^{^[18]}

It was almost all that Hunt had hoped for. ^{^[19]} But because Hancock had ordered his guns to fire throughout the Confederate cannonade Hazlett’s guns kept silence until the enemy was within canister range. Hunt believed that has his “instructions been followed here, as they were by McGilvery, I do not believe that Pickett’s division would have reached our line. We lost not only the fire of one third of our guns, but the resulting cross fire, which would have doubled its value.” ^{^[20]}

A few hundred Confederates led by Brigadier General Lewis Armistead survived the blistering fire and broke into the Federal lines at the angle. The subsequent minutes of fierce hand to hand fighting caused heavy casualties in the artillery batteries posted there from Hazlett’s brigade. Hunt noted that of the five II Corps battery commanders there that four were killed or mortally wounded a fifth severely wounded and that four batteries had to be combined in order to form two complete batteries after the battle. ^{^[21]}

Fresh batteries arrived and opened fired even as masses of Confederates attempted to surrender. One rebel soldier approached Captain Gulian Weir of Battery C, 5th United States Light Artillery out of the maelstrom and asked “Where can I go to get out of this Hellish fire?” ^{^[22]}But the attack was spent and Pickett’s charge was history, soon “Confederates on both sides of the wall three down their arms and were taken prisoners of war. All those who could do so streamed back to their own lines” ^{^[23]}

The devastation that Hunt’s well planned artillery defense and it’s execution by most of his commanders sealed the doom of the Robert E Lee’s plan to break the Army of the Potomac. Like Malvern Hill, Fredericksburg and Cold Harbor it showed that “a frontal assault on an unshaken enemy led to a costly failure.” [24] Hunt’s command of the artillery was an excellent example of mission command applied to fires and the value of well executed planning of fires in the defense.

^{^[1]} Sears, Stephen W. Gettysburg Houghton Mifflin Co. Boston and New York 2003 p.376

^{^[2]} Ibid

[3] Jordan, David M. Happiness is Not My Companion: The Life of G.K. Warren Indiana University Press, Bloomington Indiana 2001 p.97

^{^[4]} Hunt Henry Report of Brigadier General Henry Hunt, USA, chief of Artillery, Army of the Potomac in Guide to the Battle of Gettysburg edited by Luvaas, Jay and Nelson, Harold W. University Press of Kansas, Lawrence Kansas 1994 p.175

^{^[5]} Coddington, Edwin B. The Gettysburg Campaign, A Study in Command A Touchstone Book, Simon and Schuster New York 1968 p.496

^{^[6]} Guelzo, Allen C. Gettysburg: The Last Invasion Vintage Books a Division of Random House, New York 2013 p.402

^{^[7]} Ibid. Hunt, The Third Day at Gettysburg p.386

^{^[8]} Ibid.

[9] Jordan, David M. Winfield Scott Hancock: A Soldier’s LifeIndian University Press, Bloomington and Indianapolis 1988 p.96

^{^[10]} Ibid. Guelzo p.404

^{^[11]} Ibid. Stewart p.160

^{^[12]} Ibid. pp.160-161

^{^[13]} Downey, Clifford Lee and his Men at Gettysburg: The Death of a Nation Skyhorse Publishing New York 1958 p.309

[14] Millet, Allan R. and Maslowski, Peter, For the Common Defense: A Military History of the United StatesThe Free Press a Division of Macmillan Inc. New York, 1984 p.206

[15] Ibid. Stewart p.263

^{^[16]} Ibid. Sears p.425

^{^[17]} Ibid. Guelzo p.415

^{^[18]} Ibid. Foote p.555

^{^[19]} Ibid. Sears p.424

^{^[20]} Ibid, Hunt The Third Day at Gettysburg p.387

^{^[21]} Ibid.

^{^[22]} Ibid. Trudeau p.510

^{^[23]} Ibid. Coddington p.519

[24] Fuller, J.F.C. The Conduct of War 1789-1961 Da Capo Press New York 1992, originally published by Rutgers University Press, Brunswick NJ 1961 p.104

^{^[1]} Sears, Stephen W. Gettysburg. Houghton Mifflin Co. Boston and New York 2003 p.32

^{^[2]} Foote, Shelby, The Civil War, A Narrative. Volume Two Fredericksburg to Meridian Random House, New York 1963 p.545

^{^[3]} Hunt, Henry The Third Day at Gettysburg in Battles and Leaders of the Civil War edited by Bradford, Neil Meridian Press, New York 1989 p.385

^{^[4]} Trudeau, Noah Andre. Gettysburg: A Testing of Courage, Harper Collins Publishers, New York 2002 p.486

^{^[5]} Ibid. Sears p.375

^{^[6]} Stewart, George R. Pickett’s Charge: A Micro-History of the Final Attack at Gettysburg, July 3^rd 1863 Houghton Mifflin Company Boston 1959 p.131

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Filed under civil war, History, leadership, Military

Tagged as artillery at gettysburg, battle of gettysburg, freeman mcgilvery, gouverneur warren, henry hunt, james longstreet, pickett's charge, porter alexander, robert e lee, william pendleton, winfield scott hancock

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